Appellate panel weighs whether defendant’s stipulation to ‘Range II’ blocks review of foreign‑conviction sentencing error

A three‑judge panel of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals heard oral argument in State of Tennessee v. Roy Garends Jr. about whether a defendant’s concession at sentencing that he was a Range II offender precludes appellate review of whether the trial court performed the required foreign‑conviction analysis.

Appellate counsel for Garends, Kendall Jones, told the panel that the trial court erred by sentencing Garends as a Range II offender without performing the foreign‑conviction test for two out‑of‑state convictions used at sentencing. "The trial court, much like some other issues such as jury instructions or in this case, sentencing, the trial court has a duty, to make certain findings," Jones said, arguing the court must make those findings even when defense counsel agreed to a sentencing range in the trial court.

The question matters because Tennessee law treats some out‑of‑state convictions differently for sentencing classification; under the state’s reading, the Texas escape conviction at issue could determine whether Garends is a Range I or Range II offender. Jones said the record before the panel is insufficient to perform the foreign‑conviction analysis and that plain‑error review should apply despite the earlier concession.

Assistant attorney Davy Douglas, arguing for the state, said the record shows the defendant repeatedly conceded Range II status and that the trial court reasonably relied on that concession. "This court should affirm the defendant's convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault, but the state does concede that a remand is warranted to merge the conviction for aggravated kidnapping into the especially aggravated kidnapping," Douglas told the panel. Douglas argued the defendant bears the burden to establish plain error on appeal and that the record lacks the evidence Garends would need to meet that burden.

During questioning the judges pressed both sides on practical and doctrinal points: whether a stipulation at sentencing is analogous to a stipulation to a fact at trial or to an agreed‑out‑of‑range plea; whether the trial court’s independent duty to make findings can be waived by counsel; and whether any appellate relief would change Garends’s effective sentence given that the counts at issue run concurrently. Counsel for the state acknowledged that, because the sentences run concurrently, granting relief on the Range classification likely would not reduce Garends’s overall time in custody.

Both sides cited prior Tennessee decisions as guideposts for the panel’s analysis, including State v. Marable, State v. Gordon, State v. Jamieson, and State v. Vick; counsel debated which precedents control and whether this record is adequate to apply them. Appellate counsel emphasized systemic interests in requiring trial courts to make the procedural findings the law requires even when parties agree for reasons of judicial economy.

The panel did not announce a decision at the oral argument. The court took the matter under advisement and did not issue a ruling from the bench at the end of the argument.