[{"_1":2,"_99":-5,"_100":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75,87],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},"mediaId",6082536,"mediaKeyId","2937442-22c79b7dad17353f69edc74bd9b76479","parentId",2937442,"title","Witnesses warn of growing space threats, urge commercial integration, resilient launch and better space domain awareness","audioSeconds",2462,"startMs",4528000,"endMs",6990000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=2937442-22c79b7dad17353f69edc74bd9b76479&start=4528&end=6990","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2937442-22c79b7dad17353f69edc74bd9b76479/thumbnail_4528000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6082536/Witnesses-warn-of-growing-space-threats-urge-commercial-integration-resilient-launch-and-better-space-domain-awareness","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6082536-5d7b7b141c22eb623dceb69773ff7e09/orig.mp4?Expires=1770951819&Signature=UtVuuiOAgmVs~TxiQaIoQ-qxHWA1h4rnIf7SLsI1vM7WyzhG4~~wpici1UJpvW~G1DxqMV~fPF3selQ4vBOgMX75a3kInUYI5gzB83yrXR-oTmv7aRuixBAtZsFa7GOjblx8ktI5HexpYsh46sa2vQqJtnaHbr9cJidAk47TBZ0LLWKAky2jby0PCaVqMZPSXEl3ckew5cy3W8fenHPOiA3iZv39aksHGbDE~wzUf5ZNCmB8xUe8mUlWZLiRreT64YSHU0hFNHauF7Vi9xq8Vt~e2BbSdFrE8gvFxs4gL3xrJujay6SBc~8hfDdf-TWgsvsupyCof1fgHrefYwc7VQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","U.S. House Armed Services Committee","date","2025-04-09T00:00:00Z","article","Lawmakers and commanders at the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing discussed expanding counter-space activity, on-orbit risks and the department's efforts to integrate commercial capabilities and strengthen launch and test infrastructure.

Representative Mike Turner forcefully framed the risk of an on-orbit nuclear device as an existential space threat, saying the situation \"cannot be permitted to go into space\" and likening it to a \"Cuban missile crisis in space\"; he pressed U.S. Space Command to be explicit about the consequences of an orbital detonation and whether U.S. systems were prepared. General Stephen Whiting, commander of U.S. Space Command, told the committee that some command nuclear-command-and-control systems have been hardened against an on-orbit nuclear detonation, but that many national and commercial space architectures would be severely affected by such an event.

Members cited testimony (to the committee) that an orbital detonation could render low Earth orbit unusable for an extended period, and they pressed commanders to explain how the department is preparing for that contingency and how it would affect national and military systems.

Space domain awareness and debris mitigation were also discussed. General Whiting described a daily U.S. Space Command process to run conjunction predictions and notify satellite owners when potential collisions are identified: \"If we see that that is a potential, we notify the owners of those satellites. That includes satellites from Russia or China because we don't want any satellite to hit a piece of debris and create more debris.\" (General Stephen Whiting, commander, U.S. Space Command). The general said commercial space domain-awareness data are an important part of that effort, and that Space Command operates the Joint Commercial Office that fuses data from multiple companies.

Commercial integration and reserve contracting pilots were a separate focus. Whiting described a commercial integration cell at Vandenberg that shares classified information with 17 commercial companies to help protect their constellations and said the Space Force's Commercial Augmented Space Reserve (CAASR) is beginning pilot contracts and defining triggers for when those reserve capabilities would be activated.

Members and commanders also raised launch-range capacity and industrial-base resilience. \"We have to make sure that ... the launch ranges themselves never become the choke point,\" Whiting said, stressing the need for responsive launch to reconstitute space capabilities quickly in crisis. Representative Gabe Vasquez and others emphasized the role of small businesses and test ranges (White Sands Missile Range, Holloman AFB, Plant 42) in providing innovation and test capacity.

No formal changes to policy were made at the hearing. Witnesses asked for continued resources and for Congress to support acquisition pathways that enable rapid commercial integration, resilient launch capacity and improved space domain awareness.

