Texas Supreme Court hears whether "windstorm" deductible covers tornado damage

At oral arguments before the Supreme Court of Texas in case no. 240132, counsel debated whether the word “windstorm” in a homeowner policy’s deductible covers a tornado that damaged the insureds’ home.

The question matters because the court’s definition would determine whether a 2% windstorm deductible applies to tornado damage under the policy at issue and could affect how insurers draft exclusions and how insured Texans understand their coverage.

Mister DeBose, arguing for the petitioner, told the court that the policy’s undefined term should be given its ordinary meaning and that “the common feature of all those definitions of wind is a strong or a violent wind.” He argued the tornado at issue falls within that ordinary meaning and emphasized the summary‑judgment evidence that, according to a meteorologist’s affidavit in the record, “there was likely 2 minutes of rain” after the tornado, which he said qualifies as “little or no rain” for dictionary definitions that include that phrase. DeBose urged the court to follow what he described as the long line of authorities treating windstorm as a lay umbrella term rather than a precise meteorological category.

Mister Pitts, arguing for the respondent, countered that the word “windstorm” has a narrow, commonly understood sense that excludes tornadoes. Pitts said “the word windstorm is commonly used and defined in a narrow sense to refer to a categorically different type of weather event from tornadoes,” and told the justices that ordinary insureds consulting dictionaries or everyday usage would not expect tornado damage to be swept into a windstorm deductible. Pitts cited dictionary definitions that include the phrase “with little or no precipitation,” described the parent thunderstorm and tornadic supercell structure that typically involves precipitation, and noted that some insurers (identified in the record) have revised policy language to define or exclude windstorm explicitly.

Both sides discussed prior decisions and sources. DeBose referenced older Texas authority and decisions from other jurisdictions that treat windstorm as an umbrella term and urged the court to look to ordinary meaning; he cited City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen and a longstanding fire‑insurance case discussed in the briefs as framing windstorm by its “violent wind” characteristic. Pitts noted authorities and lexicographic sources (Merriam‑Webster, American Heritage, New Oxford) and argued that several decisions and statutory language treat tornadoes and windstorms as distinct hazards; he also referenced the Texas legislature’s separate listing of tornado, windstorm and hail in materials in the record and pointed to examples of insurers altering policy language after the underlying events.

The justices asked about methodology for deciding ordinary meaning — whether to rely on dictionaries, industry usage, meteorological classifications, corpora or encyclopedias — and whether a summary‑judgment record showing a brief period of rain after the tornado resolves the factual question for all cases. Counsel for the petitioner stressed that, if an ordinary meaning exists, the court should apply it before reaching any rule that ambiguous exclusionary language must be construed for the insured. Counsel for the respondent maintained that the term is reasonably susceptible to two meanings and that, in an exclusionary context, that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the insured.

The court heard additional colloquy about practical consequences: whether public warnings or ordinary conversation would lead a Texan to equate a windstorm with a tornado; whether defining windstorm narrowly would create coverage surprises; and whether insurers can—and should—avoid disputes by expressly defining windstorm in policy language. No decision was announced at argument.

The court took the arguments under advisement and the case will be decided by written opinion at a later date.