North Dakota Supreme Court hears challenge to multi‑decade sentence in Rugby Airport property‑damage case

The North Dakota Supreme Court heard oral argument Oct. 5 in State v. Tristan Lee Willett, a challenge to a district court sentence that defense lawyers say is cruel and unusual and constitutionally disproportionate. Appellant Willett was sentenced in connection with property damage at the Rugby Airport; the district court’s aggregate sentence totaled 81 years before a Rule 35 reduction that left roughly 29 years and 360 days (about 30 years) to serve.

The appeal argues the punishment is grossly disproportionate to nonviolent property offenses and to sentences imposed for more serious violent crimes. Defense counsel Kira Krausspar told the court the effective exposure of 81 years and the 30‑year custodial term are “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the North Dakota Constitution. Krausspar noted the offenses involved property damage, not physical threats, and described the damage as commercially significant but nonviolent; she told the court the group’s estimate of total damage was “about $1,000,000,” with insurance covering roughly $740,000 and the remainder reflected in restitution.

The state, represented by Joshua Fry, special assistant Pierce County state’s attorney, urged the court to uphold the sentence. Fry said the district court reviewed the defendant’s criminal history and the magnitude of the offense and that the court expressly recognized the sentence was “harsh.” The state argued the judge considered statutory sentencing factors, declined to use habitual‑offender enhancements and lawfully exercised discretion; Fry told the court the attacks “destroyed [the victims’] business in 9 minutes” and would affect “200 area producers” who relied on the business.

Before the justices, Krausspar emphasized two related concerns: (1) proportionality doctrine is a narrow exception but can apply to long, nonviolent or economic‑loss sentences; and (2) the practical effect of an aggregate maximum (81 years) is that a future probation revocation could expose Willett to decades more than the current custodial term. “The total sentence without the suspended time is 81 years,” Krausspar said, and “with the suspended time after the Rule 35, it is 29 years, 360 days,” an amount she argued was excessive compared with comparable sentences in the jurisdiction.

Fry replied that the statutory sentencing range and prior record support the district court’s disposition. He told the court the legislature provided the years used for sentencing and that parole processes mean the defendant will not necessarily serve the maximum term: “It is well known in the criminal justice community that our Department of Corrections utilizes parole regularly,” Fry said. The state also stressed the court’s Rule 35 order reduced the sentence as an exercise of leniency rather than a court concession the original sentence was unlawful.

Both sides cited precedent in contesting proportionality’s reach. Krausspar referenced federal and circuit decisions distinguishing violent from nonviolent offenses when examining Eighth Amendment claims; Fry pointed to Rummel and other precedent upholding long recidivist sentences and urged the court not to treat term‑of‑years sentences the same as life‑without‑parole cases.

The justices questioned how to assess proportionality when a sentence is expressed as a high aggregate but a shorter custodial term was imposed after a Rule 35 reduction. Several justices also asked whether particular factors the district judge mentioned at sentencing — including comments about airplane depreciation and anecdotal statements from acquaintances who are pilots — were permissible bases for a sentence. Krausspar argued the judge relied on impermissible, non‑record facts and urged reversal; Fry characterized those comments as dicta that did not change the court’s legally stated reasons for sentence.

This case was argued Oct. 5; the Supreme Court took the matter under advisement and has not yet issued a decision.