[{"_1":2,"_87":-5,"_88":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},"mediaId",6093165,"mediaKeyId","2849025-8e31de2bbc8fe9389aa18bf4685fb9a0","parentId",2849025,"title","House subcommittee presses for investigation after officials shared sensitive operational details on Signal","audioSeconds",5874,"startMs",1078000,"endMs",6952000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=2849025-8e31de2bbc8fe9389aa18bf4685fb9a0&start=1078&end=6952","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2849025-8e31de2bbc8fe9389aa18bf4685fb9a0/thumbnail_1078000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6093165/House-subcommittee-presses-for-investigation-after-officials-shared-sensitive-operational-details-on-Signal","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6093165-d6a5d2509563670b20f3bba304f4479a/orig.mp4?Expires=1770516565&Signature=I0o2tBghFWu-plp1N-tyjyLFDsBSK~bQgWzQ-ighpfuZD3NFTbu5KdbVt9XYLWGeDZ8cbh2QNDEipk8goc5~HhjkY0dpGd3sojXstFbOTOqx9uvCVHqHfEqJNKZ8N1cR03KUU~VP63EXFXnQbz6wZKEcTlDTnUr4Sq1xwZ7X3y7e0w7rdZHpg4OLxN4EaR8aYM9Bjr7iFydxSQbYsUN7Hd-ovLNlPh4ruRYfq0xbdFpS-elQvW3oLgyg7uDvaUNuRduSmlzpOu5dGbVt41LmkTwrA3UJmv~TJiTxL39t3YhVz6eaIgIzjaVPz0jZPsGAzp1FJOEGAGUJn2yz8VNZOA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform","date","2025-04-02T16:18:58.037Z","article","Members of the House Oversight and Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs pressed administration and outside witnesses on the national security implications of top officials using the Signal messaging app to share operational details before a military strike.

Ranking Member Subramanian opened the topic by describing media reports that a national security adviser “added a journalist to a signal group chat where top officials shared classified information about an upcoming strike,” and said the administration’s public statements that the material was not classified were insufficient. He asked for a “thorough review of our classification system” and for accountability and oversight.

Multiple members described the chat as reckless. Representative Stephen Lynch told the panel: “If you think that was a success, going on an insecure line in advance of a military operation and discuss openly on an insecure app the operational details of the forthcoming strikes … that was a colossal failure.” Representative Robert Garcia, among others, said senior officials who used an insecure channel to discuss sensitive operational details had endangered service members and should face consequences if rules were broken.

Witnesses agreed on technical limits and human risk. Professor Matt Blaze told members that end‑to‑end encryption protects data in transit but “if the cell phone is compromised, it doesn't matter what app you're using,” and that encrypted apps like Signal lack features required to manage classified information, such as ensuring recipients hold the necessary security clearances. Dr. Blaze said in open testimony that the easiest practical way for an attacker to obtain content on an encrypted app is to compromise endpoints rather than attempt to break the encryption in transit.

Committee members also pressed officials about the prevalence of using Signal and other third‑party apps by senior national security staff. Ranking Member Subramanian and others said they had not received a full accounting of whether private devices were compromised or how widely third‑party apps were used to discuss sensitive matters. Several members asked for an independent investigation and for the administration to provide corrective steps to prevent recurrence.

Members raised related oversight concerns about staffing at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Witnesses and some members said recent CISA personnel actions have reduced institutional capacity, which committee members warned could hamper federal ability to provide guidance and to coordinate with private industry.

The hearing ended without formal committee action but with multiple members saying they would pursue follow‑up oversight, seek secure briefings on the content and classification status of the messages, and pursue answers about whether officials followed existing protocols and whether corrective steps would be taken.

