[{"_1":2,"_123":-5,"_124":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_26":27},"root",{"_5":6,"_17":10,"_18":19,"_20":21,"_22":10,"_23":-5,"_24":-5,"_25":10},"user",{"_7":8,"_9":10,"_11":10,"_12":-5,"_13":-5,"_14":15,"_16":-5},"roles",[],"isAuthenticated",false,"isPremium","planName","subscriptionStatus","featureFlags",{},"insightsBudget","isDevelopmentHost","userPreferences",{},"recaptchaSiteKey","6LcvOJcUAAAAAHsB-gPGfGktcRlKpH7OTIU_dMTD","isImpersonating","impersonation","affiliateStatus","isFreedomPortal","routes/v2/article/layout",{"_28":29,"_30":31},"notFound",true,"relatedArticles",[32,76,88,99,111],{"_33":34,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":40,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},"mediaId",6765427,"mediaKeyId","5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec","parentId",5868629,"title","Appeals court wrestles with whether statute requires whistles at grade crossings or allows bells as alternative","audioSeconds",1453,"startMs",9188750,"endMs",10642330,"viewUrl","/Search/View?dp=1&key=5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec&start=9188&end=10642","thumbnailUrl","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec/thumbnail_9188750.jpg","articleUrl","/articles/6765427/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-wrestles-with-whether-statute-requires-whistles-at-grade-crossings-or-allows-bells-as-alternative","mediaUrl","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6765427-50935715b48affb61584d138771b0df5/orig.mp4?Expires=1770570784&Signature=Zs9zhV4-rIkk3pLvXjJ9dBh8sNHw-3-i-j3hnTM9zik2B8rK-7rSwI6mu5K7XsptbeXW3IzKozeRZCie1frIv2ht4iSACby9L~Qm9aD0tXJ~VvHv0xp1rGloAWOR3BxnaJKv4OV5DO~iOlSYElXcF6f8ecgWr81JHdjYvWdw~UPLyVeHXslfkT~GZUUPNkufw8F9NpU1XQLFu7hljEXX1tn0MCzv77ox1~xsBYSLr93-ZpddZpSIpnMd-2wUK4NGPvAN9cw5qSmkb-deU7MtH5fR7KUOVC0kYGxYSVHaZ2F2GG1VkeTnLBLxGA67Iw5MkdY58YBQKyray0etyVVkCA__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","author","Massachusetts Appeals Court Oral Arguments","date","2025-10-03T17:39:42Z","article","Peter Brown, arguing for Mark Lehman, told the appeals court the statute requiring an audibility warning at grade crossings should be read in context and history to require the more effective warning (whistle) rather than treating bell or whistle as interchangeable. Brown said that when the legislature created processes (including modern §139 petitions and home‑rule equivalents) to forbid whistles, it recognized whistles perform a unique, life‑saving function at crossings and that agencies must follow the statutory petition process rather than unilaterally removing whistles.

Justice Rubin and the panel pressed counsel on whether an 1800s drafting choice requires a modern court to read 'or' as effectively 'and' (i.e., require whistles) and whether mandamus could compel MBTA to sound whistles in particular crossings. Brown cited Boyd and other train‑safety cases to argue audibility over a quarter mile or specified rod distances can matter in avoiding deaths.

MBTA counsel Jennifer Sage responded that the statute is plain and disjunctive — a bell may be rung or a whistle may be sounded — and that mandamus cannot be used to compel the MBTA's discretionary safety judgments. Sage pointed to federal and state regulatory schemes (quiet zones, DPU and FRA jurisdiction) and operational concerns (a whistle could alarm pedestrians on platforms and induce dangerous reactions) to justify MBTA's discretion.

