[{"_1":2,"_99":-5,"_100":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,75,87],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},"mediaId",6247793,"mediaKeyId","3212652-bc7b362224b30d2dc1ac5db8aff2f421","parentId",3212652,"title","Appeals court weighs lay‑witness identification and cell‑site evidence in Commonwealth v. Harris","audioSeconds",1186,"startMs",265000,"endMs",1451000,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=3212652-bc7b362224b30d2dc1ac5db8aff2f421&start=265&end=1451","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/3212652-bc7b362224b30d2dc1ac5db8aff2f421/thumbnail_265000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6247793/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-weighs-laywitness-identification-and-cellsite-evidence-in-Commonwealth-v-Harris","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6247793-f63f14c303c43132381d3a8de75b467c/orig.mp4?Expires=1771159661&Signature=P43lOEVdCQrE05jtP0w-8aDbyBGM9U8gCHY2NGBGOhuExclkQg796fr6TmSaFzCw~VyGknR45bQ1GBjSMKbhAA5K8BWwrEtxZ8frBYlsaRWTntomHSCXTqTOf4ddRci5Kun9l58ztPZvj8V8KLCpG5inQBB4P2uzun2hZJ03mnuRFtIraFdW5exMqN-NZNlY-MWvCEyk0hUcrfQ4iPV~Htt~x~x7WI683XPwPpzs9YL58I8q7iqACCA3XstKBIAcT-qoHgU6YIWESBmdiSq8cQ5yy7zGxv-ic~wNHwXD4AhJE5tCobgNYicLb4H5eFF0~CMAFO1xvwI-zfR72dgWQA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","","date","2025-05-07T15:16:22Z","article","Good morning. An appellate panel heard oral argument in Commonwealth v. Harris (24‑P‑570) over whether a trial judge properly admitted a lay witness’s identification from surveillance video and whether cell‑site location information (CSLI) should have been considered.

The question centered on whether Douglas Hine had sufficient familiarity with the defendant to offer an opinion that the person depicted in masked and hooded surveillance footage was the defendant, and whether CSLI admitted below had probative value given its timing.

Why it matters: The court addressed the threshold used to admit lay identification testimony when a suspect’s face is obscured and the growing use of CSLI in criminal cases — issues that can affect both reliability of identifications and privacy concerns about location data.

Kevin de Mello, defense counsel for Mr. Harris, argued that the lay witness was “no better suited than the fact finder” because Hine worked with the defendant for only about three to three and a half months, with a 30‑day period of close training, and then had a 16‑month gap before viewing the surveillance. “He really only worked 30 days with this person,” de Mello said, and he described the witness as at most a “mere acquaintance” whose limited contacts made identification from a masked, hooded video unreliable. De Mello pointed to case law he argued was analogous — including an “Austin” decision cited in his brief and a more recent “Broom” case — and stressed the Pless factors courts consider for admitting lay identifications: witness familiarity, image quality, and whether the person’s appearance changed.

De Mello also questioned the admission and probative value of CSLI, suggesting judges should scrutinize such data more carefully because of privacy concerns and because, he said, the CSLI in the record did not show movement precisely at the time of the crime.

Jesse Crane, arguing for the Commonwealth, urged the panel to defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Crane said Hine “was sufficiently familiar with, the defendant to offer his opinion that he was depicted in the surveillance video,” noting that Hine hired and trained the defendant, worked closely with him eight hours a day during the 30‑day training period and continued to work with him for approximately three and a half months. Crane emphasized that the surveillance filmed activity in the same warehouse where Hine worked, allowing Hine to point to landmarks and height comparisons; Crane also noted the defendant briefly lowered his hood at one point and Hine identified a horseshoe hairline and a gait as features he recognized.

On CSLI, Crane said the record showed the defendant was “nearby to the crime scene and was traveling in the direction of the crime scene,” and that the parties had stipulated to admission of the CSLI. He acknowledged the record is not “crystal clear” on exact distances or travel time but argued the data had a rational tendency to support identity in conjunction with other evidence.

Panel reaction and law: The three‑judge panel repeatedly pressed both sides on the standard of review (abuse of discretion) and how to apply the Pless test’s familiarity inquiry. The justices probed distinctions with recent decisions — including a partially favorable/unfavorable decision the panel identified as Bell Nevis — and queried whether limited contact or masking in video undercut helpfulness to a fact finder. The court also asked defense counsel whether the judge’s on‑the‑record questioning and the stipulation on CSLI preserved the issue for appeal.

