At oral argument before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, attorneys for the Commonwealth and for a juvenile defendant sparred over whether a delinquency complaint charging a juvenile with violating chapter 269, section 10(a) requires a formal adjudication of delinquency rather than a continuation without a finding.

The issue matters because chapter 1, section 58, paragraph 7 of the juvenile-sentencing statute imposes a mandatory minimum DYS commitment of "a hundred and 80 days or until the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, whichever occurs first," for an adjudication on certain firearm offenses; the Commonwealth told the court that statutory language and the 1996 amendments require a judicial adjudication before that mandatory minimum can attach.

Attorney Molly Paris, "on behalf of the Commonwealth," told the court: "The discreet issue before this court is whether an adjudication is required for [a] juvenile charge by delinquency complaint for violating chapter 269, section 10(a). The answer is yes." Paris argued the plain language of c.269 10(a) ("prosecutions commenced under this subsection shall not be continued without a finding") must be read in harmony with c.119 58(7), and that the legislature in 1996 made clear it intended to treat firearm offenses more harshly than others.

Neil Tassle, attorney for the juvenile who received a continuation without a finding from Judge Coyne in Boston Juvenile Court, argued the juvenile-code history and the statutes purpose support permitting continuations in some cases. "Since 1975, the legislature has provided for a mechanism . . . by which juveniles can be treated differently than adults," Tassle said, and he told the court continuations without a finding have long been a discrete disposition that preserves rehabilitative options for young people.

The lawyers debated statutory structure and legislative history. The Commonwealth focused on the mandatory-minimum language in c.119 58(7) and the 1996 enactments that created the youthful-offender transfer regime; Paris said paragraph 7s "notwithstanding any other provision" phrasing indicates the legislatures intent that a finding of delinquency be required for the firearm offense at issue. Tassle countered that paragraph 7 addresses adjudications, not continuations without a finding, and that permitting continuations in some circumstances avoids an anomalous result in which juveniles who are not indicted as youthful offenders would be forced into a mandatory committed sentence while others might avoid it.

Justices pressing both sides asked whether the statutes are ambiguous and, if so, whether the rule of lenity applies. One Justice (unidentified) framed the issue: "If it's ambiguous . . . doesn't the rule of lenity militate in favor of Judge Coyne's ability to do this?" Paris answered that the statute is clear and that lenity does not apply; Tassle argued the juvenile statutes and historical practice support allowing continuations in appropriate cases.

Both sides referenced case law and statutory amendments. Counsel mentioned the courts prior decisions (referenced in argument as Connor/C. and Doan), the 1996 amendments tied to the Youthful Offender provisions, and more recent developments; neither side asked the court to resolve specific facts of the Boston Juvenile Court disposition beyond statutory interpretation. Counsel also discussed the youthful-offender process (possible indictment to adult court and adult sentencing exposure for certain ages) and practical consequences: Paris highlighted that, for certain cases a prosecutor could seek a youthful-offender indictment; Tassle noted that continuations have been rare but used where the juvenile court judge found them appropriate, citing an example in which the juvenile had mitigating circumstances (an FID card, letters of support, school reinstatement, public service) and the judge continued without a finding.

No formal ruling was issued at argument. The court heard extensive questioning from the bench and took the matter under advisement.

Ending: The Supreme Judicial Court will issue a written decision after considering the parties briefs and the oral argument; that decision will determine whether juvenile delinquency complaints charging violations of c.269 10(a) can be resolved by a continuation without a finding or instead require a formal adjudication subject to the juvenile-sentencing statute's mandatory minimums.