The Utah Court of Appeals on Sept. 5, 2025, affirmed a lower court’s summary-judgment ruling in favor of All Surface LC, holding that a signed customer agreement forestalled homeowners’ claims that the company agreed to perform mold remediation.

A basement shower’s shared wall with a furnace room allowed condensation to seep into the wall over time, producing rot and visible mold. Esther Reid and her mother, Mina Richins, hired All Surface to replace the shower after discovering a puddle and mold. Reid signed a written contract on March 9, 2017, listing a contract price of $8,470 and specifying installation of a “30x30 low threshold shower base.” The contract’s specifications pages marked demolition of the “Tub/Shower Base” as “YES” but did not mark “Wall” for demolition. The Contract also included a release provision stating: “Customer agrees to indemnify, hold harmless, release, and forever discharge . . . from and against any and all claims . . . resulting from mold or mildew found or not found, seen or unseen, discovered at the time of the job or in the future.”

Reid testified that All Surface sales associate Brad Watson told her the company could do full mold remediation, and All Surface’s general manager, David Smith, later emailed Reid on April 28, 2017, describing the condition he had observed and stating, “The mold needs to be treated and the area cleaned of all mold. The framing of the shower stall needs to be replaced and the shower stall redone. The cost of this project is approximately $8400.” Remediation Company painted visible mold with a KILZ product on June 12, 2017. All Surface removed the old shower and installed a new one on June 26–27, 2017 but did not remove the underlying wall or remediate the mold inside the wall.

Reid and Richins sued in 2019 alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and related claims, saying All Surface had promised remediation and a full tear-out. All Surface moved for summary judgment, arguing the written Contract is integrated and its release language bars claims for mold-related losses. The district court granted summary judgment and denied Reid’s Rule 59 motion to alter the judgment.

In an opinion authored by Judge John D. Luthy, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court concluded the Contract’s opening paragraphs functioned as a clear integration clause: the agreement states that “all services, products, and accessories are listed in the Job Specification forms” and that “items not listed have not been charged for and any additional services or products added . . . will require a Change Order Request Form.” The court held that, under Utah precedent, that language made the written specifications the final and complete expression of the services All Surface agreed to perform, and parol evidence could not be used to add or vary those terms.

The appeals court also rejected the homeowners’ alternate arguments. It held the specifications pages unambiguously listed only the tub/shower base for demolition and did not require wall teardown or mold remediation. The court stated Smith’s April 2017 email did not constitute a modification of the integrated contract, and that Reid could not have reasonably relied on post-contract statements to show inducement to sign a contract that was already in writing. In its conclusion the court wrote: “The Contract contains a clear integration clause as to the services All Surface was obligated to perform, and those services unambiguously did not include mold remediation or demolition of the shower wall down to the studs.”

The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the district court’s denial of Reid’s Rule 59 motion, finding no abuse of discretion in declining to revisit the integrated-contract determination or to entertain a new argument about the meaning of the term “Fast bath” raised late in post-judgment briefing.

The judgment for All Surface LC, Brad Watson and David Smith therefore stands. The opinion identifies the principal legal issues as contract integration, admissibility of parol evidence, and whether post-contract communications could modify or reasonably be relied upon to alter the written terms.

For homeowners and contractors, the case highlights the importance of clearly listing all work to be performed in the written specifications and using change orders if additional demolition or remediation is required. Reid and Richins’ remaining claims that were dismissed at summary judgment (including negligence and breach of the implied warranty of habitability) were not separately revived by the appeals court’s opinion.