[{"_1":2,"_123":-5,"_124":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75,87,99,111],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},"mediaId",6352080,"mediaKeyId","2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1","parentId",2225774,"title","Appeals court hears child-support and attorney-fee dispute after family-court trial","audioSeconds",1850,"startMs",9698000,"endMs",11548000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1&start=9698&end=11548","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1/thumbnail_9698000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6352080/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-hears-child-support-and-attorney-fee-dispute-after-family-court-trial","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6352080-8575555758b0ffa9d55a6c386aae4aa3/orig.mp4?Expires=1773661125&Signature=iBaRxci2Ksn4TjDAZoGuDTxq1HXW4SrOHJKMsnO8uPh2u0O5nQhBrqIxGo6N15QCDIIIw6CT3Nu4XDTAlI68RyEDwCAmFxQK9r7AZuTVPDtR~jlXaYHYsYJI07LWx2TXEcruyv6rFFW46KX~bJCOPyOQcfBgd6QQ1JtIiSBEUXr35dupT0iRQR-7LAjBId9TDNc1E4vZMfImJhf5x-xm4XaCLqmBayIDdTHZWd6xl~vz-Yv4vA3qcrYUhcUHziMMoh8I7T7AujVdz-ufIyoWswx29gLvmLp-To9UmaAMO4NMpNctQvucEIGUNN52llr6vA9aBY9wNlwG21J4rBvUAg__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","","date","2025-02-05T17:55:20Z","article","The Appeals Court heard argument in Loyosa v. Fabio (docket 24P0682), an appeal addressing a family-court child-support calculation and a post-trial award of attorney's fees.

Alan Loyosa, representing himself, argued that the trial judge used an incorrect attributed-income figure ($13.41 weekly) rather than the court's own finding of weekly earnings of $5.60 for a specific four-month period (December 2016'April 2017). Loyosa said that mistake materially inflated a child-support calculation for that interval and asked the court to vacate the $6,000 attorney-fee award entered against him.

Merrill Chin, counsel for the appellee, conceded the clerical error in the paragraph of the judgment and asked the court to affirm the attorney-fee award. Chin said the fee award was reasonable because Loyosa, proceeding pro se at the time, filed inaccurate financial statements, resisted stipulating to uncontested exhibits, and prolonged the trial'which ran four days instead of the one day he estimated'causing additional attorney time and expense.

The panel asked whether the error was a clerical/ministerial mistake (appropriate for remand or correction) or a substantive decision requiring findings, and whether the record supported the fee award under the statutory standard for attorney's-fee awards in domestic-relations cases. Loyosa argued his filings and mistakes were not obstructionist but the product of limited legal experience and lack of funds to hire counsel.

The court took the matter under advisement after argument. The transcript does not contain an appellate ruling.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Oral Arguments, February 5, 2025, Presiding: Desmond, Grant, Hodgens, JJ.","oneSentenceSummary","Appellant argued the trial court used the wrong attributed income figure when calculating child support for a four-month period and that a $6,000 attorney-fee award was unsupported; appellee said the error is clerical and fee award was warranted by obstructive conduct at trial.","taxTitle","Judicial - Appeals Court Oral Arguments, Judicial, Massachusetts","taxId",66294,"location","Massachusetts","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6352085,"Appeals court reviews dispute over retirement-account split and whether valuation date includes later gains or losses",1559,8077000,9636000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1&start=8077&end=9636","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1/thumbnail_8077000.jpg","/articles/6352085/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-reviews-dispute-over-retirement-account-split-and-whether-valuation-date-includes-later-gains-or-losses","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6352085-8aa35291612db38f36f2b665dc380cfd/orig.mp4?Expires=1773661125&Signature=n9ZkegsuPQSkSkExQUlY31oOwFXGJVrHNcRmgorKveJI5m308Y56GpK3EUaTfIS6CmdnXoz3172L3fVO2C6r6QREJnjYGzHNdQ4n9Hto8md7N8tgXRBqD2uFBRb~ZEd3BhCP6PXmlgtRNdkIGeXr~nCuVr4aMNDmlkTnkIzZf185cUJd4sKwbVFcrhkUi4w~cbLztcIqXqYbHEUxUJNby8-yOC0XrLBN9T36PSEKzF1qJmMOr0VUNlr7wRR7QEKfkZJqjUl7jW8aCSfzhwS7wbHa16FXuUs7nJXA8x4z9GkuLZ5poOawz4DjDqWZCFJRAurpElsyJVkFwyvwB6rmrA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The Appeals Court heard argument in an appeal over the interpretation of divorce terms in Guy Musto v. Carolyn Musto (docket 23P1418). The parties disagree about whether the trial judge's 50 percent division of certain retirement accounts \"as of Nov. 25, 2020\" fixed a dollar amount on that date or instead established a percentage that remains subject to market fluctuations until the accounts are segregated.

