Arkansas Supreme Court affirms denial of Jessie Earl Hill’s postconviction motion

The Arkansas Supreme Court on Sept. 25, 2025 affirmed a Grant County circuit court’s denial and dismissal of Jessie Earl Hill’s motion seeking postconviction relief from his 1995 capital‑murder conviction, finding the filing frivolous and upholding a statutory strike. Associate Justice Courtney Rae Hudson wrote the opinion for the court. Hill, who filed pro se, had asked the circuit court to dismiss the underlying information, schedule a hearing, allow him to be present and to file supplemental materials, and to appoint counsel.

The decision matters because it reinforces procedural limits on attempts to use civil rules to reopen criminal judgments and reiterates that Rule 60(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to criminal postconviction relief. The court said postconviction motions in criminal matters are governed by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule 37.1 and the limitations in Rule 37.2(c).

Hill was convicted by a Grant County jury in 1995 of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole; he was later convicted of first‑degree murder in Ouachita County and received a consecutive sixty‑year sentence. In the motion at issue, Hill filed a roughly sixty‑page document with exhibits asserting clerical misprision and fraud, alleging prosecutorial misconduct and defective charging documents, raising double‑jeopardy contentions related to separate prosecutions in different counties, and seeking additional DNA testing of evidence such as the rolling pin used in the assault on the victim, Arbrady Moss. The circuit court found Hill’s motion largely incomprehensible, that it reasserted claims previously rejected in other petitions, and that it attempted to evade criminal‑procedure limits by invoking Rule 60(c).

“We affirm the circuit court’s order,” Hudson wrote, noting earlier appellate decisions that rejected substantially similar petitions filed by Hill. The opinion cited prior Hill decisions and other controlling precedent, including Robinson v. State and State v. Rowe, to explain that civil‑procedure Rule 60(c) does not supply a vehicle for collateral attack on a criminal judgment. The court also contrasted civil Rule 60(c) with criminal postconviction processes governed by Rule 37.1 and the abuse‑of‑the‑writ doctrine.

Because the circuit court determined the filing to be frivolous and not a cognizable avenue for postconviction relief, it imposed a strike under Ark. Code Ann. § 16‑68‑607(b). The Supreme Court upheld that sanction, observing that Hill had repeatedly filed lengthy petitions that the courts had found to be without merit. The opinion said the circuit court did not clearly err in denying and dismissing Hill’s motion.

Hill is identified in the opinion as the pro se appellant; the Attorney General’s office, represented by Assistant Attorney General Jason Michael Johnson, defended the State’s position. Special Justice Mark Allison joined the opinion; Justice Bronni did not participate.

The ruling leaves the circuit court’s dismissal and the strike in place and reiterates that postconviction relief in criminal cases must follow the criminal procedural rules and statutory constraints set by Arkansas law.