Judge Boyd denies defense request to instruct jury on self‑defense for capital murder; reads full charge

Judge Stephanie Boyd of the 187th District Court denied multiple defense requests during a pre‑deliberation charge conference and then read the court's full jury charge to jurors in the case against defendant Tamar McIntyre.

The rulings centered on how the judge will instruct jurors about the elements of capital murder, lesser included offenses and related defenses. Boyd rejected the defense's request to give a self‑defense instruction on the capital‑murder allegation because the indictment alleges the killing occurred “in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery,” and, as the court stated, self‑defense is not available when the charged theory is a robbery‑based capital murder.

The defense had objected to multiple parts of the proposed charge. Counsel argued the draft expanded the indictment by instructing jurors on alternative culpable mental states and alternate “manner and means” (for example, knowingly or by reckless conduct) that were not alleged by the grand jury. The defense also objected to portions of the accomplice‑witness instruction, asked for a Penal Code 9.04 instruction (that displaying a weapon is not necessarily the use of deadly force), requested a mistake‑of‑fact instruction if self‑defense were excluded, and sought a “defensive property” instruction covering burglary of a vehicle.

Boyd addressed each request on the record. She removed a redundant phrase from the accomplice‑witness paragraph that the defense had pointed out would “water down” the statutory language and said she would accept the defense filing of objections into the record for purposes of appeal. The court denied the request to instruct on self‑defense for the capital‑murder count, denied the requested Penal Code 9.04 instruction, denied a mistake‑of‑fact instruction in the circumstances presented, and denied inclusion of the defensive‑property instruction as drafted. On several motions the court stated simply, “That's denied,” on the record.

The defense told the court it objected to charging jurors on mental states and manner‑and‑means that were not authorized by the indictment and cited multiple Texas cases in support; the court answered that the contested passages were definitions rather than application paragraphs but ultimately sustained some objections and denied others. Defense counsel also requested that the court remove non‑statutory wording in the accomplice‑witness instruction; the court agreed to remove the identified language.

After resolving charge objections, Boyd read the charge aloud to the panel. The written charge presented to jurors defined the elements of capital murder, murder and manslaughter; explained the law of parties and the accomplice‑witness rule (including that an accomplice's testimony must be corroborated by evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense); and gave the statutory definitions of “intentionally,” “knowingly” and “recklessly,” among other instructions. The charge directs jurors to consider capital murder first and, if they have reasonable doubt on that count, to move to the lesser included offenses in sequence.

Closing arguments then began. Prosecutors argued the evidence — including surveillance video, phone records and other physical items — tended to connect McIntyre to the vehicle and the alleged robbery and supported a finding of capital murder. Defense counsel urged jurors that the investigation and evidence contained gaps and inconsistencies, highlighted the central role of an accomplice witness and argued the state had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McIntyre committed the charged offense.

The court recessed jurors for a brief break and instructed them to return at the posted time to begin deliberations after closing arguments concluded.