The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) reviewed Delaware County s Verity 2.7 hash verification procedures on March 13, 2025, and found no procedural failures, concluding the county s pre- and post-election hash checks matched EAC trusted hashes and conformed to certification requirements.
The report matters because hash verification compares a device or file s cryptographic fingerprint against the federally issued, certified fingerprint; a perfect match is required. "The Verity 2.7 procedural conformance hash and security review conducted on 03/13/2025 yielded no findings, observations, or issues that could potentially impact the security of the system as deployed," Chief Election Director James Allen told the board. He added that EAC reviewers confirmed the county followed the certified verification procedures.
The EAC report singled out local staff. Allen read a passage noting the EAC field services team wanted to "recognize and thank Chief Election Director James Allen and IT Manager Robert Wright from the Delaware County Board of Elections for helping facilitate this project and providing vital resources and staffing to ensure a successful review." The report said the county s use of hash verification is "noteworthy" and observed Delaware County as among a small number of Pennsylvania counties performing hash verification.
Allen and others described hash testing as an extra, voluntary security layer. "There's only one passing score when you do a hash test. It's gotta be an exact match," Allen said, explaining the comparison between the county s equipment and the EAC s certified hashes. He said the county s practice is not required by law but is intended to provide an additional check beyond federal and state certification.
Robert Wright, identified in the report as the county s IT manager, was thanked by Allen and by the EAC for helping facilitate the review. Allen said the county s practice could serve as a model for other jurisdictions and suggested the report could prompt broader adoption or consideration by the Pennsylvania Department of State.
County officials also noted the EAC observed the county s voting system, facility security and counting-center procedures appeared comprehensive and were followed during the review. Allen said the county s use of hash verification has prompted some public questions but described those as "inconsistent with the expert's findings."
The board did not take formal action on the EAC report during the meeting; Allen offered to answer questions from board members after reading the findings. He did not propose changing any voting procedures based on the report.
Ending: The EAC review will remain a public record of the county s voluntary security practices. County officials said they will continue the hash verification practice and field any related inquiries or legal challenges as they arise.