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Judge Boyd allows deadly-force instruction, denies non‑deadly self‑defense instruction in Rendon aggravated‑assault case
Summary
At a Bexar County charge conference, Judge Stephanie Boyd allowed a jury instruction on deadly force (Sec. 9.32) but denied a non‑deadly‑force self‑defense instruction (Sec. 9.31) in the aggravated‑assault prosecution of Mariano Rendon; the court also included a statutory presumption tied to robbery and allowed a defense of third person charge.
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Judge Stephanie Boyd, presiding judge of the 187th District Court, ruled during a charge conference that the jury will be given an instruction on deadly force but not on non‑deadly force in the aggravated‑assault case against Mariano Rendon.
"So defense, your instruction under 9.31 will be denied. The instruction given under 9.32 will be allowed," Judge Boyd told attorneys during a pretrial conference, adding that the charge writer should include the full robbery definition and the statutory presumption tied to robbery in the jury charge.
The ruling resolves a central legal dispute between the parties about whether the force Rendon used — a knee strike amid a multi‑person melee at a downtown club — should be treated as "deadly force" for purposes of jury instructions. Defense counsel Laird Lundquist had asked the court to submit both Texas Penal Code instructions 9.31 (non‑deadly force) and 9.32 (deadly force) to the jury, arguing the evidence could support either outcome given chaotic, seconds‑long struggle among several people and testimony that Rendon and others were trying to pull people off a pile.
"I believe that it's appropriate ... because of this particular case, the force used was a knee strike, and I believe that that is usually just force," Lundquist said while asking the court to include both instructions. State prosecutors objected to the non‑deadly‑force instruction, saying witnesses and medical testimony supported a finding of serious bodily injury and citing case law they argued bars a 9.31 charge when serious bodily injury results.
The court also agreed to give the jury a statutory presumption that may operate in the defendant's favor if jurors find certain facts tied to robbery. "The presumption will be in and then what will be included then is the full definition for robbery," Judge Boyd said, directing the charge writer to include the language the parties had discussed.
In addition to self‑defense, the judge permitted a defense‑of‑a‑third‑person instruction. The defense had argued Rendon intervened to protect a security officer who was being pulled and punched by multiple patrons, while the prosecution maintained the video evidence and medical records showed the use of force was unreasonable and caused the victim serious bodily injury.
Attorneys previewed their closing arguments at the hearing. Prosecutors pressed jurors to infer culpable mental state from the facts and emphasized the victim's surgeries and lengthy hospitalization, arguing those facts support aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. Defense counsel told jurors the incident was a melee, said evidence was contested and partly inconsistent, and invoked the robbery‑presumption language as a basis to acquit if jurors find the elements of that presumption.
Judge Boyd set a time limit for final arguments, saying she would give each side 20 minutes for closing arguments and will provide a five‑minute warning. The court finalized the charge after resolving objections and ordered the charge writer to insert the agreed language; the case then proceeded to closing arguments and jury deliberation.
The jury will now consider whether the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Rendon committed aggravated assault — and, if so, whether the state has disproved the defenses the judge allowed: self‑defense and defense of a third person, and whether the robbery‑related presumption applies.

