Appellate panel hears challenge to denial of Harry Coleman’s post-conviction petition over counsel’s mental‑health investigation

An appellate panel heard argument in a post‑conviction petition filed on behalf of Harry Coleman seeking reversal of a trial court’s denial and remand for a new trial, with counsel for Coleman saying trial counsel failed to investigate possible mental‑health evidence and the state urging the court to affirm the denial.

Joseph McCluskey, attorney for petitioner Harry Coleman, told the panel, “I’ve been working on this case for over 10 years,” and said Coleman is “actually scheduled for release later this year,” framing the length and stakes of the litigation. McCluskey argued trial counsel “failed to investigate” and “failed to conduct reasonable diligence” regarding the petitioner’s mental health, and he cited case law he identified as State v. Burns to say “[f]ailure to investigate is deficient performance on its face.”

The gist of McCluskey’s claim is that trial counsel encountered statements and behavior that should have prompted further psychiatric evaluation — notably that Coleman had reported being diagnosed with a mood disorder, that “I don’t like taking my medicine. It doesn’t help me,” and that he “doesn’t always take his medicine.” McCluskey said those comments are “the biggest red flag” and argued counsel’s reliance on the defendant’s and the family’s statements, plus counsel’s own observations, amounted to an unreasonable failure to investigate.

Counsel for the state, Davy Douglas, urged the court to affirm the post‑conviction denial. “This court should affirm the judgment of the post conviction court because counsel was not ineffective here,” Douglas said, arguing the issues of diligence for newly discovered evidence and the Sixth Amendment inquiry into deficient performance are distinct. Douglas said trial counsel interviewed family and friends, found no indication of severe mental‑illness or suicidality, and reasonably decided further evaluation was unnecessary.

Douglas pointed to the trial‑record materials and an affidavit from Dr. Farmer, a psychiatrist whose affidavit he said shows a diagnosis of major depressive disorder but not bipolar disorder. Douglas told the panel that, based on what trial counsel reasonably could have learned from family and the petitioner, counsel’s decision was a strategic choice within the range of competent representation.

The panel and the parties debated the second Strickland prong — prejudice — and whether, even if counsel’s performance were deficient, Coleman could show a reasonable probability of a different result. A judge asked, “Where is the evidence here that objectively speaking, the defendant was under a threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury?” The state emphasized the record shows the victim was unarmed, that one shot was fired, and that the jury had previously weighed conflicting witness accounts.

McCluskey responded that context matters: he said multiple people were approaching Coleman, that one witness (Mr. Plunk) would have testified at trial about physical contact with the gun, and that the petitioner’s interpretation of the events should have been seen through the lens of his previously uninvestigated mental‑health issues. McCluskey urged that expert testimony presented at post‑conviction proceedings — including a later diagnosis offered by Dr. Fisher during the hearings — demonstrates material facts the jury did not consider.

The state countered that the post‑conviction court made findings that counsel interviewed potential witnesses and that the petitioner had not established deficient performance or prejudice. Douglas argued the record contains competing witness accounts and that the jury resolved credibility in favor of conviction, and he said Dr. Fisher repeatedly told the post‑conviction court she could not resolve the objective belief component, leaving that question for the jury.

Neither the appellate panel nor counsel announced a decision at the hearing. The argument focused on whether the post‑conviction court’s findings and the trial record support a conclusion that trial counsel’s choices amounted to constitutionally deficient performance and, if so, whether Coleman demonstrated prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial.

The panel proceeded to the next case after rebuttal and brief additional argument; the court did not indicate a timeline for issuing its opinion.