High court weighs whether "windstorm" deductible covers tornado damage

The Supreme Court of Texas heard argument on whether the term "windstorm" in a homeowner policy's windstorm deductible covers damage caused by a tornado. Petitioner insurer counsel argued the ordinary meaning of "windstorm"—as found across dictionaries and lay usage—includes violent wind events such as tornadoes, and that the specific loss at issue had "little or no rain," citing meteorological summary evidence. "This is the case about whether the word windstorm in a deductible provision of a homeowner's policy, includes the tornado that damaged the Mankoffs' home," counsel said. The homeowner's counsel urged a narrower dictionary-based meaning that commonly describes windstorms as storms with "little or no precipitation," arguing that tornadoes typically form from precipitating supercell thunderstorms and therefore are categorically different. That side pointed to dictionary definitions (Merriam-Webster, American Heritage) and an encyclopedia entry describing tornadoes as distinct. The insurer's counsel responded that in insurance coverage contexts the term has been construed broadly and that many judicial decisions treat "windstorm" as an umbrella term that can include tornadoes; insurers also argue that policies are read in their ordinary, homeowner-facing language and that meteorological distinctions are not dispositive. The lawyers and justices discussed practical consequences for insureds and the insurance market: whether policyholders would be surprised if a damage described in news or by a weather forecaster as a "windstorm" actually meant something narrower; whether a dictionary-based exclusion would let carriers defeat coverage for the catastrophic events (tornadoes) that most homeowners fear; and whether insurer-drafted policy language and subsequent endorsement changes (some insurers now define windstorm broadly in newer forms) alter the ordinary meaning. The record included a meteorologist's statement that the event produced approximately two minutes of rain following the tornado; counsel debated whether that quantity qualifies as "little or no precipitation." Several parties and amici pointed to older case law and varying state approaches going back to early 20th-century decisions. The court took the arguments and submitted the case for decision.