[{"_1":2,"_123":-5,"_124":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75,87,99,111],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},"mediaId",6301337,"mediaKeyId","2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746","parentId",2488666,"title","Appeals court weighs whether union’s town‑meeting warrant article bypassed mandatory bargaining","audioSeconds",2758,"startMs",1629000,"endMs",4387000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746&start=1629&end=4387","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746/thumbnail_1629000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6301337/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-weighs-whether-unions-townmeeting-warrant-article-bypassed-mandatory-bargaining","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6301337-15d886ec9c3daa593cebcde567968dc6/orig.mp4?Expires=1771178620&Signature=RSTczMTx1aFA0f9Yp0gvOnvn-WotS~XWwiCee1e-po4PmCudZeDM4TCK~U5d6BigJt2FeHmKrQdQeb~m1N6qLFSHjCKEjEZrI7ugqjdwAxzETCz4DlmQrvZRYvcbj5BnuXrvaxmf-mPqi8TGUxAfhYOOePENGcXMPCSELRnJhRdwTtUaNaqr3njscyK~8x-Grz-khSHppdEAPztEHRP-jwjYoDf0lMwQqZFz5gMRWJ335OlulGfm9f4UoCEsikKe5Md47tCvLIXTcuwtGY0H4l5ZAMiMl-SmCw9h37U1GSOoM4m5Y1zMRsSLV95C9gALRaH7F22t5aXkwZ07A~m2JA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","","date","2025-03-04T14:29:14Z","article","The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard argument in 24P0465, Andover School Committee v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (CERB), over whether a union’s route to town meeting for an appropriation article constituted bad‑faith bargaining under Chapter 150E and whether that conduct is constitutionally protected petition or political speech.

Ryan Quinn, counsel for the Andover Education Association, told the panel he sought a narrow statutory ground to resolve the case but argued the constitutional question would require strict scrutiny if Chapter 150E effectively restricts petitioning by a certified union. “This is a case of first impression with respect to the constitutional issue,” Quinn said, arguing that a town‑meeting appropriation is a different form of petition than bargaining and that Anderson v. Board of Selectmen of Wrentham left room for a narrower resolution.

Kathleen Good Burlet, representing the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board, asked the court to affirm CERB’s finding that the union bargained in bad faith by bypassing the school committee and introducing a warrant article at town meeting. She framed the statutory bargaining framework (Chapter 150E, sections cited during argument) as a structured process in which legislative bodies make appropriations and the school committee serves as the employer’s bargaining representative. Good Burlet told the panel the statute’s structure and CERB precedent support limiting direct dealing that would undermine labor peace and the exclusive‑representation regime.

John Foskett, representing the Andover schools, told the panel that certification as an exclusive bargaining agent carries statutory limits and that the state can prescribe the procedures a certified union must follow; Foskett said the union “give[s] up” some bargaining conduct by opting into exclusive representation.

Judges pressed the parties on whether the appropriate constitutional standard is strict scrutiny or the “exacting” standard from Janus and related cases and whether the union’s petition to town meeting can be treated as political speech or a bargaining substitute. Counsel also debated whether CERB’s factual finding of bad faith (in connection with a memorandum of agreement and an amendment) provided a ground on which the court could affirm without deciding the constitutional question.

Why it matters: The court’s decision could define the line between a union’s First Amendment petition rights and the statutory protection of exclusive representation and bargaining‑in‑good‑faith obligations, affecting school districts, municipal budgets, and union tactics across Massachusetts.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Oral Argument, March 4, 2025, Desmond, Ditkoff, Englander, JJ., presiding","oneSentenceSummary","The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard argument in 24P0465 about whether an education union’s town‑meeting warrant article bypassed the statutory bargaining process under Chapter 150E and whether that conduct is constitutionally protected.","taxTitle","Judicial - Appeals Court Oral Arguments, Judicial, Massachusetts","taxId",66294,"location","Massachusetts","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6301341,"Appeals court hears dispute over waiver and alternate‑employer immunity in Rosa workplace‑injury case",974,139000,1113000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746&start=139&end=1113","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746/thumbnail_139000.jpg","/articles/6301341/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-hears-dispute-over-waiver-and-alternateemployer-immunity-in-Rosa-workplaceinjury-case","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6301341-3495344ec5142015cbc2f3c19eddf83e/orig.mp4?Expires=1771178620&Signature=MAZERvr-uYfTy5F0EAxogr4YDFv5HoidtiyAcjAe82tR7EdrCcxR-o4Pu~K~nXAhxlT8mDogphJnbO2qidS0SG59-wUpCHAyLHMQ-qfqSsNs9qq-PoRP04~NWtOBA1R7Lvlitxt5aAbnyf24NLZYPVXuD5ObWuIUsZPCLjWhm7UpBbtrebHQ6Ubm20NSgEKu4yXxnxiMxxV~6XNdVF~KCafCJ6-ZOvolJSV4j1Krahd3FkY1T-YVl1PtB7kvVZtVnkuFJFxOEngQuiMH~Ku2TkT6AvXcbjRV8GJxUDRPMzuejS8goxLyyv0KE0kq6chgnD4IpdDFU6BOZURUHBK3Dw__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","A three‑judge panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court heard oral argument in 24P0540, Alexander Santiago Rosa v. Affordable Interior Systems, over whether an alternate‑employer endorsement in an insurance policy and a signed waiver bar a temporary employee’s tort suit after a workplace injury.

