House subcommittee presses Pentagon on surge of unauthorized drones over U.S. bases

The House Oversight and Reform subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs heard testimony Friday on unauthorized unmanned aerial systems (UAS) over U.S. military installations and the Defense Department’s efforts to detect and counter them.

Chairman Timmons opened the hearing by summarizing publicly reported data and incidents that have focused the committee’s attention, saying the Department of Defense estimated more than 1,000,000 drones are registered in the United States and that “more than 8,500 drones [are] flown legally across the country every day.” He said recent incursions ‘‘revealed a coordinated effort by our adversaries to collect valuable intelligence and surveillance of some of our most sensitive military equipment.’’

The hearing brought two Pentagon witnesses: Rear Admiral Paul Spadaro, vice director for operations (J‑3), Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Mark Detliffson, acting assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and hemispheric affairs. The Federal Aviation Administration did not testify in person but agreed to answer members’ written questions.

Why it matters: Committee members and witnesses said unauthorized UAS activity can disrupt training, expose force posture and sensitive equipment, and create safety risks for nearby communities. Ranking Member Subramaniam and other members pointed to dozens of incidents last year — including what witnesses and several members called prolonged incursions at Joint Base Langley‑Eustis in December 2023 — as evidence the nation’s bases remain vulnerable.

What witnesses said: Rear Admiral Spadaro said the emergence and proliferation of unmanned systems ‘‘has fundamentally changed’’ modern conflict and cited examples from overseas and at home. ‘‘You can’t defeat what you can’t see,’’ he told the panel, stressing the need for better domain awareness sensors and fused data to provide commanders with a common operating picture.

Mr. Detliffson told the committee the department has reviewed earlier responses and is pursuing work on three lines of effort: internal process reviews, improved domain awareness, and clarifying commanders’ authorities and legislation. ‘‘We act. We review that action. We adjust and we move out,’’ he said, describing changes since the Langley events and noting that U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Indo‑Pacific Command were designated as operational synchronizers for counter‑UAS in their areas.

Gaps identified: Members pressed witnesses on several recurring shortcomings: - Monitoring: Capabilities to detect and track UAS vary by installation. Spadaro said capability is ‘‘not comprehensive’’ and ranges from “very little to somewhat more comprehensive” across bases; he said many installations lack sufficient domain‑awareness sensors and that flyaway sensor kits are being fielded to address shortfalls. - Authorities: Members repeatedly raised confusion about the legal authorities available to base commanders. The witnesses said commanders retain authority under the standing rules of engagement and rules for use of force when hostile intent or a hostile act can be established, but establishing that standard in the homeland can be difficult. The department is working with Congress on statutory refinements to section 130i to expand covered locations and clarify authorities. - Interagency coordination and data sharing: Witnesses and members cited fragmented roles among DOD, the FAA, DHS and the Justice Department, and said data‑sharing rules currently limit how the department shares information for tactics and technology development. Detliffson said the department’s legislative proposal would seek to facilitate data sharing and avoid a statutory sunset on section 130i.

Numbers and incidents cited: Members and witnesses discussed several specific figures and events during the hearing. Representative Luna and others cited testimony from U.S. Northern Command that there were about 350 drone detections at roughly 100 installations during the previous year. Committee members and witnesses also referenced the December 2023 incursions at Joint Base Langley‑Eustis that continued for 17 days, and a January 27, 2024, overseas attack in Jordan that the admiral said killed three U.S. service members and wounded 40.

Technology and procurement: Witnesses described active efforts to acquire sensors and counter‑UAS systems through venues such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell and other Department of Defense acquisition offices. Spadaro said defending against UAS will require layered sensors and a fused command‑and‑control picture; he described ‘‘flyaway kits’’ being positioned to help installations with limited detection capabilities. Committee members asked whether more funding should be directed to counter‑UAS tools and whether current procurement levels match the scale of the threat.

Policy proposals raised: Multiple members urged either statutory changes or policy clarifications to reduce ‘‘paralysis by analysis’’ and make it clearer when commanders may take non‑kinetic or kinetic action. Representative Maguire and others proposed changing statutory language so that remote control aircraft (drones) are treated differently from manned aircraft for engagement authorities; witnesses said they are engaging with Congress on limited, targeted refinements to section 130i, on extending its authorities and on expanding the set of covered locations and missions.

Community and safety concerns: Several members and witnesses emphasized that kinetic engagement options carry risk for nearby civilians and commercial aviation. Detliffson noted that engagement decisions require collateral‑damage assessments and that non‑kinetic options such as jamming, takeover and other mitigations must be part of the toolset.

Follow‑up and next steps: Committee members requested documents and additional briefings. Witnesses agreed to provide the recently published standard operating procedure issued by U.S. Northern Command and to coordinate with the committee on legislative language. The FAA committed to answering submitted questions in writing. Witnesses also noted that some details and complete detection counts would be provided in a classified setting.

The hearing ended with members from both parties expressing interest in drafting legislative fixes and moving more authorities, funding and interagency coordination to address what members called a rapidly evolving and serious national security challenge.