The court also questioned standing and whether mandamus is an appropriate remedy. MBTA argued Lehman lacked the 'clear and unequivocal duty' required for mandamus and that the statutory scheme and administrative processes weigh against judicial compulsion. The panel submitted the matter after extended questioning on statutory history, safety tradeoffs, and the interplay with regulatory quiet‑zone processes.","mediaType","Video","parentTitle","Oral Arguments, October 3, 2025, Rubin, Shin, Singh, JJ., presiding","oneSentenceSummary","Appellant urged the court to read safety statutes to require whistle warnings at grade crossings; MBTA said the statute permits ringing a bell as an alternative and stressed regulatory discretion and safety tradeoffs.","taxTitle","Judicial - Appeals Court Oral Arguments, Judicial, Massachusetts","taxId",66294,"location","Massachusetts","headline","","shortSummary",{"_33":77,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":78,"_41":79,"_43":80,"_45":81,"_47":82,"_49":83,"_51":84,"_53":85,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":86,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":87,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},6765432,"Developer challenges Grafton Planning Board’s denial of waiver for 57‑unit project",1123,5015960,6139330,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec&start=5015&end=6139","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec/thumbnail_5015960.jpg","/articles/6765432/Massachusetts/Developer-challenges-Grafton-Planning-Boards-denial-of-waiver-for-57unit-project","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6765432-e004cf66c39a6a296ec0e5cf2e02bfa7/orig.mp4?Expires=1770570784&Signature=DoKODWQZbUs7zvdw2Ewom6jk5FyxDkv3y27ufIurS9~pk2B~CwQbtJOhkRaAiJbcTNSoNp3QH7vOXScDUIh8PiLxKqW6E-aaUFp0G1CHPZ0az4dcYb3tgYBFRhlejFona4HCzJEvg2hnkmiG2KoH0dOX-VmNk0xWAKC2GU86PbmH8GgNqA~l603tRDX0SehhnBuKXk0HUsd196UhvZtHILmYF0AFsYg7A6Z1eRMe1zxv-09UNgItaOAoPXlMW4nJ9Z1AxfLidHCFT~DAjHQ1zQ5c~tmqm70j0V55CO8mt8WtaVcagmeJu0sb35FTwXF2kypKOcLVqDIoDgfa-craZg__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","Brian Grossman, representing the applicants for a proposed 57‑unit multifamily development in Grafton, told the court the Planning Board's denial of a waiver from the town’s dead‑end road length limit (500 feet) was arbitrary and unsupported by evidence. Grossman said the board relied on public‑safety rationales not borne out by the record, contradicted expert testimony (including the town’s fire chief) and was inconsistent with prior approvals where longer roads were permitted.

Grossman urged the appeals court to reverse the Land Court's decision upholding the board and to find the denial of the waiver was unsupported by the evidentiary record. He argued the board's own prior finding in 2019 that ingress and egress were adequate was effectively binding and that the 2022 denial, taken without new evidence or project change, lacked a rational basis.

Anthony Riley, counsel for the Grafton Planning Board, replied that the board has broad discretion in waiver requests and that the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating a conservation or public benefit. He emphasized the board identified road length and emergency‑access concerns and argued that special‑permit standards for multifamily developments differ from subdivision standards (where prior waivers were granted), giving the board authority to weigh risks and benefits.

Justices pressed both sides on whether a reviewing court must be able to \"glean\" a rational basis from the record and whether the board's post‑remand explanations were adequate to distinguish the Hillview Estates precedent. The panel also questioned whether a 3‑2 vote without detailed reasoning was reviewable when prior, similar waivers had been granted.

The court submitted that dispute; no immediate ruling was announced from the bench.","A developer seeking a waiver of Grafton's 500‑foot dead‑end road limit for a 57‑unit project argued the board's denial was arbitrary and contradicted record evidence; the board defended its discretion and safety reasoning.",{"_33":89,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":90,"_41":91,"_43":46,"_45":92,"_47":93,"_49":94,"_51":95,"_53":96,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":97,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":98,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},6765422,"Appeals court weighs whether evidence supported finding of parental unfitness and whether DCF's remedial failures required different relief",3394,14037070,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec&start=10642&end=14037","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec/thumbnail_10642330.jpg","/articles/6765422/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-weighs-whether-evidence-supported-finding-of-parental-unfitness-and-whether-DCFs-remedial-failures-required-different-relief","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6765422-89004cc82c728b2b18218672567e2129/orig.mp4?Expires=1770570784&Signature=XjJXcv4nAL11mKiTLNpcvLpAhOeSE~rZNAlW9OdaQ1WjrvCdrYQGTcYGlVtE2z-NrIO3pZR8AEf-m5~4cMO6Ty3VXn4tu4JuMG7t66WNU8W4yDBPCygj-IQKfLfvN6bKTddyvlKHOUaEl-odc0CwkkqkzO4d53I-t9OlTeLiNvdTnsRvVKi5vigWxsh4hLcANrv1pKlNDR4U-P3QTS0hjzveX~atLfr9mpUl3XG43mcF9eBNRHLt18L6D4qBXOkGUP~A8xcdmMe44Zfvn6C~VtafgaXqYIO4VAZjinnhUjQ2jpp0K0Z8IYiYbvJn5a8N7RY07y3SRGfVLOSxw6PU0g__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The panel heard argument in an impounded appeal captioned Department of Children and Families v. Father (parties impounded on record), concerning whether the juvenile court's September finding that both parents were presently unfit was supported by clear and convincing evidence and whether the court abused its discretion in declining to order specific remedial measures after finding DCF had not made reasonable reunification efforts.

