[{"_1":2,"_112":-5,"_113":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,76,88,100],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},"mediaId",5988311,"mediaKeyId","5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4","parentId",5766973,"title","Justices consider sufficiency of evidence in parental‑rights termination tied to domestic violence and remediation efforts","audioSeconds",10613,"startMs",10628000,"endMs",14260,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4&start=10628&end=14","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4/thumbnail_10628000.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/5988311/Texas/Justices-consider-sufficiency-of-evidence-in-parentalrights-termination-tied-to-domestic-violence-and-remediation-efforts","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/5988311-05239d0fc2d0ca78b22e79ba26d53eb6/orig.mp4?Expires=1773665480&Signature=dc0JtN-xgYiathjJnT1ISxqpuZsUV8RZOaotZ0Be0vClZTBLHwM8DxUbnZ2ctbVrRZXVR81HICw-Qx5-MdpYQV9af6P7V~81PqSHM5ggun0Go8O36cHWaoHTcym4kx88p444txp3PJ96Hgh6FeFLJe7YilzY6Vw5GMXSDK1Kuv2Fj4Qno6t-HDpH1QB53O8Q3H24s~Juot2w~eYyzU4LxfOIFbeZW8TGELk4X2WkIbGQsYCS24YqRiWAF4-vf8fLQgpDZtR0IkjFI7Pf04B6Kw2d-4fe04dMZh8kOJBMhVMKXdDn3oA1tTpav32-qExbFjobZ3U2Opj5ND80O4QfjQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","Supreme Court of Texas","date","2025-09-12T00:00:00Z","article","May it please the court — the Supreme Court heard argument in a parental‑rights termination where counsel for the parents urged reversal for legal insufficiency and the state defended the jury’s findings that parental conduct endangered the children and that termination served their best interests.

Counsel for the parents framed the case as one in which the record contained undisputed evidence of improvement and disputed evidence that the children’s later psychiatric hospitalizations were caused by parental conduct rather than the consequences of removal and delayed visitation. Counsel for the father opened by saying, “This is not a case where father was woefully incapable of caring for his children,” and stressed evidence that the father had provided food, shelter and that both parents had engaged with services before trial.

The Department’s case emphasized repeated episodes of domestic violence and control problems involving the father; multiple witnesses — including therapists and a neighbor — testified about incidents and behaviors the Department said posed ongoing risks. A children's therapist testified that children sometimes “begin to process their trauma” in a safe setting and that clinicians had observed troubling behaviors after removal that the Department linked to earlier exposure to domestic violence. The court also discussed evidence the parents’ relationship was highly enmeshed in ways the Department said undermined parental independence and protection of children.

Why it matters: Termination of parental rights is the state's most consequential remedy — the statutes set a high burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence) and courts must weigh past conduct and forward‑looking best‑interest factors under the Holly factors. Appellate reversal is rare and requires showing legal insufficiency or procedural error at trial.

Legal issues and standards discussed: Defense counsel urged that the trial court had relied on subjective service‑plan expectations, had denied an extension to allow additional counseling, and that the jury may have relied on post‑removal evidence of children’s psychiatric needs rather than evidence of parental conduct before or during removal. Counsel invoked the statutory extraordinary‑circumstances standard for extension of time (citing section 263.401) and argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance.

The Department and respondents pointed to testimony from therapists and other witnesses and to incidents in the record (including reports of violent episodes, threats and an instance a neighbor testified about where a child reportedly was injured at school). The Department argued the cumulative record supported both endangerment and the forward‑looking best‑interest finding.

Courtroom focus and questions: Justices repeatedly pressed both sides on what evidence a reasonable factfinder could credit, how to treat undisputed evidence of improvement, whether a parent‑victim’s decision to remain with an abusive spouse can legally justify termination, and how courts should treat subjective service plans when assessing whether a parent complied. The court asked whether the Department had introduced objective corroborating records (police reports, medical records) and noted the trial record lacked medical or police reports in the admitted exhibits.

