Committee hears call to restore child‑support consideration in parental‑rights termination statute

A Vermont Judiciary Committee hearing on April 9 received testimony urging lawmakers to restore a line in Title 15A that would allow courts to consider a parent’s payment of child support — "within their means" — when deciding whether to terminate parental rights in adoption-related proceedings.

The question centers on language that had appeared in 15A §3504 but was repealed last year for older children while remaining in place for infants under six months. Family law practitioner Kurt Hughes told the committee the restoration would give trial courts an additional, relevant factor to decide whether a parent has exercised parental responsibilities.

"I'm just recommending that the court, that the committee, restore the statute to its original language, which will allow the court to have that financial piece to consider," Hughes said. He described a recent trial in which a respondent paid $5,000 toward arrearages during proceedings; because the subsection was removed, Hughes said that payment was not clearly available for the court to weigh.

Hughes emphasized the statute’s built‑in limitation: payment or nonpayment is to be considered in light of what the respondent could afford. He said the statutory structure also allows a respondent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was good cause for noncompliance, which prevents automatic termination just for poverty.

Committee members read a written statement from the Department for Children and Families (DCF) into the record explaining the agency’s rationale when the language was struck last year: DCF said removing a reference to child‑support payment would prevent poverty from being used to separate children from parents and would align with DCF’s goal of supporting family reunification and trauma‑informed responses. Witnesses at the hearing, including Hughes, said many adoption termination proceedings in probate are not DCF cases and that DCF typically is not a party in the 15A adoption context.

Judge Laurie (as identified during the hearing) and Chief Superior Judge Tom Sone both signaled support for restoring the language. Judge Laurie told the committee the factor "cuts both ways," meaning courts may consider either payments or failures to pay in context, and agreed it is illogical to leave the language in the statute for children under six months but not for older children.

Committee members asked technical questions about the draft language on page 20, lines 19–21, which says courts "shall consider all relevant factors, which may include the respondent's failure to pay child support." One member suggested simpler wording to make clear that courts may consider a parent’s payments as a relevant factor even when those payments are affirmative evidence of parental responsibility rather than a failure to pay.

Several attorneys reiterated that the probate adoption docket operates under different rules than juvenile proceedings under Title 33 and that DCF involvement is uncommon in the cases Hughes and others handle. The testimony left open the committee’s next step: whether to return the language to the statute as originally written or to redraft the sentence for clarity so it explicitly permits courts to consider both payment and nonpayment in context.

No formal committee vote was recorded on the restoration during the session. Witnesses said DCF representatives are expected to appear at a later hearing and that the committee will follow up with additional questions about whether DCF is a party in these matters and about the policy reasons behind the earlier repeal.

Why it matters: Restoring the language would change what evidence courts may weigh in contested adoption or parental‑rights termination hearings in probate. Advocates say the change ensures courts can evaluate a parent’s financial contributions relative to ability; DCF’s earlier rationale emphasizes avoiding the separation of children from parents because of poverty.

The committee’s work on this provision is expected to continue in subsequent meetings, including testimony from DCF and possible redrafting to address concerns about statutory phrasing and the distinction between juvenile (Title 33) and probate (Title 15A) dockets.