Speakers at a Retirement Study Council meeting summarized how teacher and public pension boards are structured across the U.S. and urged Ohio lawmakers to design any changes around fiduciary duty rather than representative politics.

Angela Rowe, policy specialist in the employment, labor and retirement program at the National Conference of State Legislatures, told the council the makeup of teacher retirement boards across the 50 states and Washington, D.C., varies widely. “Generally speaking, the composition of teacher retirement boards is determined through a combination of elections, appointments, as well as ex officio positions,” Rowe said.

Why the issue matters: board composition affects who approves investments, actuarial assumptions and benefit-administration rules. Rowe said the average board size nationwide is about 10.75 members, term lengths range from two to six years, and teacher representation on boards that require it typically ranges from roughly 20% to 70%, averaging about 40%.

Rowe noted several concrete comparisons relevant to Ohio: she said Ohio’s teachers’ retirement board is “right in line” with national averages for board size; reported teacher representation on Ohio’s board at about 63%; and said Ohio’s teachers’ plan holds “around a hundred billion or so in assets.” She also listed recent one-time cost-of-living adjustments in several states, including Maryland (4.116 percent) and Missouri (2 percent), and said Rhode Island and Washington approved COLAs for portions of their systems.

Jim Vojko, president emeritus of RVK and longtime pension consultant, told the council the central test for any board structure is whether it enables trustees to meet fiduciary duties. “It all comes back to fiduciary duty,” Vojko said, adding that boards differ by size, delegated authority, selection method and whether investment functions are centralized in a separate state investment board.

Vojko described two common state approaches: integrated systems—where a single board oversees investments and benefits administration, as in Ohio—and separation models, in which investments are handled by a centralized investment board serving multiple state funds. Each approach has trade-offs, he said: a separate investment board can concentrate professional investment staff and achieve consistency across state funds, while an integrated system can diversify governance risk across multiple, plan-specific trustees.

Questions from council members focused on whether board structure correlates with plan health. Representative Brennan asked Rowe if she had found a link between board structure and “the success of the system.” Rowe said she did not find a clear direct correlation in her review and offered to dig deeper into her dataset. Vojko warned that composition changes are difficult and tend to happen only after major events; he urged the council to start by defining the state’s values and objectives for trustees before considering structural change.

What was not decided: the council did not vote or direct formal rule changes at the meeting. Rowe offered to share her underlying spreadsheet and to pursue further analysis on correlations between board design and funded status; members asked staff to seek historical records about when board structures were last changed in Ohio and neighboring states.

Background and context: presenters stressed that many powers commonly exercised by boards include approving investment strategies, monitoring performance, adopting actuarial assumptions and, in some states, approving contribution rates or COLAs. Vojko noted that some states require confirmation of gubernatorial appointees by the senate; Rowe cited Maryland and New Hampshire as examples.

Next steps highlighted during the session included follow-up research from NCSL and additional documentary review by Ohio staff to map the history of statutory changes to the state’s retirement-board composition. No formal recommendations or legislative actions were made during the hearing.