Ending: The court did not announce a ruling at argument. Its decision will turn on the interplay of undisputed improvement evidence, the timing and cause of the children’s psychiatric hospitalizations, the statutory standard for continuance/extraordinary circumstances, and the jury’s evaluation of credibility under the clear‑and‑convincing standard.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Supreme Court of Texas - Oral Arguments (9.9.2025)","oneSentenceSummary","May it please the court — the Supreme Court heard argument in a parental‑rights termination where defense counsel urged reversal for legal insufficiency and the state argued the record supports both endangerment and best‑interest findings.","taxTitle","Supreme Court of Texas, Judicial, Texas","taxId",66295,"location","Texas","headline","","shortSummary",{"_33":77,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":78,"_41":79,"_43":80,"_45":81,"_47":82,"_49":83,"_51":84,"_53":85,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":86,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":87,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},5988327,"Justices at oral argument split on whether TxDOT-specific immunity covers contractors on county tollway project",1009,318000,1327000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4&start=318&end=1327","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4/thumbnail_318000.jpg","/articles/5988327/Texas/Justices-at-oral-argument-split-on-whether-TxDOT-specific-immunity-covers-contractors-on-county-tollway-project","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/5988327-1bf50271c9eec1f629c7f59e8edcfd49/orig.mp4?Expires=1773665480&Signature=oRWmCWRlePer3zjq10qOY04E6x4iQtb9bWIuDc9i6XHJXVoKNuIkUmYz0DTNfVlY3DreZpV03TF10sBFf5NippUmJcTEFEeKcuZ3qKYtx8aw9tmHcP9N~DaNZjVB--b5Tuhvfw3c9Cx7Udmp5oltMP8OSaDMSgDQNU-pgDNFCCQpT~rRtoLI2wIGLCpS4ESaB6IWM0q~zVf9-odzah3SF39yFolmX-qeLg858GAMkpQVriZf8O3lR90iTD0-oIr8NMnO1cy2cDuRk~YfpoGM78Nlc9I~QpL0T0OGHibQKMquk1aM2x3ScA1rOloHwmruTgnAT3Jf-LzOQFy4a3joqw__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","May it please the court — petitioners and respondents argued Tuesday over whether a provision in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code protects subcontractors who worked on a Montgomery County segment of State Highway 249. Petitioners said the statute was intended to protect contractors who construct or repair parts of the state highway system; respondents said the statute applies only to contractors who contract for TxDOT itself.

The dispute arose in a wrongful-death and negligence suit tied to traffic-signal work performed on frontage roads alongside the SH 249 toll project. Counsel for petitioners, Mr. Goles, asked the justices to apply what he described as “a very simple straightforward answer,” saying the statute “protect[s] those contractors who construct or repair part of the state highway system.” He pointed to the Transportation Code and, in particular, the duties listed in section 224.031 to argue that a contractor whose work is on the state highway system qualifies for the statute’s protection.

Why it matters: The parties framed the case as a statutory-interpretation dispute that could narrow or expand immunity for contractors on large multi-jurisdictional projects. If the court reads the statute to require privity (a direct contract with TxDOT), more plaintiffs may be able to sue subcontractors; if the court reads it more broadly, more contractors may defend claims by invoking the statutory protection.

Arguments and key evidence: Petitioners pointed to project documents and an e‑mail cited in the summary-judgment record in which a TxDOT official told an electrical subcontractor that the lights “were going to be controlled by TxDOT after the project was complete” and so the subcontractor’s work “needs their work to comply with TxDOT standards,” which petitioners said shows the work was performed “for TxDOT.” Petitioners also emphasized the physical scope of the signal work — large signal foundations and poles anchored beneath the roadway — and argued that traffic signals are “necessary” structures tied to the highway definition in the Transportation Code.

Respondents, represented by Ms. Gibson, countered that the Legislature chose the term “TxDOT” in the statute deliberately and that separate statutory language already exists for contractors who comply with general governmental specifications. Gibson argued the Montgomery County contract explicitly allocates design, construction and control of the frontage roads to the county, and that the contract even disclaims an agency or principal–agent relationship with TxDOT. \"The statute does not use the language for the benefit of,\" Gibson told the court, arguing that for the immunity to apply petitioners must show they were contracting \"for TxDOT.\" The respondent highlighted record testimony and contract provisions stating Montgomery County had responsibility for design and construction of frontage roads and the traffic-control plan.

Justices' concerns and limits: Several justices pressed petitioners on where to draw a limiting principle — whether things like landscaping, parking signage or bus stops could be swept into a highway construction definition — and whether compliance with TxDOT specifications should be the test for immunity. The court also explored whether the relevant contract for compliance purposes should be the contract between TxDOT and the county or the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor, and whether a vertical privity/third‑party‑beneficiary analysis could bring a subcontractor within the statute if TxDOT contracted with the general contractor.

Procedural posture and record items: The argument addressed summary‑judgment evidence, including affidavits, deposition testimony and an email exhibit relied on by petitioners. Justices asked whether petitioners had presented “conclusive” summary‑judgment proof that their work complied with the contract documents and TxDOT specifications.

