[{"_1":2,"_99":-5,"_100":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75,87],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},"mediaId",6385837,"mediaKeyId","2118901-eb9233946e0ce8f12890eea0546e345e","parentId",2118901,"title","Texas Supreme Court Hears SMU Challenge Over Church’s Role in University Governance","audioSeconds",2734,"startMs",396000,"endMs",3130000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=2118901-eb9233946e0ce8f12890eea0546e345e&start=396&end=3130","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2118901-eb9233946e0ce8f12890eea0546e345e/thumbnail_396000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6385837/Texas/Texas-Supreme-Court-Hears-SMU-Challenge-Over-Churchs-Role-in-University-Governance","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6385837-cd43b7958a2d94194b021d18aa24fbf7/orig.mp4?Expires=1771194443&Signature=MqwbBlV~d-EnyarleCVpWV42sJ~MjFoNUOIZTvMMT-uaiXMXKdCinAn8bDamRstG05XYy5XY5fRtKY1pbWHU9K46H6mL689wU61YWNaPGBaWQ7pGuni2rau0yF1WXn~eHhYtWpk1AkpgWm2Y23QemckNBJT1LgvaxZYh0KdGlUSoKrFrN0OZZRLqH7nvDDJrskJcKfKUEhUM-dvWK3k~PDd6JBVvP-8ogMhc2--TDKwZlR-5RQUdR~W8EDvxlvZfBdFXU5Mk~ookSqpsNCLvGiRD27m6NHk889qVN7HaKroRMEVflOJ5Plg-w6ow8XVZGC84SAhktEY17cIIyig0Vw__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","","date","2025-01-16T10:29:47.277Z","article","The Supreme Court of Texas heard argument in Southern Methodist University v. South Central Jurisdictional Conference of the United Methodist Church, No. 230703, over whether the conference has statutory authority to challenge SMU’s 2019 amendments to its articles of incorporation and whether ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine removes the courts’ jurisdiction.

Petitioners’ counsel, A. Ho, told the court that the question is governed by neutral principles of law and Texas nonprofit law, not church doctrine. Ho argued that SMU is a nonmember nonprofit corporation and therefore cannot be \"owned\" by the conference under Texas law; she said the board updated the articles in 2019 to conform to Texas law and that section 22.002 of the Texas Nonprofit Organization Act limits who may bring ultra vires-type claims. \"If any rule of corporate law is firmly established, it’s that third parties can’t bring vexatious litigation, second‑guessing board of trustees’ exercise of their sound business judgment,\" Ho said during argument.

Respondent counsel Sonny McIntyre said the dispute is a hybrid one that implicates church autonomy and the conference’s long‑standing governance role over SMU. He told the court the conference seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under what it contends are the university’s own founding documents and cited other provisions the conference reads as preserving control. \"The church must prevail here; otherwise we are interfering with an ecclesiastical aspect of its mission,\" McIntyre said. He asked the court to recognize the conference’s asserted rights under statutes cited in briefing and to allow relief including a declaratory judgment and remedies for an allegedly false certificate filed with the secretary of state.

Justices questioned both sides about the interplay of Masterson and other precedents the court has used to apply neutral principles of law in church‑related disputes. Petitioners emphasized Masterson and related decisions as support for resolving corporate‑governance disputes without wading into religious doctrine. Respondents asked the court to consider whether statutes the parties cited (as discussed at argument) supply authorization to sue, and whether the articles from 1996 that state SMU was to be \"owned, maintained, and controlled\" by the conference retain legal effect.

No ruling was made from the bench; the case was taken under submission after argument and the court recessed.

The argument focused on two threshold issues: (1) subject‑matter jurisdiction/abstention (whether ecclesiastical doctrine requires dismissal), and (2) statutory authorization/standing under the Texas nonprofit statutes as framed by the parties’ briefs and oral argument. The parties and the justices discussed whether the claimed remedy (breach of contract, declaration, or a claim under the ultra vires/section‑based framework) is properly characterized so that section 22.002 (as raised by petitioners) either forecloses or allows relief. No final decision was announced at argument.

