North Dakota Supreme Court hears appeal claiming defendant was forced to proceed pro se after attorney withdrawal

The North Dakota Supreme Court heard argument in State of North Dakota v. Daeden Llewellyn, file no. 20240295, over whether the district court violated Llewellyn’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying a continuance after the last appointed attorney withdrew the day before trial.

Samuel Drasek, attorney for appellant Daeden Llewellyn, told the court that the district court improperly treated multiple attorney withdrawals as a functional waiver by the defendant and then forced Llewellyn to proceed pro se on the eve of trial. Drasek said only two withdrawals in the record were tied to breakdowns in the attorney–client relationship; other withdrawals were for retirement or ethical conflicts. "He maintained saying, no. I want an attorney," Drasek summarized of Llewellyn’s position, arguing the defendant repeatedly objected to proceeding without counsel.

Drasek also argued the district court relied improperly on the age of the case — which the district court characterized as 468 days old — to deny a continuance and that the defendant had shown good cause. He told the justices Llewellyn had limited time and access to evidence while incarcerated (describing about 19 hours available to prepare from jail) and that the last attorney’s withdrawal the day before trial left Llewellyn unable to prepare exhibits and thoroughly review videos and other discovery.

Julie Lawyer, representing the State of North Dakota, urged the court to affirm. Lawyer said there is "no magic number of attorneys" required before a court may find a functional waiver and stressed the record showed repeated requests by Llewellyn to change or dismiss court‑appointed counsel, including a pattern the state characterized as obstructive. The state pointed to multiple entries in the record — including a June 19, 2023 preliminary hearing and subsequent status conferences — where the court advised Llewellyn of options and warned of consequences. Lawyer told the court an exhibit video was identified by Llewellyn, copied to a disc and played at trial, and argued the record does not show prejudice from denying a continuance.

Both sides also debated which attorney withdrawals were the result of breakdowns in the attorney–client relationship and which resulted from retirement or asserted ethical conflicts. Counsel named several previously appointed attorneys (Morrow, Walker, Weinberger, Arthurs, Balaban, Glass) and disputed the district court’s characterization that every withdrawal was the defendant’s doing. Defense counsel said two withdrawals were for breakdowns in the relationship; the state emphasized earlier moments in the record when Llewellyn told the court he could handle a "simple" case on his own.

The justices questioned counsel about timing and what process the district court followed before finding a functional waiver. Defense counsel invoked precedent the parties cited on when a waiver may be found and reminded the court that, under the cited jurisprudence, prejudice is presumed if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. The state urged a case‑specific analysis and argued the record contains indications that Llewellyn was warned about firing counsel and was able to present at least one exhibit and to question witnesses at trial.

No decision was announced at the hearing. The court heard rebuttal from defense counsel and took the matter under advisement.