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Appeals court hears homeowner’s claim she lost shack by improper taking and contested statute-of-limitations
Summary
A pro se appellant told the panel her beachfront shack was taken without proper process and that Massachusetts eminent‑domain/land statutes and the Declaration of Rights provide relief; the town argued the structure is part of the realty and that takings claims are time-barred.
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The final argument of the morning addressed Wendy Swolinski v. Town of Aquinnah, docket 23P892. The appellant argued the town voted to take her shack without notice, without following Chapter 79 eminent‑domain procedures, and without providing just compensation. She said the property had been privately owned and transferred among owners since 1939 and that state transfers of the underlying land did not convey ownership of the shacks themselves.
Swolinski, appearing pro se, told the panel she relied on a prior select‑board vote and a sequence of private transfers (bills of sale and probate‑court references) and that the federal court had dismissed an earlier action for failure to exhaust state remedies—she argued that dismissal should not produce a final judgment for statute‑of‑limitations purposes and that G.L. c. 79 §18’s savings clause applies, allowing a timely refiling in state court.
Town counsel Justin Amos argued the longstanding rule that structures affixed to land become part of the realty absent a clear agreement to the contrary. He noted the record showed the shack sat on a foundation and that state deed language transferring lots to the towns did not exclude buildings; he said the absence of historic tax records, recorded deeds, or other indicia of separate ownership weighed against the appellant’s position. Amos also urged that, even if the shack were personal property, the appellant had not removed it during the lease term and that summary-judgment grounds were sufficient.
The panel questioned physical‑affixation evidence, applicable vesting dates, and how the chapter‑79 statutory scheme and the state Declaration of Rights (Article 10) interact when the town’s procedures for taking property are contested. The court took the matter under advisement.