Mother's counsel Michael Penta asked the appeals court to vacate the unfitness finding and the award of permanent custody or, at minimum, to require the juvenile court to fashion remedial orders and a reunification plan before permanent custody was resolved. Penta said certain documents the juvenile court relied on post‑trial (a December status report) were not admitted at trial and had not been subject to cross‑examination.

Father's counsel Colleen Duran and child counsel Kristen McKenna emphasized that the underlying removal stemmed from a supervision concern (a five‑year‑old left alone) and that the child experienced multiple placements (counsel cited about 13 placements) that contributed to emotional dysregulation; McKenna urged the court to prioritize a path for safe reunification where possible.

Assistant Attorney General Arjun Jay Kumar defended the juvenile court's conclusion that the parents were presently unfit at trial, citing missed medical appointments, failures to engage in services and the child's ongoing therapeutic needs. He also noted the juvenile court separately found DCF had not made sufficient efforts in certain respects and had ordered follow‑up status hearings and step‑down planning for the child's placement.

The justices explored whether, if the September order relied in part on post‑trial materials (a December report), the remedy should be vacatur and remand for clearer findings or whether subsidiary findings could be excised. Counsel debated whether vacating the order would moot the pending review and redetermination scheduled in juvenile court and how the two proceedings should interact.

The court thanked counsel and submitted the case for decision after extended argument. No opinion was issued from the bench.","The appeals court considered whether a juvenile court properly found both parents 'presently unfit' and whether a failure by DCF to provide reasonable reunification efforts required different or additional remedial relief.",{"_33":100,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":101,"_41":102,"_43":103,"_45":104,"_47":105,"_49":106,"_51":107,"_53":108,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":109,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":110,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},6765440,"Appeals court probes whether Second Amendment bars duty to retreat from cohabitant in home",987,348210,1336180,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec&start=348&end=1336","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec/thumbnail_348210.jpg","/articles/6765440/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-probes-whether-Second-Amendment-bars-duty-to-retreat-from-cohabitant-in-home","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6765440-43ca408421f7a57ca435ea34de37f888/orig.mp4?Expires=1770570784&Signature=bYw4iADULX6twkOocnBiPamt02Mw5wRLQsYOqrwyxKJceqlk3bVXFFCFXwCE4djWRqiP-bVaomSXF0C3jqrchwTyuYylNouMkvksIP8YQ8h31cD5b9I9gsjc7-xQpggm098aF4gcsWAkK6ZL3Fs4rEdUFPdrhLpUco8MNpuqRdyQVhDT0FmYeiQvaZgUfyxgWZ3WrxQjsakBQjCjXwMh~kzrl3eV~TxW8Xivl2GM4vzHwmGSjgwMMEISGs2Bh5rN4GKIBhzUDkP1LjkWe7-GTNUVgKIEIxJ-xi6WxRLvhPDPs-jW4kWd40GpHF5bMGDR-gWagyqb09B31wPa-6zh-Q__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","Justice Rubin convened the session and opened argument in Commonwealth v. Tehachdil, a challenge to a jury instruction that the defendant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self‑defense.

Defense attorney Jessica LeClaire told the three‑justice panel that Bruen, Heller and McDonald make clear the Second Amendment protects self‑defense in the home and therefore precludes a rule requiring a person to flee from a cohabitant before using force. \"At the time of the founding what the universal rule was, there's no duty to retreat in one's home,\" LeClaire said, citing People v. Tomlin and federal decisions she described as surveying the common law.

The court repeatedly questioned whether a person who could safely retreat nonetheless could claim lawful self‑defense. Justice Shin asked whether a defendant who was \"way down the hall\" and could have left the house but instead used deadly force would have a valid self‑defense claim. LeClaire said that necessity is a jury question and that the national tradition the Supreme Court recognizes supports no duty to retreat inside the home.

On rebuttal, Assistant District Attorney Sarah Lewis urged the panel to view the jury instruction as a limitation on when deadly force is lawful, not as a restriction on possession or ownership of arms under the Second Amendment. Lewis told the court the instruction requires the Commonwealth to prove a defendant \"did not use or attempt to use all proper and reasonable means under the circumstances to avoid physical combat before resorting to the use of deadly force.\" She argued that the instruction, when read with the model language and the trial judge's framing, allowed the jury to consider the circumstances (relative size, weapons, room to maneuver and location of the assault).

The justices pressed both sides on whether the instruction conflated when the duty to retreat arises (moment of deadly force versus earlier) and on whether the Commonwealth bore a historical burden to show a national tradition of a duty to retreat inside the home. LeClaire suggested that an instruction requiring proof that the defendant could have retreated \"in complete safety\" would better reflect the law; Lewis said the model instruction properly focused the inquiry on the circumstances and necessity.

The court heard extended questioning about whether the jury could fairly apply differing standards (what must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt versus preliminary authenticity findings) but limited argument time and submitted the case.