What the court must decide next: The justices must construe the statute's scope — whether liability protection attaches to contractors contracting directly for TxDOT or extends to contractors whose work, by contract or practice, was for the benefit of TxDOT because it involved part of the state highway system. The court did not announce a decision at argument.

Ending note: Counsel agreed the question implicates common construction issues for large, mixed-jurisdiction highway projects: how to parcel responsibility for design, construction and operation among state and local actors and which contract or specification controls for purposes of statutory defenses such as contractor immunity.","May it please the court — petitioners and respondents argued Tuesday over whether a provision in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code protects subcontractors who worked on a Montgomery County segment of State Highway 249.",{"_33":89,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":90,"_41":91,"_43":92,"_45":93,"_47":94,"_49":95,"_51":96,"_53":97,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":98,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":99,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},5988317,"Justices weigh whether shareholders can sue adviser directly or must bring derivative claim",2753,7360000,10113000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4&start=7360&end=10113","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4/thumbnail_7360000.jpg","/articles/5988317/Texas/Justices-weigh-whether-shareholders-can-sue-adviser-directly-or-must-bring-derivative-claim","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/5988317-064bf668b7dd4c37b903bea37b1bbcdf/orig.mp4?Expires=1773665480&Signature=KHe7gVEWDdbMlyXUcN3pM9KnvXlucLGSjNJTeSMQryJU2mLXHsPJG33wQd6PQOiP6UxEeLVIMbbsSGrv2iYXi6SEWGi~VxhX5jyYazYVn0rtkmqJffQFq8H49fQsk4J9~qHl4ozwSpUHTqTHoyk23wm07yr2P83iQY7dWUwHFV0amcj2WUm53BknnagCneD9vUz1APfmKFo4gfaMsEi3FMhL3U77T5XG0T0YeMGq0efqYodQpdLje5CRiyHSza22A3mjsYmEU-Kx9tiNM4YJAAg0zLPwJ7dkH0eymokHU-TV3SbEiK0GiiNt0-QSLi8Cbn46JD0CdQFjpymipolDWQ__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","May it please the court — counsel for the adviser and for NexPoint argued a central corporate‑law question: when do shareholders have a direct cause of action against a third‑party adviser for alleged mismanagement, and when are such claims derivative and therefore subject to derivative‑action rules?

Petitioners' counsel, Mister Hawkins, urged the court to find NexPoint’s claims are derivative and to dismiss the direct complaints. His argument tracked long‑standing Delaware and Texas principles that an individual shareholder cannot recover for injuries that are collective and pro rata: such claims must ordinarily be brought derivatively on behalf of the entity. Hawkins contended that NexPoint’s alleged harm — depreciation in the value of shares caused by alleged advisor misconduct — is the same injury suffered by all shareholders and therefore derivative.

Real parties’ counsel, Mister Tillotson, said the advisory agreement created an express fiduciary duty to the trust and its shareholders and that the plaintiffs allege individualized contractual rights and injuries arising from the adviser’s conduct. He argued the contract created enforceable obligations running to shareholders, which, if proved, would permit direct suits.

Why it matters: The court’s decision will determine whether shareholders who allege adviser misconduct may proceed directly in Texas courts or must pursue derivative remedies (and associated procedural prerequisites) often in the state of incorporation. The ruling also touches on choice‑of‑law and forum‑selection clauses, corporate governance and the risks of parallel litigation.

Legal framework and precedent discussed: Advocates and justices discussed a series of controlling decisions long relied upon by Texas courts — Tooley (direct‑versus‑derivative test), Wingate, Ritchie and earlier precedents going back to Massachusetts v. Davis. Petitioners urged the court to apply a strict rule that the complaint’s gravamen determines capacity; real parties urged that contractual language can create direct rights and that discovery was necessary to flesh out individualized allegations.

Procedural posture: Petitioners argued capacity and jurisdiction were proper bases for mandamus and dismissal; they noted related motions and procedural history, including a denied mandamus at the court of appeals on other procedural grounds. Real parties said they had alleged direct injuries and that discovery was needed to develop the record.