No ruling was issued during the session; the court moved to its next scheduled matter after oral argument concluded. The panel’s future decision will determine whether the trial court’s balancing of witness familiarity, video quality and the CSLI evidence was within its discretion.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Oral Arguments, May 7, 2025, Sacks, Englander, Walsh, JJ., presiding","oneSentenceSummary","An appellate panel heard oral argument in Commonwealth v. Harris over whether a lay witness should have been allowed to identify a masked figure in surveillance video and whether cell‑site location information (CSLI) was properly considered.","taxTitle","Judicial - Appeals Court Oral Arguments, Judicial, Massachusetts","taxId",66294,"location","Massachusetts","headline","shortSummary",{"_33":76,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":77,"_41":78,"_43":79,"_45":80,"_47":81,"_49":82,"_51":83,"_53":84,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":85,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":86,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6247783,"Appeals court hears challenge to termination of parental rights amid disputed permanency plan",2882,3128000,6010000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=3212652-bc7b362224b30d2dc1ac5db8aff2f421&start=3128&end=6010","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/3212652-bc7b362224b30d2dc1ac5db8aff2f421/thumbnail_3128000.jpg","/articles/6247783/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-hears-challenge-to-termination-of-parental-rights-amid-disputed-permanency-plan","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6247783-140367e44bfd052e419e6cc248325b6a/orig.mp4?Expires=1771159661&Signature=TVlrKXB7RF6ufe8L~lo01Ix~7iaoPhZmukvk2OZ0ID-HYO7FPlfYAQBue4N7~9sEKx~Bpf2nsnuPaOrrmY7kaFp6znO1yyK-3KdweqoZLs4p~2WHS3LTWSwUTnV3Ds2Q5d8Qj0lGBnrMMLsadUkRpTsgfdgSyevjfyQjktoJi3tW50T-xb8Jy3QQyO~jjPK0K7NwmH77qi~BTi6Z3bL-05hoN~C6rmuFkN545Pz3keMA9iJEoUMa7bO54n3DtTvGbi0js31zbf8RD72DfWXlket1atwcqsALq~89DwM4-YNT3nZx7ioqsgzN8eOsrOqttddP4D3DpRVlUU39IIDyEA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","An appeals panel heard arguments in Department of Children and Families v. Child 1 and Others (24‑P‑1053) about whether the trial court erred in terminating a father’s parental rights and whether the Department of Children and Families’ (DCF) adoption plan was adequate.

Why it matters: The case presents the tension that sometimes arises when a parent is found unfit but children oppose adoption and DCF’s permanency plan lacks up‑to‑date, case‑specific details. The appellate court’s decision will affect how trial courts weigh termination, the availability of guardianship as an alternative, and required detail in permanency plans under the controlling statutes.

Charles Levin, counsel for the younger child, urged reversal of the termination decree and remand for further consideration of whether termination was required in light of the child’s age and strong bond with his father. Levin argued DCF offered no recent, concrete permanency plan: the most recent written adoption plan he cited was from April–May 2021 and, he said, lacked the detail a judge needs to evaluate adoptability. Levin noted the younger child has been in foster care placements for about four years and argued adoption appears unlikely because the child is strongly opposed to being adopted; Levin asked whether guardianship (which does not require termination of parental rights) had been adequately explored.

Counsel for the father (identified in the record as counsel for father) acknowledged the trial finding of unfitness but argued the judge relied on concerns that termination would “loosen” the child’s attachments in ways that could permit permanency; counsel urged that remand should allow DCF to develop a more detailed plan and that termination was not necessary to achieve guardianship if that option were pursued.

Marta Diaz, counsel for the older child, told the court the older child (now 15) had been in his current foster home about a year and a half and reported he continued to oppose adoption. Diaz said she had asked the foster family and child whether guardianship had been discussed and was told no; she confirmed there was no identified guardian in the record for either child.

Courtland (Court) Murphy, appearing for DCF, argued the termination decree should be affirmed. Murphy said the department’s goal remained permanency through adoption or guardianship and that termination can increase the likelihood of a stable, permanent placement because potential adoptive or guardian families are often reluctant to accept a placement where the legal parent remains able to litigate custody. The department stressed the trial court had made detailed findings about the children’s special needs and the parent’s long history of instability and unfitness.

Panel questions focused on whether DCF had provided a current, practical adoption or guardianship plan that addressed the children’s special needs and whether retaining parental rights would foreseeably disrupt a stable placement. Counsel and the panel discussed a recent unpublished decision the parties referenced (Osborne) in which the court reversed a termination of parental rights while distinguishing custody outcomes. The panel also asked practical questions about permanency hearings scheduled in the trial court and whether counsel could identify evidence that the father would seek to reopen custody in a way that would disrupt a stable guardianship; counsel said there was no clear record evidence that the father would do so.