India Mintroff, arguing for Carolyn Musto, said the judgment's silence about post-valuation gains or losses created ambiguity or, at minimum, an inequitable result that would shift post-valuation appreciation on the wife's separate property to the husband. Mintroff argued that usual family-court practice and out-of-jurisdiction authority favor assigning gains and losses to each party's separate share until segregation.

Scott D'Amelio, representing Guy Musto, responded that the record before the Appeals Court is limited to the trial judge's denial of a clarification motion and that the wife failed to timely pursue relief after earlier motions (including a Rule 60B motion) and an appeal that was dismissed for failure to prosecute. D'Amelio said the judge's judgment, read as a whole, establishes the formula the court intended and that the court did not abuse discretion in denying clarification.

The panel asked whether procedural bars (failure to prosecute an earlier appeal, and the proper vehicle for clarification) foreclosed the current challenge. Counsel debated the scope of Rule 60 motions, earlier SJC decisions (cited in argument as Connor v. Bennett, Catalano, DeLuca, Littles) and whether the trial judge's later, oral remarks altered the written judgment.

The oral argument concluded and the matter was submitted to the panel; the transcript contains no disposition.","A divorce appeal turned on whether a judgment that awarded 50% of retirement accounts \"as of 11/25/2020\" meant a fixed share measured that day or a percentage that carries subsequent gains and losses until segregation; the record includes a denied motion for clarification in the trial court.",{"_33":88,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":89,"_41":90,"_43":91,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6352089,"Appeals court hears drug-possession appeal with disputed constructive-possession and prosecutorial-misconduct claims",1551,4554000,6105000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1&start=4554&end=6105","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1/thumbnail_4554000.jpg","/articles/6352089/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-hears-drug-possession-appeal-with-disputed-constructive-possession-and-prosecutorial-misconduct-claims","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6352089-44ad842464c717098c31caa47e6dd724/orig.mp4?Expires=1773661125&Signature=C0uNLP5RI9R8KF41UVORopxmE6QLy-0a6rfe5dIVD1IY-gsdxqpgaXxjw4mvNq177JYWFG780UJdsk8JQNGQSsmdabiHjx1SPQu9og8C3gw~hXAIXXrE63oGQuo4KELlhYB6RUng-qFLT-ewZDAptd~vmmcwK3W0eFcV4U5sNlh6YHNZvy8HiZT6rEVbX-K~6gErXaqzklmeT45NhONpSeTyYLdsaa5eHWKzB2qzfqPIHlzSyXprTALv3VFpYkzUfzEc9CL8OnM2fEtwsJVzhsYfDXTmw3Vu2XeOQOJbovH55iZBM9BwjPqO4-z~wAl4Xy7XVCXkg2yHp7jH3kM8zA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The panel heard argument in Commonwealth v. Ahmed Shabazz (docket 23P1417), an appeal raising sufficiency-of-the-evidence and prosecutorial-misconduct claims stemming from a multi-defendant search and drug seizure.

Jean Liddy, arguing for Shabazz, said the evidence in the east bedroom'where officers found a scale, a price ledger and drug residue'did not support constructive possession beyond mere presence because multiple people used the house and some contraband was found on a severed co-defendant. Liddy challenged the prosecutor's opening and closing rhetoric, saying repeated references to an absent co-defendant (Marcus Johnson) and themes about a \"trap house\" unfairly prejudiced the jury.

