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Justices weigh whether shareholders can sue adviser directly or must bring derivative claim
Summary
In a dispute over whether NexPoint may pursue a direct claim against an investment adviser, advocates debated whether the advisory agreement created individualized rights for shareholders or whether the alleged harms are derivative and belong to the REIT.
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May it please the court — counsel for the adviser and for NexPoint argued a central corporate‑law question: when do shareholders have a direct cause of action against a third‑party adviser for alleged mismanagement, and when are such claims derivative and therefore subject to derivative‑action rules?
Petitioners' counsel, Mister Hawkins, urged the court to find NexPoint’s claims are derivative and to dismiss the direct complaints. His argument tracked long‑standing Delaware and Texas principles that an individual shareholder cannot recover for injuries that are collective and pro rata: such claims must ordinarily be brought derivatively on behalf of the entity. Hawkins contended that NexPoint’s alleged harm — depreciation in the value of shares caused by alleged advisor misconduct — is the same injury suffered by all shareholders and therefore derivative.
Real parties’ counsel, Mister Tillotson, said the advisory agreement created an express fiduciary duty to the trust and its shareholders and that the plaintiffs allege individualized contractual rights and injuries arising from the adviser’s conduct. He argued the contract created enforceable obligations running to shareholders, which, if proved, would permit direct suits.
Why it matters: The court’s decision will determine whether shareholders who allege adviser misconduct may proceed directly in Texas courts or must pursue derivative remedies (and associated procedural prerequisites) often in the state of incorporation. The ruling also touches on choice‑of‑law and forum‑selection clauses, corporate governance and the risks of parallel litigation.
Legal framework and precedent discussed: Advocates and justices discussed a series of controlling decisions long relied upon by Texas courts — Tooley (direct‑versus‑derivative test), Wingate, Ritchie and earlier precedents going back to Massachusetts v. Davis. Petitioners urged the court to apply a strict rule that the complaint’s gravamen determines capacity; real parties urged that contractual language can create direct rights and that discovery was necessary to flesh out individualized allegations.
Procedural posture: Petitioners argued capacity and jurisdiction were proper bases for mandamus and dismissal; they noted related motions and procedural history, including a denied mandamus at the court of appeals on other procedural grounds. Real parties said they had alleged direct injuries and that discovery was needed to develop the record.
Ending: The justices pressed both sides on whether the advisory agreement’s language — that the adviser owes a fiduciary duty "to the trust and its shareholders" — is a sufficiently clear statement to displace the default rule that mismanagement claims are derivative. The court did not issue an immediate ruling at argument.

