Proponents to Revise Language After Colorado Review Hearing on ‘Just Cause’ Employee Initiative

A review-and-comment hearing held March 21, 2025, for Initiative 2025‑26 No. 43 examined proposed language that would require private‑sector employers in Colorado to establish "just cause" before discharging or suspending an employee and would allow affected employees to sue within 180 days, with courts authorized to order reinstatement and back pay.

The hearing, conducted by Legislative Council staff and the Office of Legislative Legal Services, focused on questions about the initiative’s single‑subject compliance, definitions of key terms, the scope of who qualifies as an employee, and procedural mechanics for litigation and attorney‑fee awards. Proponents from labor organizations told staff they would return with clarifying edits.

The memorandum read at the start of the hearing summarized four principal purposes of the proposal: to require an employer to establish just cause before discharge or suspension; to mandate employer policies to prevent specified conduct; to permit an employee to file a civil action within 180 days after an alleged wrongful discharge or suspension; and to authorize courts to provide relief including reinstatement, rehiring, back pay or front pay. When asked, a proponent representative said, "Yes," that summary reflected their intent.

Legislative staff pressed several substantive points. On single‑subject rules, staff asked, "What is the single subject of the proposed initiative?" The proponents answered that the single subject is "just cause for employee discharge or suspension." Staff also raised ambiguity in the initiative’s definition of "just cause," notably how the draft treats repeated violations and whether courts should develop guiding case law for different contexts; proponents said they preferred courts to establish that body of law.

Staff questioned the reference to "crimes of moral turpitude" in the definition of just cause and asked which crimes would qualify. Proponents responded they would rely on existing case law rather than enumerating specific offenses. Staff also asked whether pleas of guilty or no‑contest pleas would qualify as convictions; a proponent representative answered affirmatively.

On the definition of "suspension," staff noted the draft could be read to include employer‑directed unpaid periods caused by inclement weather, natural disasters, or other third‑party interruptions. Proponents agreed to amend the text to make clear that involuntary unpaid interruptions caused by acts of God or third parties outside an employer’s control and unrelated to employee conduct would not count as a suspension under the measure.

Staff also flagged ambiguity about which individuals qualify as "employees." The current draft defined employee as "any natural person who has worked for at least 6 consecutive months for a private sector employer," but did not specify whether former employees were covered or whether any minimum hours were required. Proponents said they would revise the language to clarify that the protection applies to a person who has worked for the same private‑sector employer for at least six consecutive months (and that the drafters intended to include individuals who worked part time or performed de minimis intermittent work during that six‑month period).

Technical and procedural questions prompted additional edits. Staff suggested removing an unnecessary sentence that read, "If the court orders back pay, the employer shall pay the back pay to the employee," and proponents agreed to delete it. On written notice requirements, staff asked what recourse employees would have if employers failed to provide required written notification; proponents said they would add language making clear that, after a specified period without notice, the employee could treat that as notice and sue within 180 days of that date.

Staff raised a separate concern about attorney‑fee awards in cases deemed frivolous, groundless, or vexatious, citing the draft’s cross‑references to Article 17 of Title 13, Colorado Revised Statutes, and to section 405 of Article 34 of Title 24, Colorado Revised Statutes. The draft language appeared to contemplate that a court could find either a pleading or a defense frivolous but then implied only a defendant could receive fees in some scenarios. Proponents said they would consider clarifying the interplay between the clauses so that fee awards comport with the drafters’ intent.

No formal vote or final action was taken at the hearing. Legislative staff read the memorandum of substantive and technical comments into the record and asked whether the proponents had further remarks; proponents declined and said the comments were helpful. The review-and-comment process was completed at the end of the session.

Proponents indicated they will revise the initiative text to address the questions raised, including clarifying the definitions of "employee" and "suspension," specifying the treatment of convictions and pleas, addressing written‑notice timing for filing, and correcting attorney‑fee language. The transcript records the staff and proponents agreeing to additional drafting changes but does not show any formal statutory referrals, ballot‑title determinations, or other binding actions taken at this meeting.