The dispute centers on whether the trial judge properly allowed summary judgment for the employer after discovery and whether two separate legal defenses—statutory exclusivity under the workers’ compensation scheme and a separate private waiver—both must be found to block the plaintiff’s negligence claim.

Attorney George Leahy, for Alexander Santiago Rosa, told the panel the case returns after an earlier procedural reversal and that the superior court later permitted additional discovery and allowed summary judgment based on deposition evidence. Leahy argued the waiver question matters for whether Rosa, a worker who “doesn’t read or write English,” adequately understood giving up tort rights. “How is somebody like Alexander Santiago Rosa, who doesn’t read or write English … possibly gonna understand that he’s giving up his right to the lawyer that represents him in the workers’ compensation case,” Leahy said.

Defense counsel Ethan Ryder for Affordable Interior Systems said the case aligns with Molina and the key question is whether the special employer qualifies as an insured alternate employer under the policy’s endorsement. Ryder told the panel that neither Molina nor Lang makes a valid waiver a requirement for the statutory immunity test and that the alternate‑employer endorsement named AIS as an insured, supporting dismissal of the common‑law negligence claim.

Panel members pressed both sides on granular points from Molina, Horner v. Boston Edison, and the Lang line of cases and queried whether courts should treat the statutory exclusivity defense and the contractual waiver as separate or merely alternative bases for the same result. Attorneys also discussed practical consequences for experience‑mod adjustments, possible Section 28 (serious and willful misconduct) arguments, and whether a failure to disclose the special employer endorsement to counsel below undercuts the waiver analysis. Ryder told the court the alternate‑employer endorsement was drafted to make the special employer “insured” for employer‑liability coverage and pointed to a lump‑sum settlement and lien figures in the record: the settlement approved in December 2021 was $189,365 and a lien reported at about $220,000 (of which counsel said roughly $19,000 was medical).

There was no decision from the panel at argument; counsel acknowledged time limits and submitted the case to the court.

Why it matters: The panel’s resolution will guide whether employers that function as a special employer under an insurance endorsement retain the immunity of the workers’ compensation system, and whether separate private waivers may operate independently to bar tort claims, affecting temp workers, staffing agencies, and insurers.","The Massachusetts Appeals Court panel heard argument in 24P0540 over whether an alternate‑employer endorsement and a worker’s signed waiver bar a temp worker’s tort claim after a workplace injury; attorneys debated the scope of Molina and whether the superior court’s summary‑judgment allowance is the only issue before this court.",{"_33":88,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":89,"_41":90,"_43":91,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6301323,"Appeals court hears libel in rem over oysters as attorneys debate ‘sustenance’ and commercial fishing",2926,8762000,11688000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746&start=8762&end=11688","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746/thumbnail_8762000.jpg","/articles/6301323/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-hears-libel-in-rem-over-oysters-as-attorneys-debate-sustenance-and-commercial-fishing","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6301323-7ec8475e490b9446bc86cc326228ea58/orig.mp4?Expires=1771178620&Signature=dBfRKY~NheSPVwOftmJ-N50-P6oUty~JSTGaOLYatg9V-SRQuCAnKtM9bR0T4gjhBb0qd1j1tGUqGMBiHC10AThRhUUFWf6XZfaeJoykLSdjq6~Ot3yoSAF4gRSnXWKeGzoA58FDHrGq-k8VYavYTs3gFv5ppGwlxhkT9eK1LMpYh22G7naBR7RC2Hy0kEVNV8KuzgSdcSTonnoq2at~Bzi5RBftRmKfW85UAZQHlXLz3NXhEwbyl1Nihz6nnfsnn8B8t9WdL4m1-6JzqdTb9aFbtGd~PcVZZmG8uCkKn5swp4rCuhYXOUZi4D8yOIS0hLMzWMMozqscARy1i9Ah9w__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The panel considered 24P0507, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Pockney, an in‑rem libel proceeding concerning oysters seized by environmental police, and debated whether the defendant’s asserted tribal/aboriginal “sustenance” rights or his conduct as a licensed commercial fisherman controlled the outcome.

