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Justices Hear Arguments Over Whether 30-Day Filing Deadline Bars Review of CAT Orders in Riley v. Bondi

3075554 · March 24, 2025

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Summary

At oral argument in Riley v. Bondi, advocates and an amicus debated whether the Immigration and Nationality Act's 30‑day filing deadline in INA §1252(b)(1) is jurisdictional and whether Convention Against Torture (CAT) determinations prevent an order of removal from becoming final for purposes of judicial review.

The Supreme Court heard arguments in Riley v. Bondi on whether the 30‑day filing deadline in the Immigration and Nationality Act is a jurisdictional bar to federal court review and whether a Convention Against Torture (CAT) decision can postpone finality of a removal order.

Advocates and amicus counsel emphasized competing statutory texts, prior decisions and practical consequences for removal procedures. “A sensible scheme of judicial review would provide a right to review on a petition properly filed,” counsel for the petitioner said, arguing the statute should be read to let CAT claims and removal challenges be consolidated after the agency completes its work. Counsel for another party told the court directly: “On the first question presented, the 30 day filing deadline in section 12 52 b 1 is not jurisdictional,” and argued Stone and other precedents do not require a different result.

Why the case matters: the court’s ruling will determine whether certain withholding‑only (CAT) determinations can be appealed together with removal orders after agency proceedings conclude, or whether the 30‑day clock that follows a final administrative removal order bars review regardless of ongoing CAT proceedings. The outcome affects whether noncitizens must file early protective petitions, whether courts must hold many such filings in abeyance, and whether some CAT claims could become effectively unreviewable in some circuits.

Petitioner’s argument Petitioner’s counsel told the justices that the statutory scheme and this court’s precedents support treating CAT orders as reviewable together with removal orders and that the filing deadline should not cut off review when the agency’s proceedings remain unfinished. Counsel argued that waiting until the agency “has fully finished with its work” is the sensible approach so a single petition can encompass removability, the designated country of removal and CAT questions. Counsel warned that forcing early protective petitions would produce administrative burdens and a “flood of meritless prophylactic petitions,” and would create a trap for unrepresented litigants.

Government and respondent positions Opposing counsel urged the court to treat the 30‑day deadline in INA §1252(b)(1) as jurisdictional and to adhere to Stone and related decisions. That side argued the statutory definition of “final order of removal” and other provisions (including regulations governing expedited removal) indicate finality occurs when the administrative removal order is issued. Counsel also stressed that regulations and prior decisions (cited during argument) limit when an alien may be removed to a third country during ongoing withholding‑only proceedings, and noted practical consequences if courts broadly read finality to await CAT resolution.

Practical issues and circuit practices Several justices probed how a rule that delays finality until the end of CAT proceedings would operate in practice. Advocates warned that protective petitions—filed within 30 days to preserve review—would force many courts of appeals to choose whether to hold thousands of protective filings in abeyance, producing a patchwork of outcomes across circuits. The petitioner’s counsel also noted that CAT proceedings can be “several months, if it’s a real… serious claim” and, in some instances, “over a year.”

Statutory and precedential anchors Argumenters and the justices repeatedly cited this court’s prior decisions—Stone (Stone v. INS), Nasrallah, Santos‑Zacarias, and Guzman Chavez—and provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act discussed at argument (transcribed as “12 52 b 1,” “12 28 b,” and related cross‑references). Counsel for petitioner relied on what has been called the “zipper clause” to argue Congress intended a single consolidated petition for review after the agency’s work is complete; opponents relied on Stone and the statutory language tying finality to issuance of the administrative removal order.

Limited on‑the‑record concessions During argument, the government counsel said it would waive the filing‑deadline defense in this particular case for Mr. Riley, a concession recorded on the argument docket. Counsel also described agency practice: while the government acknowledged it has statutory authority to remove to a third country in some circumstances, its regulations provide procedures—including notice and an opportunity to raise a fear of persecution regarding a proposed third country—that limit removal while withholding proceedings are ongoing.

The court recessed after rebuttal, and the case was submitted for decision.