","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Supreme Court of Texas - Oral Arguments (1.15.2025)","oneSentenceSummary","The Supreme Court of Texas heard argument in Southern Methodist University v. South Central Jurisdictional Conference of the United Methodist Church over whether the conference may challenge SMU’s 2019 amendments to its articles of incorporation and whether courts must abstain under ecclesiastical‑abstention doctrine.","taxTitle","Supreme Court of Texas, Judicial, Texas","taxId",66295,"location","Texas","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6385824,"Dallas Ordinance Dispute: Justices Hear Argument Over Permit Error and Equitable Estoppel",2676,7500000,10176000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2118901-eb9233946e0ce8f12890eea0546e345e&start=7500&end=10176","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2118901-eb9233946e0ce8f12890eea0546e345e/thumbnail_7500000.jpg","/articles/6385824/Texas/Dallas-Ordinance-Dispute-Justices-Hear-Argument-Over-Permit-Error-and-Equitable-Estoppel","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6385824-fc9096d97692b77f06f2a4b4a2f72713/orig.mp4?Expires=1771194443&Signature=crB6-mQye-CDwyX6~7KhZmnFJnNDKCPkr7Tp8-LQ81wo3TFvn1Cra9sIeV3NHdmKOfkvXq7kdA0Yba5Nm03g1fyk68urRBFMNfvE2vwIsfp7tmwL9aqS-YA8BS~vBUOZ689d2AgfNjZQDhlyDPBRLQgRFI0nB3azLp2nMpodlj4~sNNo-sfjUbjPT~CQflKyyn8pcX6f7gbDmPN2N6Axf4gD0h6RHlvSaLaHyvgidvjJbWghCmvNkN4Ohhifcvxm1yrovNrYKRpi05cQtZooUtFglMltBdHM3Sd~YYIQDDkVNURpVFSM5eBllnYUP4GK25vLGcNIrPfcUdPIegDsLQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The Supreme Court of Texas heard oral argument in PDT Holdings v. City of Dallas, No. 230842, a dispute arising after PDT Holdings built a multi‑unit townhouse that Dallas later said violated the city’s Residential Proximity Slope (RPS) rules. The trial court applied equitable estoppel and enjoined the city from enforcing the RPS requirement against the completed structure; the City of Dallas appealed.

Petitioners’ counsel (identified in the record as Mr. Bridal) described a seven‑month sequence of communications and inspections between PDT and Dallas staff, starting with pre‑purchase inquiries and culminating in issued permits and inspections. Counsel said city staff repeatedly reviewed plans and issued permits (including an initial approval and a later reapproval after an inspector raised a height issue), that construction reached near completion, and that the city then raised an RPS objection so late that the building remained physically complete and unoccupied. Counsel argued the facts make an \"exceptional\" case under this court’s precedents (Superwash and related authorities) that warrants estoppel against the government to prevent a manifest injustice: demolition of a completed structure and the loss of substantial investments.

City counsel (Mr. Palmer) replied that the record does not support the trial court’s application of estoppel because the petitioners failed to prove the predicate elements the court has required before estopping a government entity. Dallas’s counsel argued (1) the evidence showed oversight or negligence rather than deliberate inducement or affirmative misrepresentation by the city, (2) the city received no material benefit from the actions at issue, and (3) applying estoppel where a municipal function is at stake would interfere with the city’s ability to enforce land‑use laws for the benefit of neighbors. Counsel noted the court’s guidance in Superwash and API and argued those decisions limit estoppel against governmental entities.

Witness Philip Thompson testified at trial that his company had relied on the city’s representations and inspections and that the building sits vacant because the city refuses to issue a certificate of occupancy absent compliance with RPS. Counsel and justices discussed alternative remedies the petitioner pursued (requests for variances and board of adjustments proceedings) and why the trial court nonetheless granted equitable relief.

The court took the case under submission after argument; no decision was announced from the bench.

