Texas Supreme Court weighs whether DFPS "abandoned" parental-rights termination during trial

May it please the court: attorneys debating a parental-rights case told the Texas Supreme Court that a single public employee''a designated caseworker''testified during a bench trial that the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) was not seeking termination of a mother's parental rights. The petitioner argues that statement amounted to abandonment of the termination claim and that the trial court''s resulting termination judgment was unsupported by the pleadings. Respondent DFPS counters that the caseworker lacked authority to unilaterally abandon the department's pleaded claim and that the department continued to present termination evidence.

Why it matters: a ruling that a caseworker's testimony can constitute abandonment would affect how DFPS litigates in bench trials and could impose a duty on agency counsel to immediately correct or clarify witness statements; conversely, a decision that prevents such unilateral abandonment preserves prosecutorial flexibility but raises concerns about clarity for parents and family-court factfinders.

Petitioner counsel, identified in argument as Mister Rowans, told the court that the caseworker was the department's designated representative and that her testimony represented a clear, unequivocal statement that DFPS was not seeking termination. He requested reversal of the court of appeals and a remand (or a rendered judgment) naming respondent mother a parent nonconservator, the lesser relief the department had said it sought.

Respondent counsel argued that (1) the caseworker did not have authority to abandon the department''s pleaded claim; (2) other witnesses and the attorney ad litem provided testimony indicating termination remained at issue; and (3) even if abandonment occurred, termination was tried by consent because the record shows the department elicited evidence on termination and the trial court considered it. Respondent asked the court to affirm the termination judgment.

Justices pressed both sides on limiting principles. Several asked whether a clear, contemporaneous statement by agency counsel could undo any ambiguity; others asked whether parents or their counsel should object immediately when the department's witnesses signal the agency is not pursuing termination. Petitioner urged that, because DFPS routinely pleads termination in initial petitions, the court should focus on whether the department, through its designated representative and counsel, actually disavowed the claim during trial.

Record points noted at argument: the child was placed with the paternal grandfather; DFPS had sought to name the father permanent managing conservator and to make the mother a parent nonconservator; other courts of appeals have decided similar fact patterns and found abandonment where DFPS witnesses unequivocally disavowed termination; counsel cited family-code provisions and precedent (including Shepherd v. Ledford) bearing on stipulations and the effect of admissions during judicial proceedings.

Outcome requested by petitioner: reverse the court of appeals and render judgment declaring the mother a parent nonconservator (the relief the department said it sought at trial). Respondent asked the court to affirm the termination judgment, arguing the department never abandoned its claim and that termination was tried by consent.

Next steps: the Supreme Court will issue a written opinion resolving whether and when testimony by an agency representative constitutes abandonment and what remedial or procedural rules trial courts should apply to clarify the agency's position in bench trials.