Appellant counsel Jeffrey Loeb argued that the word “sustenance,” historically used in references to Aboriginal harvesting rights, should not be read narrowly and that the statutory and historical record supports recognition of subsistence activities beyond immediate personal consumption. Loeb asked the court to view the record facts about which oysters were kept for family use and which were sold through a dealer in that light.

The Commonwealth’s attorney (assistant AG counsel in argument) and the environmental police record show Sergeant Opie inspected a dealer (Big Rock Oyster), located baggedand‑tagged oysters with a harvester tag tied to Pockney’s DMF number, and proceeded with a libel in rem; the record reflects 1,600 oysters associated with a $480 check, and the libel named the oysters as the res. The Commonwealth argued that Pockney presented the oysters to a licensed dealer and the circumstances—bagging, tagging, and attempted dealer sale—bring the transaction into the commercial regulatory scheme rather than into a pure subsistence exemption.

Argument ranged over whether the district court correctly adjudicated the libel on the summary‑judgment record, whether the libel procedure required trial to resolve the defendant’s factual claim that he was harvesting for personal/aboriginal use rather than commercial sale, and whether the Commonwealth properly pursued the in‑rem forfeiture without pursuing further actions against the dealer who resold the product.

Why it matters: The appeals court’s treatment of the factual record and the legal meaning of any Aboriginal‑sustenance exemption could inform enforcement and permitting practices for coastal indigenous harvesters and dealers.

The panel took the matter under advisement after argument.","In 24P0507 the panel considered whether mussel/oyster forfeiture (a libel in rem) can be defended by asserted Aboriginal/sustenance rights and whether the facts show commercial activity; the record includes disputed facts about harvest location, dealer handling, and a $480 check tied to 1,600 oysters.",{"_33":100,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":101,"_41":102,"_43":103,"_45":104,"_47":105,"_49":106,"_51":107,"_53":108,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":109,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":110,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6301328,"Appeals court asked to overturn zoning board variance over stacked‑parking system and abutter standing",1976,6770000,8746000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746&start=6770&end=8746","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746/thumbnail_6770000.jpg","/articles/6301328/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-asked-to-overturn-zoning-board-variance-over-stackedparking-system-and-abutter-standing","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6301328-5b0e3e6dcc414eace5d004ac8ae65336/orig.mp4?Expires=1771178620&Signature=mZCvKuFU4U3vI8kPhWIigppeHoqiMF79cQgzgqK6bQl7EVIvMKo5Ax1iJggOCHz6S0rd31zd9hdu5uCsTqwzTAzZHUdpM4lQvzFKnyrJHr7NHDDgolOJf6HtaOPwOT~gwaEz-~tYX3DfSNFmxqRa8KKglRtEcEv2NApy2nfDfarRBKXPyeIEGX28r5Y2AEhobn9beVk6GFrScp25SAhxPnEKlHyUxn75cdGuACbZYrkGZ0xzw7RVMpCy5Y3NwUWQGC~-s-gs7wpV-M-gEdS94VEFy4gWW8eSXw7XsFdOyfRPSQdwyjH2~1YXkm~h~S3qwmi8~1Md0uTHsPYyNqUbvQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The appeals court heard argument in 24P0915, Joyce Michaelides (co‑trustee of the 3 Dana Ave Trust) v. HHC 1 Arnold LLC, over whether the plaintiff next‑door abutter has standing to challenge zoning variances granted for an automated, stacked‑parking system serving a substantially larger residential project.

Attorney Damon (Tony) Seligson, arguing for the appellant Joyce Michaelides, said the project increases density from an existing four‑unit configuration to 27 units and 36 bedrooms and that the variance to a stacked system will meaningfully affect on‑street parking and street operations. Seligson relied on affidavits from the property owner and tenants describing limited on‑street parking, rental discounts previously paid to tenants for MBTA lot parking, and the narrowness and one‑way nature of the street. “My client put in an affidavit,” Seligson told the panel, summarizing tenant statements that parking is already constrained and that the added residents and visitors will burden local curbspace.

Michael McDermott, counsel for HHC 1 Arnold and the developer, and the city’s traffic expert submitted a professional report and affidavit from traffic engineer Ian McKinnon. McDermott said the zoning‑code ratio for required spaces is satisfied and that the maneuverability relief relates to a technology that McKinnon described as commonly used, regularly maintained, and unlikely to have measurable effect on street operations. McKinnon’s affidavit estimates system arrivals during peak hours and forecasts vehicle service times; during argument McDermott cited the expert’s estimate that vehicle demand could be one vehicle every four to five minutes with a per‑operation service time of around 40 seconds.

Judges pressed counsel on whether expert traffic evidence was required to rebut the presumption of standing and whether the affidavits submitted by Michaelides were sufficiently particularized rather than generalized neighborhood complaints. The zoning board and city counsel argued that the record included objective expert evidence addressing maneuverability and street operations and that the presumption of standing had been rebutted.

