Mass. Supreme Judicial Court hears speedy-trial challenge in Commonwealth v. LaRice

BOSTON — The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on Thursday heard argument in Commonwealth v. John LaRice over whether LaRice’s pretrial delay violated his right to a speedy trial.

Emily Carty, counsel for LaRice, told the court that LaRice “was jailed for 1,341 days pretrial in violation of his right to a speedy trial,” and identified five contested categories of delay the defense says should count against the Commonwealth: (1) a period when Rule 14 mandatory discovery, including grand jury minutes and ballistics results, remained outstanding; (2) the period while pretrial motions were pending; (3) the interval between LaRice’s filing to rescind his pro se status and the hearing on that motion; (4) the time his first Rule 36 speedy-trial motion was pending; and (5) a span when the Commonwealth said it could not secure its witnesses. Carty argued the Commonwealth failed to make the required particularized showing under Rule 36 that witnesses were unavailable and that resource congestion (for example, a lack of stenographers producing grand jury minutes) should not be charged to the defendant.

The dispute over witness availability centered on a December 5, 2022 status hearing in which the Commonwealth requested a January 17 trial date after consulting witnesses; LaRice objected and sought an earlier date. Carty told the court that, because a trial court had warned the Commonwealth that only four days remained on the speedy-trial clock as of July 8, 2022, the Commonwealth’s later request to extend beyond those four days required a more detailed showing than “vacation and holidays.” She said the judge’s interest-of-justice continuance finding was inadequate without particulars about which witnesses were unavailable and when.

Travis Lynch, arguing for the Commonwealth, acknowledged the case involved a long delay and invoked the Barker v. Wingo balancing test for constitutional speedy-trial claims. Lynch said the COVID-19 suspension of jury trials — which he identified as a roughly 638-day period during which statewide jury trials were halted — should not be charged against the Commonwealth, arguing most courts treat pandemic suspensions as an external event outside the government’s control. He told the court the case’s other lengthy intervals included a six-month tracking interval early in the case that follows ordinary Superior Court scheduling for complex matters and delays attributable to the defendant’s change from pro se status and later mental-health defenses.

Lynch also disputed the defense’s contention that the Commonwealth had a duty to produce the grand jury minutes more quickly. He said it had been represented that a lack of available stenographers delayed preparation of grand jury transcripts and that, under the court’s Taylor line of cases, a showing that the Commonwealth made diligent, good-faith efforts to obtain mandatory discovery could justify excluding that interval from the Rule 36 calculation.

Justices pressed both sides about how Rule 36’s particularity requirements for excluding time because of unavailable witnesses interact with a judge’s interest-of-justice continuance analysis. One Justice queried whether it was pragmatic to require the prosecution to itemize each witness’s scheduling conflicts rather than to report an aggregate date when the court could seat all witnesses; another asked whether an implicit interest-of-justice finding by a trial judge was sufficient under Rule 36. Carty replied the rule requires particulars when excluding time for unavailable witnesses, particularly where only a handful of days remained on the speedy-trial clock; Lynch responded that a judge’s express interest-of-justice finding can, in practice, resolve the scheduling problem.

The parties also debated earlier rulings below. Carty noted that, at the trial-court stage, Judge Hodge (referenced in the record) found some pretrial motion time properly counted in the speedy-trial calculation but left other periods contested. Carty said grand jury minutes and ballistics testing remained outstanding for long periods after motions to compel were filed. Lynch said some interim orders reflected the trial judges’ balancing and that forensic testing and transcript preparation were tangible reasons for the delay.

The record reflects that two motions to dismiss were filed in the trial court; the appellate argument focused on whether time the trial court excluded (or should have excluded) under Rule 36 and/or under constitutional principles is legally chargeable to the Commonwealth. The transcript of Thursday’s argument does not include a final ruling from the Supreme Judicial Court.

The court heard roughly an hour of argument and questions from multiple justices before closing the argument period.