No witness or member provided evidence in the public hearing record that the private devices of the officials involved had been compromised; several witnesses said there is currently no public evidence one way or the other. Members entered several news articles into the record and asked the administration for investigations and briefings.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Salt Typhoon: Securing America’s Telecommunications from State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks","oneSentenceSummary","Members of the House Oversight subcommittee raised alarm about national security officials using Signal to discuss pre‑strike operational details, demanded an investigation and asked what corrective steps the administration will take; witnesses emphasized that device compromise and human error are central risks.","taxTitle","Oversight and Reform: House Committee, Standing Committees - House & Senate, Congressional Hearings Compilation, Legislative, Federal","taxId",1835,"location","","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6093169,"Experts tell House panel SALT Typhoon exposed deep telecom vulnerabilities; call for infrastructure redesign",901,803000,1704000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2849025-8e31de2bbc8fe9389aa18bf4685fb9a0&start=803&end=1704","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2849025-8e31de2bbc8fe9389aa18bf4685fb9a0/thumbnail_803000.jpg","/articles/6093169/Experts-tell-House-panel-SALT-Typhoon-exposed-deep-telecom-vulnerabilities-call-for-infrastructure-redesign","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6093169-ee86c8703c54a6e3c6d18f7e2fb4a265/orig.mp4?Expires=1770516565&Signature=a2q7xlPMjTJlerkLqGTYhgHrdkUZ~4R4D2g2YgdpF9W3~jP~WRsS637t3plX8I-BbIVH9n~x~hX1fTCHOmMZ1~ZnZprQHK1EiVL2oUs1pm3FqQ~ihDl4kNkL2UV8gmLhJr01ZnPNCYl2APsMT-VHJK0-zBhbVKad1l3M8eLXX3cpKW-~mBb2bC7pL1zg6WWqGxu7-T~l6qtwMMLbdf~JdtXObO4W2s858P-XuNUYkGY8f27oe84UETQblGwHK8ucqPKBCGYFzLsFrUlHLNAgok6KJMLF3CW43fYCOlzYX7LhhzNtT-y34sx-UnsdDQ9DjsD~aA0oLwimAQSBQpJb-w__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","At a hearing of the House Oversight and Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs, cybersecurity experts told members on March 27 that the SALT Typhoon espionage campaign exposed systemic weaknesses in U.S. telecommunications infrastructure and argued the nation needs a coordinated, large‑scale program to replace legacy systems.

The witnesses cited decades‑old rules and architectural choices that created the conditions for mass surveillance. “In 1994, Congress enacted something called the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act or CALEA,” said Professor Matt Blaze of Georgetown Law, adding that CALEA “required virtually all switching equipment in the public telephone network must be designed with explicit backdoor capabilities to wiretap traffic.” Blaze said those requirements, combined with the virtualized, remotely‑managed nature of modern networks, expanded the attack surface and made large‑scale unauthorized surveillance more likely.

Why it matters: Committee members were told that SALT Typhoon’s operators used weaknesses in telecommunications backhaul and management systems to collect voice and message data at scale. Joshua Steinman, CEO of Galvanic, said the problem is not limited to telecoms but extends across multiple critical infrastructure sectors, including power, water and transportation, and that foreign actors have “sitting on American critical infrastructure” in ways that create the possibility of “an attack, at a time and place of their choosing.” Dr. Edward Amoroso, CEO of Tag Infosphere and a former AT&T chief information security officer, urged planning for future threats driven by artificial intelligence and said current intrusions may be “child’s play” compared with what could come.

The witnesses described how technical and policy legacies intersected. Blaze explained that when CALEA was adopted it shifted the burden for lawful intercept from law enforcement to network operators and mandated features that effectively left every relevant switch “wiretap ready,” creating potential backdoors. Over time, Blaze said, telecom equipment moved from physically secured switches to remotely managed data‑center style systems managed over the Internet, removing a human check that once limited large‑scale tampering.

Amoroso used a roadway metaphor to describe the scale of the risk: lawmakers have been patching “potholes” — individual vulnerabilities — while larger “sinkholes” enabled by automation and new attack techniques loom ahead. He and Steinman argued that identifying and fixing discrete gaps is insufficient; instead, they urged congressional support for designing and transitioning to “next‑generation infrastructure” that presumes hostile state actors will attempt to exploit built‑in lawful‑access mechanisms.

Committee members also pressed witnesses on policy responses. Several members discussed deterrence and the balance between defensive investment and more aggressive responses. Amoroso said the “best defense is a good defense,” and that deterrence can help but does not substitute for stronger technical protections. Steinman and others recommended improved information sharing, clarified liability protections to encourage cooperation between government and industry, and sustained investment in both workforce and technology.

The panel repeatedly flagged endpoint security and human factors as limitations of any encryption or infrastructure fix: Professor Blaze noted that end‑to‑end encryption can protect in‑transit data but does not protect a compromised device, and that large‑scale legal mandates that introduce “lawful access” capabilities can preload systemic vulnerabilities. The witnesses also warned about quantum and AI‑driven risks to current cryptographic assumptions and urged a coordinated national effort to anticipate those future threats.

The hearing produced no formal votes or legislation. Members said they would pursue additional oversight, information sharing improvements and potential statutory responses to strengthen U.S. defenses against state‑sponsored espionage.

The subcommittee hearing brought technical background and policy choices into sharp relief: specialists told members that SALT Typhoon exploited design decisions stretching back decades and that the country faces both an immediate remediation challenge and a longer‑term modernization task.","Witnesses at a House Oversight subcommittee hearing said the SALT Typhoon campaign exploited long‑standing design and operational weaknesses in U.S. telecommunications systems and urged Congress and federal agencies to build next‑generation infrastructure rather than rely on incremental fixes.","actionData","errors"]

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House subcommittee presses for investigation after officials shared sensitive operational details on Signal

Experts tell House panel SALT Typhoon exposed deep telecom vulnerabilities; call for infrastructure redesign