The Utah Court of Appeals on Aug. 14, 2025, vacated the convictions of Jennifer Lynn McCraw and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that her trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move for a directed verdict after the prosecution presented no evidence that the damaged plates belonged to someone other than McCraw. Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster wrote the opinion, which Judges Gregory K. Orme and David N. Mortensen concurred in.
The ruling matters because the criminal mischief charge—an essential element of the domestic-violence-in-the-presence-of-a-child count—requires proof that the defendant "intentionally damage[d], deface[d], or destroy[ed] the property of another," language found in Utah Code § 76-6-106(2)(c) as it applied in 2021. The appeals court concluded the prosecution’s proffer at trial did not include any evidence identifying ownership of the plates, and that omission undermined the convictions.
At a bench trial held in October 2021, McCraw did not appear. Trial counsel reported that McCraw had relocated and was experiencing homelessness; counsel did not move for a continuance, and the court proceeded. The prosecutor proceeded by proffer, offering anticipated testimony from Victoria (a pseudonym used in the record) and two responding officers that described an argument inside the residence, McCraw’s breaking of plates in front of Victoria’s young child, and a confession that McCraw had broken the plates. The prosecution’s proffers did not identify who owned the plates.
Judge Forster wrote that trial counsel ‘‘agreed the City could proceed entirely by proffer’’ and then made no motion and called no witnesses after the prosecution rested. The opinion states, "Because Cedar City presented no evidence that McCraw damaged or destroyed the property of another—an essential element of criminal mischief ... counsel’s failure to move for a directed verdict was deficient and prejudicial." The court applied the two-prong Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, finding both deficient performance and prejudice that undermined confidence in the outcome.
The appeals court acknowledged a counterfactual: had defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, the trial court might have allowed the prosecution to reopen its case to produce ownership evidence. But the court emphasized that reopening is discretionary and not guaranteed. Given the prosecution’s evidentiary gap, the appellate court concluded there was at least a reasonable probability the trial court would have granted a dismissal, which in turn would have defeated the domestic-violence count that depended on the mischief conviction.
The opinion notes related procedural facts: the case was initially charged in Iron County Justice Court and later transferred to the Fifth District Court (Cedar City Department), the bench trial was continued once before ultimately proceeding in McCraw’s absence, and appellate counsel on record for McCraw in the appeals court included Dylan T. Carlson, Debra M. Nelson, Benjamin Miller and Wendy M. Brown. Randall K. McUne represented the appellee, Cedar City, in the appeal.
The Court of Appeals’ decision vacates McCraw’s convictions and remands the case for a new trial so that the district court can address the evidentiary deficiency and proceed in conformity with the court’s guidance on counsel performance and the prosecution’s burden of proof.