Ending: The justices pressed both sides on whether the advisory agreement’s language — that the adviser owes a fiduciary duty \"to the trust and its shareholders\" — is a sufficiently clear statement to displace the default rule that mismanagement claims are derivative. The court did not issue an immediate ruling at argument.","In a dispute over whether NexPoint may pursue a direct claim against an investment adviser, advocates debated whether the advisory agreement created individualized rights for shareholders or whether the alleged harms are derivative and belong to the REIT.",{"_33":101,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":102,"_41":103,"_43":104,"_45":105,"_47":106,"_49":107,"_51":108,"_53":109,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":110,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":111,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},5988322,"Supreme Court hears dispute over timing and deliberative‑process privilege under Texas Public Information Act",3077,3600000,6677000,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4&start=3600&end=6677","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5766973-f4062cfdfebaa7c042169a04b25f5ce4/thumbnail_3600000.jpg","/articles/5988322/Texas/Supreme-Court-hears-dispute-over-timing-and-deliberativeprocess-privilege-under-Texas-Public-Information-Act","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/5988322-9be473a1f8183c18beace3033572d70c/orig.mp4?Expires=1773665480&Signature=GGbSNXuitwqqDG3C45n9jCrzBDYJVHxXMrhNs106xgxXdk~CPbHRmV42gfgiz0F82mbo-nKr7WgCdN4Yb5gbfyPkDttrYfhca7xTCEUwbLdcCFtfkt-Eeb6X-qm1Ijg~T8jqVI~JbEjC2yka2ep7LaW~7ELQz7d7BPjAW3E7GtOsHG7~YMfVztvGKbviKKu3tq9cXqksdafDFzDlnYSYlqRz9FUQQRvOXRT8W4OI5Gbe9vuk7q0hpAFG48e1Y8stKXkqMu4QqvoNUIllARDZxQeR6iGWVnw2MiKIirYgLK9BGKbTR20NiPDAO0GglUKAQnfKmpjnK2cVZJsueUJSfw__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","May it please the court — counsel for the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and the Sierra Club sparred at oral argument over two core questions: when an agency's request for an attorney‑general decision is timely under the Texas Public Information Act and whether the deliberative‑process privilege can shield communications with outside consultants.

The petitioner's side, represented at argument by counsel identified in the record as Mr. Wozdorf and Mr. Wasser, told the court that TCEQ submitted a timely request for an attorney‑general decision and that, even if it were late, the deliberative‑process privilege would justify withholding. Mr. Wasser emphasized three statutory bases for timeliness, including that “business days” under the Act do not include agency‑closed days, that an agency’s clarification request can reset the 10‑business‑day clock under section 552.222(b), and that the mailbox rule in section 552.308(b) supports TCEQ.

The Sierra Club, through counsel William Christian, argued the agency did not satisfy the Act’s strict deadlines and that the agency’s email asking whether the requester wanted confidential information was not a permitted request for clarification or narrowing under the statute — a characterization the Sierra Club said would allow agencies to indefinitely toll the 10‑day deadline by asking routine questions of requesters.

Why it matters: The court’s ruling could reshape how agencies respond to voluminous public‑records requests and when they may delay production to seek an attorney‑general ruling. It may also clarify whether common agency communications with outside contractors or experts can be withheld as privileged internal deliberations.

Timeliness disputes: TCEQ argued the mailbox rule and an agency‑closure interpretation of “business days” entitled it to treat July 5 as a non‑business day and to regard its July 17 submission as timely. TCEQ also contended that its request to Sierra Club asking whether it wanted confidential information was a permissible clarification or narrowing that restarted the 10‑day clock. Opposing counsel said that routine questions of that kind are not the species of clarification the statute contemplates and pointed to the city of Dallas line of cases that limit when an agency can restart the clock.

Deliberative‑process privilege: TCEQ urged the court to treat communications with third‑party contractors and experts as potentially privileged when they are predecisional and deliberative. Sierra Club urged a narrower rule: communications with outside parties ordinarily are not cloaked by the privilege and disclosure to third parties can waive protection much as it does under attorney‑client privilege. The court pressed the parties on who must present which evidence to the attorney general and on whether the attorney general needed the agency’s affidavits before issuing an opinion.

Record and procedural issues: Petitioners noted affidavits and an interagency‑mail affidavit in the summary‑judgment record; opponents pointed out that much of that material was not before the attorney general when the office issued its opinion and that the statute and Open Records Division practice both require strict adherence to procedural deadlines.

Ending: The court took no immediate ruling at argument. The case centers on statutory timing rules, the scope of agency authority to query requesters, and the circumstances under which internal deliberations and outside consultant communications may be withheld under a qualified privilege.","In TCEQ v. Paxton, attorneys argued whether the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality timely sought an attorney‑general decision and whether communications with outside experts may be withheld under the deliberative‑process privilege.","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Justices consider sufficiency of evidence in parental‑rights termination tied to domestic violence and remediation efforts

Justices at oral argument split on whether TxDOT-specific immunity covers contractors on county tollway project

Justices weigh whether shareholders can sue adviser directly or must bring derivative claim

Supreme Court hears dispute over timing and deliberative‑process privilege under Texas Public Information Act