State high court weighs whether Mattis decision automatically altered life-without-parole sentences or requires resentencing

The Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument in Hammel v. Hiran Perez over whether this court’s March 22, 2024 revised Mattis opinion automatically altered certain life-without-parole sentences for emerging adults or whether judges must hold resentencing hearings to implement new parole eligibility rules.

Attorney Valerie DePalma, representing the defendant, told the court that the Mattis rescript established a parole-eligibility scheme that, for offenses committed before 2012, fixed parole eligibility at 15 years. "When the rescript in Mattis was issued, he had already served 15 years in prison. So as a result, he was immediately eligible for parole," DePalma said, and she argued that correcting the mittimus (the court record of the sentence) rather than holding a resentencing hearing would enable the defendant to seek a parole hearing.

The Commonwealth, represented by Rachel Eisenhower, urged the opposite approach. "This case presents the question of how a new constitutional ruling at a state Supreme Court level flows outward to other people who were affected by the case," Eisenhower said, arguing that in many cases — including Perez’s, where multiple homicides and concurrent sentences were involved — resentencing may be necessary so the judge can exercise discretion about concurrent versus consecutive sentences and consider traditional sentencing factors and the evidence in the particular case.

Justices questioned how the competing approaches interact with procedural rules and constitutional protections. One justice pressed whether the Commonwealth’s ability to seek modification of an illegal disposition is limited to the 60-day window in Rule 209(1) and whether permitting resentencing after that window would raise double-jeopardy problems. DePalma cited Montgomery v. Louisiana and related authority to argue that Mattis produced an expectation of finality and that the court’s rescript fixed the parole eligibility term for defendants whose offenses occurred before 2012.

The parties also debated how statutory parole-credit rules apply when an inmate serves multiple concurrent or consecutive sentences. Counsel referenced chapter 127, sections 130 and 133, and the court discussed Dinkins (as cited in argument), which the attorneys described as directing the parole board to establish a single parole eligibility date when an inmate serves two or more state prison sentences. The justice panel asked whether, under those provisions, a defendant sentenced to concurrent life terms would be treated differently as to parole eligibility than one given consecutive terms on resentencing.

DePalma told the court she had filed a motion in the lower court seeking correction of the mittimus and, alternatively, had prepared for resentencing. Eisenhower said the Commonwealth sought resentencing in this case because multiple plausible outcomes (concurrent or consecutive sentences; differing parole-start calculations) remain, and because the sentencing judge must be able to weigh the facts, victim impact, traditional sentencing factors and any contested scientific evidence offered under Mattis.

Counsel and justices repeatedly returned to the sentencing-package doctrine — whether a judge’s original package of concurrent sentences must be reexamined as a whole on remand — and to whether credit for time served on concurrent sentences would be preserved if a resentencing judge later imposed consecutive terms. Both sides cited appellate authorities (including Costa, Pierce, Carter, Wiggins and Shabazz, as discussed at argument) but acknowledged gaps and tensions in the existing case law on some of these specific questions.

Argument concluded with no immediate ruling from the court. The high court’s decision will determine whether, for defendants like Perez whose offenses occurred before 2012, the Mattis rescript operates by operation of law to produce immediate parole eligibility and permit ministerial correction of the mittimus, or whether lower courts must hold resentencing hearings to implement the new rule and resolve questions about concurrency, aggregation of parole-credit and any double-jeopardy constraints.