Appeals court considers Chelsea's immunity and MCAD jurisdiction in Jane Doe abuse claims

Two consolidated appeals, styled Jane Doe number 99 v. Chaffee (24P601, 24P803), were argued April 2 in the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The City of Chelsea asked the court to affirm dismissal of two counts against the city based on immunity under G. L. c. 258, § 10(j) (the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act). Chelsea’s counsel also argued that a parallel statutory scheme governing sex-based harassment in education requires an administrative filing at the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) as a prerequisite in some cases. Plaintiff counsel Mark Itzkowitz (joined by Carmen Durso) said the SJC’s recent decision in Thais v. MBTA forecloses MTCA immunity where a plaintiff is directly harmed by an on‑duty public employee and that Jane Doe’s claims therefore survive.

Strefon Treadway (counsel for the City of Chelsea) argued the superior court relied on the Appeals Court’s Thais briefing and that subsequent Supreme Judicial Court authority requires careful reading of §10(j) and the term “originally caused.” He told the panel the scope-of-employment analysis matters: intentional torts that are purely personal to an employee typically are not covered as acts “on behalf of” the employer.

Co-counsel Peter Christopher focused on the remedial statutory scheme for harassment in education (chapter 214, §1C, and chapter 151C), arguing the plain text leads to different remedial paths and that some claims must first be pursued administratively at MCAD. Christopher pointed to statutory cross-references and to decisions he said interpret the remedial provisions as requiring MCAD exhaustion in particular fact patterns.

Plaintiff counsel responded that the SJC’s decision in Thais, issued two weeks before argument, holds that §10(j) does not shield a municipality from claims for harms inflicted directly by an on‑duty public employee and that when an employer’s retention, supervision and renewal decisions foreseeably allow abuse, those actions are not remote and can constitute the basis for municipal liability. On the MCAD question, the plaintiff argued that chapter 214 §1C provides a superior‑court remedy for students who are not vocational students or applicants and that requiring an MCAD filing would create a meaningless ritual because MCAD has repeatedly said it lacks jurisdiction over many public-school student claims.

The justices questioned counsel about the interplay of the statutes, the recent SJC Thais decision, the factual allegations of grooming and recurrent misconduct across years, and whether the school or university’s changing employment relationship (Chelsea and later BU) changes the legal analysis. Plaintiff counsel said the alleged misconduct was continuous and involved Chelsea’s and later the university’s decisions to retain and place the teacher in contact with students.

The court heard argument from both sides and took the case under advisement.