Why it matters: The panel’s treatment of standing and the evidentiary threshold for traffic/parking impairment will affect how courts review variances for automated parking technologies and whether nearby property owners can mount successful challenges absent technical traffic proof.

Argument concluded and the matter was submitted to the court.","In 24P0915 an abutter challenged variances for an automated stacker parking system at 7 Dana Avenue, arguing the proposed 27‑unit project will worsen parking and street operations; developers and the zoning board countered that off‑street parking requirements are met and an expert rebutted claims of street impact.",{"_33":112,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":113,"_41":114,"_43":115,"_45":116,"_47":117,"_49":118,"_51":119,"_53":120,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":121,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":122,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6301333,"Appeals court reviews claims that friend‑broker acted as fiduciary and violated Chapter 93A in Wheaton property sale",950,4412000,5362000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746&start=4412&end=5362","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2488666-ffeed07c58f7c3bc4b2b31fbab4c4746/thumbnail_4412000.jpg","/articles/6301333/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-reviews-claims-that-friendbroker-acted-as-fiduciary-and-violated-Chapter-93A-in-Wheaton-property-sale","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6301333-3c101236e4c975ed0ef678a0c7170e44/orig.mp4?Expires=1771178620&Signature=M3pdlxjok-D~-YDaXA~l4HsrGIWgOuFEuzqJ1F77waLfUsN~o8w6Y27oTDPtD7ebGOGaRUn~IguPfWfoBcFKUZ5iTUwuAA1gRJNDF0vGbgzj2~hb82NY51stb8NYgrLSaXz2xH7HgsR2cCLPSJUlJgVDu4swGELj3EaaPq60zH7rokqazWMub~s8n-tP-KDU5~CpBpReSXwl7MevLJVaXZZQsIMx5cT99G4a4qC7lben45bn0z~OWFmMPPVRiRhsU9jRH7eFQlqv9WjNzMg~ppfwDUS6yYOr3oCIjh4YMrBdlvLbP-wuHrBK1u4vXZjb5wFL~NwiOjKTHCgNQBYO~w__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The Massachusetts Appeals Court heard argument in 24P0287, George H. Wheaton v. Anna Coletta et al., over two principal issues: whether the trial judge erred in finding that Coletta owed a fiduciary duty to Wheaton and whether the court correctly concluded Coletta engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.

Roger Peace, counsel for Anna Coletta, said Coletta was a friend of the family who helped facilitate introductions and document preparation and that she did not act as a licensed real‑estate broker on behalf of Mr. Wheaton. “This was a favor. This was family,” Peace told the panel and argued that paperwork associated with the sale was not the type of commercial broker engagement that creates fiduciary obligations.

Mark Dickerson, counsel for the conservator and the party defending the Wheaton interests, urged deference to the trial judge’s special‑verdict factual findings and said the record supported the judge’s conclusions. Dickerson pointed to evidence that Coletta prepared, transmitted, and participated in the purchase and sale documents, was present at the closing, and had regular contact with Wheaton and family members as support for the jury‑like verdict form that found a fiduciary duty and Chapter 93A violation.

Argument focused on several disputed facts in the record: whether Wheaton had requested a real‑estate agent, whether he was competent at relevant times (experts and medical evidence of cognitive decline were discussed), whether Coletta ever disclosed to Wheaton or his attorney that she had a personal relationship with the buyer, and whether a reasonable factfinder could infer a commercial agent relationship from her conduct. Counsel also debated the role of testimony from family members (including Margaret Wheaton) and documentary evidence such as offer forms and text messages that prosecutors’ counsel said showed Coletta procured buyers and coordinated the transaction.

Why it matters: The case tests how courts distinguish between a social‑favor introduction and a commercial brokerage relationship, and whether undisclosed relationships and transactional participation can create fiduciary obligations and Chapter 93A liability when an elderly owner later complains about the transaction.

The panel heard argument and took the matter under advisement.","In 24P0287 the panel heard argument about whether Anna Coletta—who introduced a buyer to elderly property owner George Wheaton and later facilitated a sale to an associate—owed a fiduciary duty to Wheaton and whether her conduct amounted to an unfair or deceptive practice under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Appeals court weighs whether union’s town‑meeting warrant article bypassed mandatory bargaining

Appeals court hears dispute over waiver and alternate‑employer immunity in Rosa workplace‑injury case

Appeals court hears libel in rem over oysters as attorneys debate ‘sustenance’ and commercial fishing

Appeals court asked to overturn zoning board variance over stacked‑parking system and abutter standing

Appeals court reviews claims that friend‑broker acted as fiduciary and violated Chapter 93A in Wheaton property sale