The appeals court did not announce a decision from the bench; the case was submitted for decision following oral argument.","Justice Rubin convened the session and opened argument in Commonwealth v. Tehachdil, a challenge to a jury instruction that the defendant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self‑defense.",{"_33":112,"_35":36,"_37":38,"_39":113,"_41":114,"_43":115,"_45":116,"_47":117,"_49":118,"_51":119,"_53":120,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":121,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":122,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":74},6765436,"Appeals court grills both sides on \"true threat\" standard, authentication and phone searches in paired Hayes appeals",3156,1848880,5005800,"/Search/View?dp=1&key=5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec&start=1848&end=5005","https://assets.pipeline.soar.com/5868629-c7e0a0d696e414030a42bcfc711230ec/thumbnail_1848880.jpg","/articles/6765436/Massachusetts/Appeals-court-grills-both-sides-on-true-threat-standard-authentication-and-phone-searches-in-paired-Hayes-appeals","https://secure.pipeline.soar.com/6765436-52c66d82aa94339c6fb5fc973011fc27/orig.mp4?Expires=1770570784&Signature=WUmZ4WIRnnWZRchtXOZtZ7CvIA5NYHdOUE~j3LdOyX5~S88iA1shChMFekBj86ZFviAlm7vaV3AXuFVcpQ8vRAR~DNNXvo1SiZQUj6GVLIIkMx061Naay6843iGtfEhRpx3o8tvGRPyn41SPMfiEpDXp0ugBJ~W-~9n9ffQa9-tLwVz6hvJfjihGrEVxRfzG187eaC3aiTFKlZmC9POAEyWkcl0MHz4nUtgTLvmdmQ05972~kwVxdt~TUJJCqyxaN7NrBha6l7jKIrkkmmnnrMNXWPriWpIDxPR2kJKgtPwAx2mMZnBipyJz5Sdu8FSN7dZTmg5lSTRQfS-qgMFpyg__&Key-Pair-Id=KUT5TJCACFTXG","The panel heard argument in two consolidated appeals captioned Commonwealth v. Hayes, focused on criminal intimidation and related counts arising from disturbing mailings and electronic communications.

Appellant counsel Christopher DeMaio argued the evidence (including Exhibit 20 and certain mailings) did not amount to a \"true threat\" under Virginia v. Black and related First Amendment precedent and that the jury could not reasonably find the communications were a serious expression of intent to commit violence. He pressed the court to apply the Virginia v. Black standard for a true threat and to construe Massachusetts statutes constraining criminal punishment for communications narrowly so as not to chill protected speech.

DeMaio also challenged the authenticity and jury instructions used to determine authorship of emails and electronic communications, urging the panel that the judge's instruction allowing a preponderance finding for authentication but beyond a reasonable doubt for guilt created confusion and possible reversible error. He noted the Alden and Purdy lines of cases and argued the mixed instructions might be structurally erroneous or at least require careful harmless‑error review.

On search and seizure, defense counsel argued that the warrant's scope permitted forensic examination for specific data but that a broad review of every photograph and document on a phone invaded privacy without particularity; the court asked how Cellebrite/GrayKey tools are used and whether screenshots could be located without reading every image.

Commonwealth counsel responded that the mailed swastika and doctored materials were properly characterized as threatening to the victim, that the mailing was integral to criminal conduct because it encouraged harassment, and that evidence showed the victim was frightened. The Commonwealth also defended the trial judge's instructions and the search as consistent with SJC precedent (citing Snow and authorities allowing photo review when communications are searched because people create screenshots of communications).

Judges queried whether the jury could have been misled by mixed standards, whether some alleged errors could be harmless given admissions or concessions, and whether any structural error required reversal. Counsel debated whether certain post‑trial documents affected sentencing or were appropriately considered on review.

The arguments spanned threats doctrine, evidentiary authentication, warrant particularity for digital devices, and sentencing challenges; the panel submitted the appeals for decision after extensive questioning.","In paired appeals captioned Commonwealth v. Hayes, defense counsel urged that harassing emails and mailed materials did not constitute constitutionally unprotected true threats and attacked jury instructions and authentication standards; the Commonwealth argued a swastika and targeted mailing were threatening and that the warrant and instructions","actionData","errors"]

Article not found

Appeals court wrestles with whether statute requires whistles at grade crossings or allows bells as alternative

Developer challenges Grafton Planning Board’s denial of waiver for 57‑unit project

Appeals court weighs whether evidence supported finding of parental unfitness and whether DCF's remedial failures required different relief

Appeals court probes whether Second Amendment bars duty to retreat from cohabitant in home

Appeals court grills both sides on "true threat" standard, authentication and phone searches in paired Hayes appeals