Arkansas Supreme Court Affirms Convictions, Upholds Cell‑phone Search as Good‑Faith; Calls Order‑of‑Protection Questioning an Error but Harmless

The Arkansas Supreme Court on Sept. 25 affirmed Santiago Vasquez Jr.’s convictions on five counts of rape and vacated the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ decision, ruling that evidence extracted from Vasquez’s cell phone need not be suppressed because officers reasonably relied on a magistrate’s probable‑cause determination, but that the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross‑examine Vasquez about unrelated orders of protection — an error the majority found harmless.

The ruling, written by Justice Barbara W. Webb, upheld a 960‑month aggregate sentence that the Greene County jury imposed after a third trial and clarified how the good‑faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when an issuing judge received additional sworn testimony beyond a warrant affidavit.

In its opinion the court accepted the circuit court’s finding that Lieutenant Rhonda Thomas’s written affidavit omitted an explicit sentence linking the alleged child‑pornographic images to the phone, but concluded that Judge Dan Stidham had received supplemental sworn testimony from Thomas by telephone before issuing the warrant and that it was objectively reasonable for officers to rely on the warrant. The court applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s good‑faith framework in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and cited Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), for the proposition that child‑pornography can be used to groom children and thus supported a nexus to an alleged child‑sexual‑abuse investigation.

The court summarized the facts underlying the search: Paragould police arrested Vasquez on Feb. 28, 2019; officers recovered a black backpack from his residence and found an iPhone inside that was later searched pursuant to a warrant issued after Detective (Lieutenant) Rhonda Thomas submitted an affidavit. The affidavit reported that a minor victim (identified in the record as MV) had alleged multiple acts of deviate sexual activity and that she had told investigators Vasquez had shown her pornographic images on his phone. Judge Stidham testified at the suppression hearing that Thomas had told him MV said Vasquez had photographed her and shown her child‑pornography images on his phone; the circuit court nonetheless found the written affidavit deficient but declined to suppress the images under the good‑faith exception because it found no evidence Thomas had misled the judge.

On the admission of other evidence, the court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State to elicit detailed testimony from Vasquez about two orders‑of‑protection matters involving his then‑girlfriend Angel Spurlock in 2020. The court concluded the questioning exceeded the bounds of Arkansas Rules of Evidence 404(a)(1), 405, 608, and 613 because it introduced specific instances of conduct that were not shown to be a proper basis for attacking Vasquez’s truthfulness or a permissible character inquiry under the rules. The majority nevertheless concluded the error was harmless.

The majority relied on the broader evidentiary record when assessing prejudice. It noted that forensic evidence and testimony corroborated MV’s account: sexual‑abuse nurse examiner Tracy Smith testified that MV’s description was consistent with sexual assault and explained that a high proportion of child sexual‑abuse examinations are medically “normal”; DNA testing of a purple vibrator recovered from a toolbox in the house identified Vasquez as the major male contributor to a mixture; and images of a prepubescent child’s genitalia and buttocks were found on the phone. The opinion also summarized MV’s graphic trial testimony about multiple sexual acts, her delayed disclosure, and corroborating lay testimony from MV’s mother, Abigail, who described treating vaginal irritation and who testified about household conditions. The court concluded that, given the totality of the admissible evidence, the improper orders‑of‑protection questioning was only mildly prejudicial and did not warrant reversal.

Chief Justice Karen R. Baker wrote a dissent concluding the evidentiary error was not harmless and that the case turned largely on competing credibility determinations. Baker argued that unlike cases in which eyewitnesses or direct physical evidence independently corroborate the victim’s account, the record here did not contain that kind of corroboration and therefore the improper impeachment evidence could not be deemed “slight.” She would have reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Key procedural points: the case reached the Supreme Court after the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded an earlier conviction; this appeal represents Vasquez’s third trial on the charges. The Supreme Court’s opinion vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed the Greene County circuit court order denying suppression and the convictions.

What this means: the opinion clarifies that a magistrate’s probable‑cause finding may be supported by sworn supplemental testimony received contemporaneously with a warrant application, that the good‑faith exception can apply when an affidavit is facially weak but the judge had additional sworn information, and that trial courts must carefully apply the Arkansas Rules of Evidence before permitting inquiries into specific instances of a defendant’s past conduct that bear on credibility.

Court filings list Erin W. Lewis as counsel for the appellant and Walker K. Hawkins, assistant attorney general, for the State.