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Experts and members warn HHS workforce cuts could weaken FDA oversight of device cybersecurity
Summary
Committee members and witnesses told the House subcommittee that proposed HHS and FDA staff reductions risk eroding the agency's ability to perform premarket review and postmarket cybersecurity oversight for medical devices, potentially harming patient safety and slowing innovation.
Members of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee pressed witnesses that reductions to HHS and FDA staffing could undermine federal oversight of medical devices and the nation's ability to detect and mitigate cybersecurity risks.
Multiple members cited the administration's announced plan to cut 20,000 positions across HHS and the prospect of removing roughly 3,500 FDA staff, and asked witnesses whether such reductions would affect device safety work. "I'm deeply alarmed by the Trump administration's announcement that the Department of Health and Human Services is DOSH's next target," Ranking Member Clark said during opening remarks, criticizing planned workforce reductions and calling for oversight.
Witnesses with direct FDA experience said the agency's specialized cyber subject‑matter experts play a central role in both premarket guidance and postmarket incident response. Dr. Kevin Fu, who previously led medical device security work at FDA, warned of capacity shortfalls: "If you lose 1, you're probably going to have a much harder time responding to simultaneous threats, which seem to be a natural course of the future. If you lose 2, we might just not have a response." He told the committee those cybersecurity staff are not interchangeable with routine reviewers because they coordinate vulnerability disclosures, liaise with manufacturers and law enforcement, and evaluate emergent technical threats.
Dr. Christian Dameff and Eric Decker said FDA's role is one leg of a three‑way partnership with manufacturers and health care delivery organizations. Decker said weakened federal capacity would hamper cross‑sector coordination and recommended reconstituting advisory constructs that facilitate protected industry‑government collaboration, such as critical infrastructure policy advisory committees.
Why it matters: Members and witnesses said losing institutional memory and specialized technical staff at FDA would slow premarket clarity and postmarket incident management, which could delay safe products reaching patients and lengthen response times for emergent vulnerabilities. Several lawmakers asked the committee to demand answers from the administration about firings, rehiring, and the status of positions central to device security.
Requests and next steps: Committee Democrats repeatedly urged immediate oversight and a briefing from HHS on the restructuring plan, and several witnesses recommended reestablishing formal public‑private advisory forums and expanding resources for FDA cybersecurity staff. The subcommittee concluded by directing members to submit written questions for the record and soliciting follow‑up responses from witnesses.
