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North Dakota Supreme Court hears arguments over use of prior plea and judicial notice in gun-possession case

5381524 · February 7, 2025
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Summary

The state asked the Supreme Court to reverse a Burleigh County judge's dismissal of an information charging Leon Helland with unlawful firearm possession, disputing whether the district court improperly considered materials outside the preliminary-hearing record and whether a deferred plea preserves a firearms prohibition.

BISMARCK, N.D. — The North Dakota Supreme Court on Feb. 24 heard oral arguments in State of North Dakota v. Leon Helland, a dispute over whether a Burleigh County District Court erred in dismissing an information that charges Helland with unlawful possession of a firearm.

Isaac Lees, counsel for the appellant State of North Dakota, told the court the central question is procedural: the district court exceeded its role at a preliminary hearing by considering evidence outside the record and by adopting a theory of defense not advanced by counsel, then weighing that extraneous material against the testimony that was actually presented. “The court must make factual decisions only upon the evidentiary record of testimony and exhibits,” Lees said, citing the State’s view of this court’s precedents on the limited fact-finding permitted at preliminary hearings.

Lees emphasized the limited record in the hearing below: only one witness — Officer Benitez — testified. According to Lees, Officer Benitez testified she reviewed a Mandan Police Department affidavit of probable cause that alleged a firearm was used or possessed during the events that led to a prior menacing conviction (case number 30-2020-CR-00861), but the written plea agreement in that prior case did not contain specific facts about a firearm and there was no in-court change-of-plea transcript establishing that factual basis.

Alexander Gross, counsel for the appellee Leon Helland, argued the district court acted within permissible bounds when it considered the prior case materials and other records. Gross told the justices that the court may take judicial notice on its own and that documents accessible to the judge and counsel may inform a probable-cause finding. Gross also argued that a written plea agreement that does not state the presence or use of a firearm does not prove such facts, and therefore the state should not be able to treat silence in a plea agreement as dispositive proof of a firearm’s use.

A second legal dispute presented to the justices was statutory: whether a deferred imposition of sentence or later dismissal in the prior menacing case removes the conviction as a qualifying predicate for later firearm-prohibition charges. Lees cited statutory language in North Dakota law indicating the firearms prohibitor can survive a deferred imposition, while Gross relied on the effect of sealing and dismissal of deferred cases and on case law (including State v. Nelson) that the parties debated as to its present applicability.

Members of the court questioned both sides closely about limits on judicial notice at preliminary hearings, the applicable burdens at the probable-cause stage, and what would put a defendant on notice that a prior plea could serve as a firearm-disqualifying conviction later. Chief Justice John Jensen and Justices Daniel Crothers, Lisa Fair McEvers, Jared Tufte and Douglas Barr asked about Rule 201 and the difference between taking notice of the existence of records and taking notice of disputed factual content within those records. Lees responded that permitting a court to rely on post-hearing filings or non-evidentiary filings without giving the opposing party an opportunity to respond would violate basic due process at the preliminary-hearing stage.

Both counsel agreed that a trial — where the state must prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt — is the appropriate forum to resolve factual disputes about whether a firearm was used or possessed, but they differed on what the state must be allowed to rely on at the preliminary-hearing probable-cause inquiry. Lees urged that any disputed factual inferences must be resolved in favor of a finding of probable cause; Gross countered that relying on extrinsic documents to convert a plea that omits a firearm fact into conclusively proving a firearm was used is improper.

The court took no immediate action and the case was taken under advisement. No decision was announced at the hearing.

Why this matters: The justices’ resolution will affect when and how prosecutors may rely on prior pleas, sealed records or affidavits of probable cause to establish predicate convictions for later gun-possession prosecutions, and it may clarify the permissible scope of judicial notice and court inquiry at preliminary hearings in North Dakota.