ND Supreme Court hears challenge over coerced evaluation, speedy-trial delay and credit for time served in Allman case

BISMARCK, N.D. — The North Dakota Supreme Court on Aug. 19 heard arguments in State of North Dakota v. Christopher Walter James Allman over five issues raised on appeal, most prominently whether a court-ordered criminal-responsibility evaluation—requested by a stipulation in the record—was improperly used in a way that delayed criminal proceedings and whether the sentence calculation failed to credit Allman for time spent in custody before sentencing.

Kiera Krauspar, attorney for appellant Christopher Walter James Allman, told the court she was defending five issues on appeal, beginning with whether “the court erred in not ordering a fitness to proceed or competency evaluation,” and pressing that the stipulation in the record was ambiguous about who requested what. Krauspar told the justices the stipulation “discusses seeking a criminal responsibility evaluation, but also that there’s been information or observations that lead to questions of competency.”

Nathan Madden, attorney for the appellee (the state), responded that the stipulation was filed under the statutory provision governing criminal-responsibility evaluations by stipulation, and disputed the defense characterization that the state had misled the court. “The stipulation was filed under 12.1‑04.1‑05 subsection 2, which relates to a criminal responsibility evaluation by stipulation of the parties,” Madden said.

Why it matters

The dispute turns on two distinct but sometimes overlapping legal processes: a competency (fitness to proceed) evaluation, which the court can order if there is reason to doubt a defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel; and a criminal-responsibility evaluation, which examines whether the defendant lacked the requisite mental state at the time of the alleged offense. Krauspar argued the two evaluations were conflated in the record and that the state should not, in her view, be a party to a criminal-responsibility evaluation because that evaluation is tied to an affirmative defense that effectively admits the defendant’s conduct.

What counsel told the court

Krauspar said the court-ordered criminal-responsibility evaluation produced a delay of about 17 months from arrest to trial and that Allman repeatedly objected to participating in the evaluation. She told the court the defendant was clear throughout that “this didn’t happen” and that he did not want his attorney to pursue a criminal-responsibility defense that would require admitting conduct. Krauspar argued defense counsel’s stipulation and the court’s response “coerced” Allman into signing releases and undergoing an evaluation he opposed, and that the results were shared with the state and the court.

Madden disputed that the state hid or misfiled anything and urged the justices to follow the record. He said the stipulation was initiated by defense counsel (Mark Scherer) and that delays reflected periods in which the defense controlled the process, including a period when the defendant asked the court to put complaints into the record and initially refused to sign a release for Department of Veterans Affairs records. “The record is what the record is,” Madden said, arguing that at least a seven-month block of delay was attributable to the defense and that the state did not file a notice of lack of criminal responsibility.

Speedy-trial claim and alleged prejudice

Krauspar framed much of the appeal around speedy-trial prejudice tied to the evaluation process. She said Allman asked the court at least twice to dismiss the case because of delay, that he was told his case would not move forward unless he signed a release of information, and that he was held in custody while those matters were pending. Krauspar asserted the delay both was presumptively prejudicial under North Dakota case law (the parties discussed a one‑year presumption) and directly harmed Allman’s right to a timely trial.

Madden countered that the record shows multiple defense-controlled pauses—complaints about counsel, repeated filings, and the defendant’s statements about the need to get matters into the transcript—so the state argued the delay was not solely attributable to court or prosecution action. He pointed to filings and status-conference transcripts showing the defense at times controlled whether records were produced to the state hospital doing the evaluation.

Competency versus criminal responsibility

Counsel and the justices discussed the legal distinction between competency (fitness to stand trial) and criminal responsibility (mental state at the time of the offense). Krauspar emphasized that competency inquiries can be initiated by any party or the court when there is reason to doubt fitness and that a competency finding can require a different process (including hospitalization for evaluation) than a criminal-responsibility inquiry. She argued the stipulation’s language mixed the two and that the court ordered only a criminal-responsibility evaluation while the stipulation referenced both.

Madden told the court the statutory provision cited in the record authorizes the parties to stipulate to a criminal-responsibility evaluation and disputed a defense theory that the state improperly drove the evaluation or disguised it as a stipulation. He said the state hospital ultimately completed the evaluation after receiving VA records and that the timing in the record shows the hospital added newly received VA materials to its report within a day of getting them in August 2024.

Sentencing and credit for time served

On sentencing, Krauspar argued the trial court misapplied the statutory rule governing credit for time in custody, asserting Allman served about 636 days in custody before sentencing and that the court improperly applied credit only to one of several consecutive terms instead of applying credit against the sentence imposed for the charge or conduct that produced the sentences. The defense sought credit calculations that it said were supported by case law and the statute’s text.

Madden responded that the record does not show the defendant served the larger number of pretrial days the defense requested (the appellant’s brief had sought far greater credit), and he cited North Dakota precedent—cases the attorneys named in argument—holding that credit need only be applied toward one of consecutive sentences. Madden also attacked a separate good-time credit theory advanced on appeal as inconsistent with the record and statutory limits on good-time accrual.

What the justices pressed on

The justices repeatedly asked counsel what specific remedy the defendant sought if the court agreed with his arguments—whether dismissal or reversal was warranted in the absence of proof of actual prejudice beyond delay. The bench also questioned whether prejudice from delay could be shown by the defendant’s assertions that witnesses were unavailable or that the state had not pursued investigation while the evaluation proceeded.

Case status

The court took the case under advisement after oral argument. No opinion or decision was issued from the bench on Aug. 19.

Notes and next steps

The parties and the court discussed specific dates in the record: an initial evaluation appointment set for June 16, 2023 (with an interview performed June 20, 2023), a status conference in January 2024 where defense counsel told the court he would sign a release, and the state hospital’s receipt of VA records on Aug. 14, 2024 and submission of an updated report on Aug. 15–16, 2024. The Supreme Court will issue its written decision at a later date.