Sarah Swan, for the Commonwealth, said the verdicts reflect a careful, limited jury decision and that the judge repeatedly instructed the jury not to attribute evidence found on a severed co-defendant to the defendants on trial. Swan pointed to documentary and testimonial indicia of constructive possession: the defendant was observed leaving the room where the items were found, price sheets and a scale were located there, and a substitute chemist and other witnesses connected the substances to cocaine.

The panel probed whether the prosecutor's repeated references to the severed co-defendant were prejudicial when the judge had given limiting instructions, whether the drug certificate evidence was properly preserved, and whether the lack of a joint-venture instruction (as argued by defense counsel) undermined the constructive-possession finding. The Commonwealth noted the jury convicted on one count of possession with intent and acquitted on five other counts, and argued that the mixed verdict shows discernment rather than undue prejudice.

The court took the case under advisement; the transcript shows the argument concluded and the matter was submitted with no opinion recorded in the hearing transcript.","Defense argued the evidence and trial conduct were insufficient or prejudicial to support convictions for possession with intent; the Commonwealth said the record supports constructive possession and the jury verdicts.",{"_33":100,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":101,"_41":102,"_43":103,"_45":104,"_47":105,"_49":106,"_51":107,"_53":108,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":109,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":110,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6352093,"Appeals court weighs whether police questioning of 17-year-old required Miranda and an interested adult",1791,1680000,3471000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1&start=1680&end=3471","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1/thumbnail_1680000.jpg","/articles/6352093/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-weighs-whether-police-questioning-of-17-year-old-required-Miranda-and-an-interested-adult","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6352093-0aff035cdbc016d32106b6b21001ae3d/orig.mp4?Expires=1773661125&Signature=jdYOivopCKOh3RXmei91ozeLRpH0ag3GoHg-SgH3PGx50WZlJECypNPlfSqdJC5tMzgoJdeyoVr36iqjo34Q6DCZvE~IPNjesjqWm1ASQx-LkFvkraEQhYtjHbqQ0dnzQYt4v3J5WfM~g37sE1M7~QcKIHZwHaDY3HBCaAQIPpPpGyFkE5sItnkspcBmrHV3XWbc-3iNtDL0qEisZD2drofwTUXsAtYFtWPmH~Nb8FwBrY2W1BJaQFoBdjNmMkG2qRzi~m3JtklqQxH5vWWNBTM8Vo6TQj4Qc7F6IukgBOvBywXA9jhmA3DUuCwAk6WPAXEaUeH0ZiG~CyGbG6G36A__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard argument in an appeal of a suppression ruling in Commonwealth v. Juvenile (docket 23P1458), focused on whether police violated Miranda and related protections for a 17-year-old who was questioned after a shooting.

Michelle Minkin, representing the juvenile, told the panel that both recorded interviews should be suppressed because the first was a custodial interrogation conducted without an interested adult or Miranda warnings and the second interview'despite a Miranda form and the mother's presence'was not sufficiently attenuated from the first.

Minkin described the scene: a nighttime shooting in which the juvenile'who had called 911'had a friend in the driver's seat shot in the head. She argued the police knew early that a gun had been in the car and that knowledge transformed questioning from \"humanitarian\" to custodial and investigative. She said the juvenile was 17, traumatized, taken by uniformed officers to the station, photographed and placed in repeated controlled interviews. Minkin argued that any incriminating statements in the second interview flowed from the first interview'a coercive environment lacking Miranda protections and an appropriate adult.

Assistant District Attorney Jacqueline Martinelli, arguing for the Commonwealth, urged the court to affirm the trial judge's denial of the suppression motion. Martinelli said the first interaction was noncustodial and investigatory in an emergency; the juvenile was a 911 caller and a possible victim eyewitness. The Commonwealth also argued the second interview included a knowingly executed Miranda waiver with the mother present and that an hour-plus break and the different subject matter of the second interview dissipated any taint.

The panel questioned counsel about the custody analysis for a juvenile in an emergency, whether police should delay initial identification questions until an adult arrives, and whether the silence and later answers constituted an implied waiver. Counsel debated case law on interrogation, the functional equivalent test and the standard for attenuation after a break.

