A man appealing the district court’s approval of an adult adoption told the North Dakota Supreme Court that he did not receive a required notice of the adoption hearing and asked the court to remand the matter for a new hearing so he could attend and present evidence.

The appellant argued at oral argument that the district court erred by relying on a finding that notice was unnecessary because his consent was not required and by failing to ensure valid proof of service of the notice of trial, which he said violated North Dakota statutes and his due-process rights.

The argument centered on whether the petitioners or the court were required to ensure service of notice of the time and place of the hearing and whether service of the petition alone satisfied the statutory requirement. The appellant cited the North Dakota Century Code provisions the transcript records as 14-15-06.2 and 14-15-11.7 and told the court that “Notice and notice of the trial is not some courtesy provided, but is a mandatory step under due process and statute itself.” A justice asked, “If we agree with you on that point, do we just remand to start that hearing over?” and the appellant replied that a new hearing with proper notice should occur.

The appellant told the court he received service of the adoption petition before it was filed on the docket — which he said occurred on June 25, with the case filed June 28 — but that he did not receive the separate notice of trial (referred to in the record as R47). He said the court clerk’s calendar-control entry included a statement that a copy of the order was mailed to him but lacked a certificate of service or any indication of when or how it was sent. He argued that because the notice-of-trial entry lacked valid proof of service, the district court’s order could not be treated as if he had been properly notified.

At argument the appellant also raised undue-influence and family-law concerns. He said his adult daughter’s consent to adoption was subject to question because of what he described as “a strong . . . result of undue influence” arising from a history of familial conflict and actions by the petitioning mother. He told the court he had submitted a multi-volume affidavit to the district court but that the judge limited his filings and directed him to narrow his affidavit to five pages, which he argued improperly prevented the trial court from considering the full record.

The attorney for the petitioners is referenced in briefing as Thomas Jackson; the appellant argued Jackson bore a duty under the statute to ensure service of notice to him or, at minimum, that the court enter an order directing service. A justice questioned whether electronic service would have been adequate and whether the appellant had consented to receive documents electronically; the appellant replied he is signed up for electronic service but maintained that, in any event, there must be a valid proof-of-service filing for the notice of hearing.

The appellant also invoked broader constitutional concerns, arguing his familial rights under the Fourteenth Amendment supported at least an opportunity to object and present evidence even if statutory consent was not required. He described factual circumstances presented in his filings — including earlier family-therapy recommendations, contested parenting-time disputes and a prior restraining-order filing — as the background for his undue-influence claims.

The court did not announce a decision at the hearing. The bench took the case under advisement and announced the matter would be taken under advisement; the clerk noted the court would adjourn and reconvene at 10:45 a.m.