No decision was announced from the bench. The appeal presents factual and statutory questions about when termination of parental rights is necessary to secure a child’s best interest and how detailed a permanency plan must be.","A three‑judge panel considered whether the trial court properly ended a father’s parental rights where the record showed significant special needs, the children opposed adoption, and the department’s written permanency plan was several years old.",{"_33":88,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":89,"_41":90,"_43":91,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":56,"_74":56},6247788,"Appeals court reviews restraining order where judge probed victim’s failure to report prior abuse",911,1492000,2403000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=3212652-bc7b362224b30d2dc1ac5db8aff2f421&start=1492&end=2403","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/3212652-bc7b362224b30d2dc1ac5db8aff2f421/thumbnail_1492000.jpg","/articles/6247788/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-reviews-restraining-order-where-judge-probed-victims-failure-to-report-prior-abuse","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6247788-5c7d31a55728fdb76cb1618b2f50f665/orig.mp4?Expires=1771159661&Signature=af-IiOIShzDOFUqzwP7XbDamCKLPcKC~tAUsjCAe3mREHBKleeDMrNrsbZME9PVyJ2aO1cPnnJ3L6a25qiaY1iUMu4MVzl0z1vZJEW7u1TLizHCEgt7znfhzg1o7RvGDOuMQSoQKoKbdGCLRyPYDnye1D4Fjom1xSejyCtwBIlXKYyKANuoru67RD8gz34x-h4JIuinHMQSjZDkl9DAi6xk5hG2IyJ5ZFwdV6A6Fq0yA7~DE5pZBnoiqsFzoWVwk75KcHnJpLpL16SJCpbKfQ2GmogiuKKfam6yHsyekm5LDhRohkVlZRHzlKwklIe~jd7eGMm8HQ0nUtlGBJfbl2g__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","An appellate panel considered arguments in an appeal challenging the trial court’s issuance of a restraining order after a two‑party hearing, focusing on whether the evidence supported a finding of imminent danger and whether the trial judge’s questions about the alleged victim’s failure to report prior incidents were an improper basis for credibility determinations.

Why it matters: The case raises how trial judges may weigh delayed reporting or a victim’s failure to seek prior relief under the controlling statute (including the statutory prohibition against using a victim’s failure to report as the sole basis for denying relief). The panel’s treatment could affect how lower courts evaluate credibility and the role of prior reporting in domestic‑abuse hearings.

Daniel Clardy, appellate counsel for the appellant, argued that the trial record lacked sufficient evidence that the appellant posed an immediate physical danger, citing prior authority the court had applied where testimony of hitting plus a red mark was found insufficient without corroboration. Clardy emphasized the absence of documentary proof (photographs, hospital records) for alleged scars and pointed to a line of cases he said require more than a bare assertion of assault to meet the statute’s threshold. He urged reversal where the trial judge relied on credibility findings that, he said, were improperly grounded in the victim’s failure to report prior incidents or seek prior restraining orders.

Clardy urged the panel that the judge’s questioning repeatedly returned to whether the alleged victim had called police or previously sought restraint: “the only four questions the judge asked were focused on the failure to report prior abuse,” he told the court, arguing those questions appear to have driven the credibility assessment and that such reliance undermines the statutory public‑policy protection against penalizing victims for delayed reporting.

Responding, counsel for A.S. (Tracy Green) and the panel’s questioning acknowledged that trial judges routinely assess credibility and may consider delay in reporting as relevant to motive and context. Green and others argued the court’s factual record included testimony that the alleged assaults occurred, at least one incident resulting in an ER visit, and that the district court had an opportunity to hear competing versions and make credibility calls. The respondent’s counsel maintained that credibility determinationsreceive deference on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.

The panel asked whether the judge was permitted to consider failure to report as part of a broader credibility evaluation but noted the statute’s language that such failure “shall not be the sole basis” for denying relief. Appellate counsel asserted that several of the judge’s follow‑up questions, and the emphasis on prior nonreporting, warranted reversal or at least remand for clarification of the findings.

No decision was announced from the bench. The argument concluded with the panel hearing additional briefing and the case moving to the next calendar item.","An appellate panel heard whether a trial judge abused discretion in granting a restraining order in a domestic‑abuse proceeding and whether the judge improperly relied on the victim’s failure to report or seek prior protection orders.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Appeals court weighs lay‑witness identification and cell‑site evidence in Commonwealth v. Harris

Appeals court hears challenge to termination of parental rights amid disputed permanency plan

Appeals court reviews restraining order where judge probed victim’s failure to report prior abuse