Panel considers whether criminal-court findings preclude civil claim in assault/intentional-distress case

The panel considered whether a criminal conviction that resolved the absence of justification or excuse for physical force precluded relitigation of related facts in a follow‑on civil suit seeking damages for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Michael Jurati, counsel for appellant Michelle Nassif, argued that elements litigated in the earlier criminal proceeding should have precluded relitigation of the same facts in the civil trial. Jurati relied on collateral estoppel principles and precedent such as Norrington (cited at argument) to say the criminal elements were actually litigated and established.

The appellee’s lawyer, Stephen Delamare, representing Alexander Nguyen, responded that the civil claims required separate proof — notably the severity and lasting emotional distress element of the intentional‑infliction claim — and that limiting instructions and trial discretion tempered any juror confusion. He noted the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant’s conduct extreme and outrageous and awarded damages, while also pointing to the limited medical records and ambulance report in the record.

The panel explored whether defense counsel’s cross‑examination and admission that the plaintiff may have struck first unfairly influenced jurors’ assessment of damages for emotional distress, and whether severance or a limiting instruction would have cured any prejudice. Judges also focused on whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence on the “severe emotional distress” element to support the verdict on that separate tort.

No ruling was issued at argument; the court said it would review the record and briefs to determine whether the trial court’s approach or the evidence presented requires a new trial or other relief.