Guideposts, an outside security consulting team, told the Revere Public Schools Security & Safety Committee on Aug. 13 that the district has many safety tools in place but lacks a single, districtwide security plan and full integration of its systems.

"We did not perform an audit. We were not auditing any of the schools' safety and security measures, processes, programs, resources, or tools," Michael Bairstone, senior consultant with Guideposts, said while presenting the firm’s review. The consultants described their work as a holistic review based on site visits, document review and interviews, not technical system testing.

The consultants said Revere Public Schools (RPS) operates 11 schools at eight locations and that individual schools have many security elements — door contacts, proximity readers, video systems, emergency operation plans and periodic "enhanced drills" conducted with Revere Police Department. "The district has some good security features and technologies," the presenters said, while adding the technologies are "not well integrated" and are "not consistently used." John Galina, introduced as a senior managing director at DIPOST Solutions affiliated with the presentation team, said he was presenting as a Revere native and praised staff cooperation during the review.

Why it matters: consultants told the committee that a single districtwide security plan would consolidate existing provisions and create consistent guidance for emergency operations, training, equipment use and reporting. Guideposts recommended using the federal high-quality emergency operations plan template as a district-level model and said current building-level plans do not align with that industry-recognized template.

Key findings presented
- No single districtwide security plan: Guideposts said provisions exist across RPS documents but a single, formalized district plan that aligns schools and clarifies responsibilities, review cycles and training does not yet exist. The consultants recommended adopting a district EOP (emergency operations plan) template and aligning school-level plans to it.
- Video and monitoring: All schools have video surveillance, but systems are uneven, some cameras are inoperable, and most video is used for forensic review rather than active monitoring. Revere Police Department can access some feeds and a few larger schools reportedly have staff watching feeds, but active, districtwide monitoring infrastructure is not in place.
- Access control and hardware: Operational doors generally use proximity readers (fobs/cards) and schools have door-contact sensors; many classroom doors rely on manual flip locks that comply with the Commonwealth guidance referenced in the presentation. Guideposts noted request-to-exit (REX) devices and emergency push-bars on some doors that can both unlock and silence alarms, which requires careful review of design choices.
- Panic/duress devices lacking: The consultants said most schools do not have static panic or duress alarm buttons in key offices (principal, nurse, guidance), though a few locations do. Guideposts highlighted this as a possible area for consideration.
- Intrusion detection and integration: Motion detectors and intrusion sensors exist, but the access control, CCTV and intrusion-detection systems are not integrated on a single platform. Integration would allow automatic camera pulls and alarm-linked video, the presenters said.
- Behavioral threat assessment and reporting: The district has bullying reporting and is working on a bystander-reporting capability. Guideposts described a Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management (BTAM) program and a multidisciplinary Threat Assessment Team as national best-practice components; presenters said RPS has many of these elements but should formalize who manages them and how information flows among SROs, social workers, principals and city partners.
- Site and building issues: Some building layouts include concealable areas, non-ballistic glazing, and landscaping that can limit lines of sight. Lighting audits found several lights out and inconsistent illumination types across sites.
- Training and drills: RPS conducts required fire drills and enhanced active-threat drills coordinated with RPD. Consultants emphasized training as a core strength, noting that repeated training helped people respond quickly in other incidents.

Quotes and attributions in context
"We did not perform an audit. We were not auditing any of the schools' safety and security measures, processes, programs, resources, or tools," Michael Bairstone said to stress the scope of the engagement. He later summarized the district-level finding: "There does not yet exist a district wide security plan." John Galina, senior managing director with DIPOST Solutions who participated in the presentation, said the work "has been a great opportunity" and praised Revere staff for cooperating during site visits.

Local officials and responders participated in the discussion. Sergeant Joe Turner (Revere Police Department) and a fire lieutenant identified in the transcript as Lieutenant O'Leary and Chief Lavetta contributed operational perspectives on drills, inspections and response times. A district representative said cameras that had failed in recent years are being replaced under a committee-approved budget; the presentation noted cameras purchased under a prior procurement requirement had proven unsustainable and were being replaced.

Action and next steps
At the close of the public presentation the committee voted to move into an executive session to discuss questions about individual schools. A motion to enter executive session was made and seconded on the floor; the committee chair announced, "All in favor? Yes." The committee also said it will form a working committee composed of school committee members, police and fire representatives and district staff to pursue recommendations, build an implementation roadmap and coordinate communications with parents and the community.

What the report did not provide or specify
The Guideposts presenters said they did not perform live stress testing of systems (for example, video feed integrity under weather conditions). Several items mentioned in the review — e.g., the size of the camera-replacement budget and exact timelines for implementing an integrated system or additional duress devices — were discussed at a high level but not specified in dollar amounts or deadlines during the public presentation.

Next public steps noted by the committee include convening the multiagency implementation committee and going into executive session for school-specific follow-ups. The district and Guideposts said they will continue to work together to answer follow-up questions submitted during the presentation.