","The court considered whether equitable estoppel can bar the City of Dallas from enforcing a residential‑proximity slope (RPS) ordinance against a completed, permitted townhouse project, a dispute that raises when courts may apply estoppel against government actors.",{"_33":88,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":89,"_41":90,"_43":91,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6385831,"Justices Weigh Challenge to College Station’s Extraterritorial Regulation Under Texas Constitution",4377,2316000,6693000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2118901-eb9233946e0ce8f12890eea0546e345e&start=2316&end=6693","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2118901-eb9233946e0ce8f12890eea0546e345e/thumbnail_2316000.jpg","/articles/6385831/Texas/Justices-Weigh-Challenge-to-College-Stations-Extraterritorial-Regulation-Under-Texas-Constitution","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6385831-244b6f6ea3ace226842aa57857109a4c/orig.mp4?Expires=1771194443&Signature=AdDZHUstef0KM7w5~IYm~1a6jB6B9pZcP0rNDmwLVzPVims5A2PfG53DZZMy9J0T8puOAUcBTtgXWTCVJGmGwDN3pR29TL5cS84a~XAi2wTAK9uy2H7N0hBJeo1N9x-ZX3T3T76rL~UW57JUTquwH8bbZHtyDq02QWQ-EcU3VLzoVAjInqw9yRoQ6vP0MqnUAQdGvXN8MfZmzOEsct8miRAXTV9OjtZrf6OztUH4Gi859OueWhIE1MLw3MJQ5Lkr6ZSG-RCZwvSuKIg4tZPgZPYedSjBxz6swz765bZHmdVY-LWhGJVQObx5o1sC~bzsP~hrK9PJFfZo0KLSA-pfAg__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The Supreme Court of Texas heard oral argument in Shana Elliott and Lawrence Kalkke v. City of College Station, No. 230767, a challenge to municipal regulation of properties located in a city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ). Petitioners argue the city's exercise of regulatory power over nonresidents who cannot vote in municipal elections infringes Article I, Section 2 of the Texas Constitution (the republican‑form provision).

Petitioners’ counsel, Mr. Weldon, told the court that his clients \"want to do ordinary things for their property like put up yard signs or make modifications to their driveways, but they can’t do so without seeking permission from a city where they do not live.\" He argued municipal regulation absent a democratic check violates the republican‑form clause and likened the injury to being governed by officials in whom the property owners have no electoral recourse.

City counsel (Miss Killian and Mr. Hightower) urged multiple jurisdictional hurdles: ripeness, standing, mootness and the political‑question doctrine. They argued there is no live controversy because the city has not actually enforced ETJ regulations against petitioners and because Senate Bill 2038 (SB 2038), a recently enacted statute referenced during argument, provides a statutory process by which property owners may seek removal from a city's ETJ. The city counsel said those withdrawals (where granted) can render the constitutional question moot and that the court below properly considered the political‑question doctrine.

Justices pressed both sides on two recurring issues: whether SB 2038 changes the standing analysis or moots claims if petitioners instead use the statutory withdrawal mechanism; and whether the republican‑form clause is a nonjusticiable political question. Counsel for petitioners said SB 2038 does not cure their injury where petitioners still must seek permission from a city in which they cannot vote and noted the record showed multiple denials by College Station of withdrawal petitions (counsel said the city had denied 10 separate applications). City counsel replied that application and judicial review of SB 2038 is pending in other courts and that the statute remains in effect until and unless a court invalidates it.

No decision was announced from the bench; the justices took the case under submission after argument.

","The court considered whether homeowners who live outside College Station but inside its extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) may be regulated by the city without a democratic check and whether those plaintiffs have standing or face other jurisdictional obstacles; argument also addressed the new SB 2038 withdrawal process.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Texas Supreme Court Hears SMU Challenge Over Church’s Role in University Governance

Dallas Ordinance Dispute: Justices Hear Argument Over Permit Error and Equitable Estoppel

Justices Weigh Challenge to College Station’s Extraterritorial Regulation Under Texas Constitution