The oral argument concluded with the court noting the matter was submitted to the panel. The transcript records that the motion judge had denied suppression; the parties debated preservation and standards of appellate review during argument.","The court heard argument over whether two stationhouse interviews of a 17-year-old after a shooting were custodial and whether the second interview was tainted by the first; parties disputed waiver and the presence of an interested adult.",{"_33":112,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":113,"_41":114,"_43":115,"_45":116,"_47":117,"_49":118,"_51":119,"_53":120,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":121,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":122,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6352098,"Appeals court hears challenge to Massachusetts——OUI per-se 0.08 rule",1387,270000,1657000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1&start=270&end=1657","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2225774-0d8235fb82b3188833e3626749d115b1/thumbnail_270000.jpg","/articles/6352098/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-hears-challenge-to-MassachusettsOUI-per-se-008-rule","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6352098-042cb27199e67781a214a086232dc1fe/orig.mp4?Expires=1773661125&Signature=Y0ccIgX4funR0zbexzfX5wwdjQeV~BdtGzGu5qtbiaeNa8jcx1JV~V79nV28TM~NWzc4ouXTApJkXJrgvAlWlennUwVyLdPvrGUgFJ2IMy9CB3WK4Dxx0-lIffGGG0aeRLCa811K0~ndOlaoIvmyb39cpQ7~pAS8WcX38bxAc8Y-F1m~z3Tu1ieOB0MqId6eBd0KrCypL1eb4crqyNrq8aydluytpmHbb9SQ-o8QSsKoPD7uzkLe13h8lFugipF60UE9g5KDnvH04HT0XGa9Istpeq51GiS4JZ23DD2oyhaXdNF10kQj3GsY4-D~s8IK--1qKhSfXii~cZ9UpWnprg__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard oral argument in Commonwealth v. Saban Saqib (docket 24P0154) over whether the state's OUI statute and post-2003 amendments permit conviction based solely on a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent.

Scott Martin, counsel for the defendant, told the three-judge panel that the statute's per-se 0.08 theory effectively lowers the Commonwealth's burden of proof in criminal trials and should be treated as a civil regulatory limit rather than a separate criminal theory. \"We're not arguing that it cannot be regulated,\" Martin said, \"but it's more appropriately regulated as a civil regulatory scheme.\"

Catherine Jansen, arguing for the Commonwealth, said the Legislature reasonably set 0.08 as a threshold level and that Culturi and related precedent support the statute as written. Jansen told the court that the Legislature had access to expert testimony when it adopted the amendment and that the per-se reading is a rational policy to reduce the risk to public safety.

The defense urged that the amendment allows a \"second bite at the apple\" for prosecutors who fail to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt on the impairment theory, framing the 0.08 theory as one that can nullify a jury verdict. Martin argued that using 0.08 as a per-se criminal basis circumvents the jury's fact-finding role: \"To legislate that away, alleviates the prosecution of a necessary burden of establishing with real facts and real evidence at a trial.\"

The panel repeatedly asked whether the issue was one for the Legislature or the courts to decide, and whether existing Supreme Judicial Court precedent (discussed in argument as \"Hebb,\" \"Culturi,\" and related authorities) forecloses the defense's claim. The justices also queried the appropriate standard of appellate review for constitutional and preserved/unpreserved claims raised in the briefing.

The argument concluded with the court taking the matter under advisement; the clerk announced the case \"stands submitted.\" The transcript does not record a ruling.

If the Appeals Court were to endorse the defense view it could narrow the Commonwealth's ability to rely on per-se BAC evidence in OUI prosecutions; if it affirms existing precedent, the per-se theory will remain a separate pathway for criminal charges even when juries acquit on impairment.","Attorneys argued whether the 2003 statutory amendment that treats a 0.08 blood-alcohol reading as a separate theory of conviction under the OUI law undermines the prosecution's burden to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Appeals court hears child-support and attorney-fee dispute after family-court trial

Appeals court reviews dispute over retirement-account split and whether valuation date includes later gains or losses

Appeals court hears drug-possession appeal with disputed constructive-possession and prosecutorial-misconduct claims

Appeals court weighs whether police questioning of 17-year-old required Miranda and an interested adult

Appeals court hears challenge to Massachusetts——OUI per-se 0.08 rule