","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","20250409 STR: FY26 Strategic Forces Posture Hearing","oneSentenceSummary","Members and commanders highlighted increasing counter-space activity, on-orbit risks including potential nuclear anti-satellite threats, the need for commercial partnerships (CAASR and Joint Commercial Office), and fragile launch-range capacity.","taxTitle","Armed Services: House Committee, Standing Committees - House & Senate, Congressional Hearings Compilation, Legislative, Federal","taxId",1833,"location","","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6082541,"Committee hears calls to accelerate nuclear modernization; leaders discuss Sentinel, SLCM, B-21 targets and pit production",4341,1345000,5686000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2937442-22c79b7dad17353f69edc74bd9b76479&start=1345&end=5686","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2937442-22c79b7dad17353f69edc74bd9b76479/thumbnail_1345000.jpg","/articles/6082541/Committee-hears-calls-to-accelerate-nuclear-modernization-leaders-discuss-Sentinel-SLCM-B-21-targets-and-pit-production","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6082541-011f6782cd1caced9f4ed7b5766579a0/orig.mp4?Expires=1770951819&Signature=i05V0J8FpMmfgw6LnYDx8soHpTXSEYxtro3mvZJXnAQgsf7PNoyQkgytxfCZxWuhLfx3fnj2uy3~IIvOhwO93xE3k4bCwTqYidL0Tqrv029snEFySYuu7niQeIFXCGJBEX3be-GmoP8k9Vhrp5cjDap3Kux7Xb04GitFdOL0YWAxzp4fAoa~ezcqz77rMPxzxyR3gGPA5p~vWWo~Fr5ogeX25ustKjv4SNw2ZF4FatyTvvuftKcG8u~ZkigaASVsoQAMEynfKWiWBFureSeMd7tYtjan8xUJ5ZnyymurWEidrQ0buxN0S9f7Jt1Je1CxW2MKquCaEQmOaeCgQ-S7eA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","Senior commanders told the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee that sustaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains the department's top strategic priority and outlined several near-term modernization points lawmakers should consider.

General Anthony Cotton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), told the panel in his opening remarks that \"America's nuclear forces, the bedrock of our national security, is and continues to be safe, secure, effective, and credible,\" and said modernization across the triad and nuclear command, control and communications must accelerate.

Members pressed commanders on specific programs. Chairman Des Jarlais noted that the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act required the Department of Defense to establish a program of record for a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). General Cotton described that capability as both a strategic capability and regionally relevant, saying that \"there is an opportunity for regional capability\" and that geographic combatant commanders support the ability to hold targets at regional levels.

On bomber force structure, Representative Bacon asked General Cotton about preferred B-21 fielding numbers; Cotton said the program of record is a minimum of 100 aircraft but stated a preference \"about 145\" to reach an overall fleet of roughly 220 modernized bombers once legacy aircraft are phased.

Lawmakers and commanders also discussed the Columbia-class submarine program. In a back-and-forth with members, witnesses said the Columbia program is delayed; General Cotton said the service reported about a 16-month delay on the Columbia class and described a fleet-management trade space (PIRA/SLEP options) to cover gaps until replacements are available.

Plutonium pit production and resilience also arose. Representative Joe Wilson asked about a two-site strategy; General Cotton called Savannah River a \"cornerstone\" of pit production and said having two sites \"betters the opportunity for us to get to the numbers that we need\" and provides resilience if production at one site is disrupted.

Members asked about legacy airborne nuclear command-and-control missions (the Looking Glass/NC3 airborne element). General Cotton said an NC3 roadmap and an active trade-space study would report in the June time frame; among options is whether to retain an airborne leg and which service should host it.

On timely fielding of prompt-strike and survivable delivery options, members pressed that delays are unaffordable: \"Absolutely not\" was General Cotton's response when asked whether the conventionally armed prompt strike deployment could afford delays. The committee repeatedly linked modernization choices to preserving decision time for national leadership and strategic stability.

No formal decisions or votes were taken at the hearing; witnesses and members agreed on the need for sustained funding and congressional attention to acquisitions, test schedules and industrial-base resiliency as modernization programs progress.

","Commanders and staff said the U.S. must modernize nuclear forces across the triad, discussed the sea-launched cruise missile program of record required by FY24 NDAA, B-21 fielding objectives, Columbia-class submarine timing, and two-site plutonium pit production.",{"_33":88,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":89,"_41":90,"_43":91,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":72,"_74":72},6082545,"House strategic forces hearing presses DOD on ‘Golden Dome’ reference architecture, spectrum needs for homeland defense",3649,1036000,4685000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=2937442-22c79b7dad17353f69edc74bd9b76479&start=1036&end=4685","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/2937442-22c79b7dad17353f69edc74bd9b76479/thumbnail_1036000.jpg","/articles/6082545/House-strategic-forces-hearing-presses-DOD-on-Golden-Dome-reference-architecture-spectrum-needs-for-homeland-defense","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6082545-350f68d069ba72c70c594393564b1352/orig.mp4?Expires=1770951819&Signature=Rw8RZtgJ0G1ppz4blsNHNfeWtLoF5NZYiGmMiQXNPS2iFybMuF59J8mWjihvXk5LLtfk98hwnNNYPSHBqisQZcE6hjP3iMjxjnMUwG7vIE8Mqp6Q0lu3KIFexHYych9GkL-h4CRfx6C5jvB1RO57B0ERPJDGsN09gElqHIIE9QyFIXs~1uKrFTLaSmcKf5duHXUgjLVA4ioxk1OOpz06osCe1MguyLg-EAPHvK62Ht7K2qJHB4AXMTD~wTwXP3Imw9rxlMtuN8Cr9nJEsgoNakKg~BsXzHAEaQrRF5jNXSLy5sGmimCE6orS-nZBf-q4XKVZz1wmZYLNlArKwkxwbQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","At a House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, witnesses and members pressed the Department of Defense for details on the Administration's \"Golden Dome\" concept for homeland defense and on related studies ordered by the White House.

The discussion centered on how to build a layered defensive architecture to detect and defeat incoming threats, how the \"Golden Dome\" reference architecture under study will affect strategic stability, and whether the DOD can retain essential spectrum needed for detection, tracking and satellite communications.

The issue drew bipartisan attention because the executive order directing an \"Iron Dome for America\" study directed the secretary of defense to provide a reference architecture to the president. John Hill, who is performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, told the committee that the study produced a reference architecture for the president to consider but declined to detail recommendations that remain between the secretary and the president: \"that'll be for the secretary and the president to ... provide the president, a reference architecture that the president could incorporate into the president's budget.\" (John Hill, performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy).

Members pressed the witnesses on what a final architecture would need to include. \"I've provided our command's recommendation of a 3 dome approach with the first dome being a domain awareness dome, the second to handle ICBMs and the third to handle the air threat to include cruise missiles,\" said General Gregory Guillot, commander of U.S. Northern Command, describing NORTHCOM's submission to the study and how hypersonic threats might be apportioned across the domes.

Representatives and generals repeatedly emphasized the importance of radio frequency access for the program. When asked whether a Golden Dome could be effective if the department lost access to the 3.0'0'.5 GHz band, Guillot responded, \"I don't see how we can have an effective homeland defense system, without, full use of the 3 to 3.5 spectrum and the higher, numbers you mentioned, will be challenging as well.\" (General Gregory Guillot, commander, U.S. Northern Command). Other witnesses described ground radars in those lower-3 bands and SATCOM links in higher bands as central to missile warning, missile defense and space domain awareness.

Ranking Member Seth Moulton told the committee he had asked Hill about what the 60-day study period produced and what recommendations reached the president; Hill reiterated that the study provided a reference architecture for the president's budget process and that specifics would be released with the budget. Moulton and other members also asked witnesses to account for strategic-stability effects of a homeland-layered defense; witnesses said those considerations were part of the study analyses.

Committee members and commanders described the Golden Dome approach as inherently layered: domain awareness to \"detect, track, cue and feed\" defeat systems; an ICBM-focused layer for long-range ballistic threats; and an air/ cruise missile layer that would also address certain hypersonic profiles. Members emphasized that domain awareness is a prerequisite to defeat: \"they can't defeat what they can't see,\" a point made repeatedly during the hearing.

Witnesses asked for sustained funding and for Congress to consider acquisition, test and fielding timelines as the executive branch and Department of Defense finalize requirements. Hill said most training and testing approvals do not require the highest-level review and that the department is seeking opportunities to reduce unnecessary approvals as space becomes more integrated with joint operations.

The committee did not receive a public, itemized budget or design for the Golden Dome at the hearing. Hill said the reference architecture is presently between the secretary and the president and will be incorporated into the president's budget for public consideration. Members said they would press for clearer costings and timelines as budgets and program details are submitted.

The hearing recessed for votes before question rounds concluded; the panel said it would resume questioning after the votes to continue oversight and to press for more detailed, budgeted plans to implement a layered homeland defense.

","Witnesses and members debated the administration's \"Golden Dome\" concept and a White House executive order study (the \"Iron Dome for America\" study), pressing for a layered homeland defense and uninterrupted access to key spectrum bands.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Witnesses warn of growing space threats, urge commercial integration, resilient launch and better space domain awareness

Committee hears calls to accelerate nuclear modernization; leaders discuss Sentinel, SLCM, B-21 targets and pit production

House strategic forces hearing presses DOD on ‘Golden Dome’ reference architecture, spectrum needs for homeland defense