Defense urges resentencing, state asks court to affirm 3-year confinement in Ellerbusch aggravated-assault case

Ms. Jones, defense counsel, asked the appellate court to remand the sentence imposed on the defendant, identified in the record as Ellerbusch, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by relying chiefly on “depreciating the seriousness of the offense” and by giving insufficient weight to rehabilitation and other confinement factors.

The arguments matter because the trial court sentenced Ellerbusch to three years at 100% on an aggravated-assault conviction after he pleaded guilty; defense counsel said the judge ignored a number of mitigating considerations — a “strong R” risk assessment indicating a low likelihood of reoffending, evidence of post-offense remedial steps (anger management and drug/alcohol assessments), an offer of employment, and a limited prior criminal record — and therefore reached an “illogical conclusion” on confinement.

At the hearing, Ms. Jones argued the sentencing transcript showed the trial court “wholly failed to consider alternative dispositions” and instead “hung its hat on deprecation,” a catch-all justification that, she said, negated the presumption that a Range I, Class C offender would be eligible for probation (3 to 6 years is the Range I sentencing band for the offense). She said the defendant’s post-offense conduct and the assessment in the record supported a lesser, noncustodial outcome and asked the court to remand for resentencing.

Johnny Saraceno, representing the state, responded that the trial court’s confinement decision was within the presumptively reasonable range and that the record supported the judge’s findings. Saraceno summarized the indictment and factual background, saying the defendant “severely beat the victim by punching, kicking, and strangling her,” and listed injuries read into the record at sentencing: a brain bleed, compression fractures of the spine, a fractured pelvis, a ruptured eardrum, ruptured blood vessels in both eyes and subsequent diagnoses including post-traumatic stress disorder. Saraceno told the court that the trial judge relied not only on the severity of the injuries but also on general-deterrence considerations and publicly available sentencing statistics.

Both sides addressed whether the court considered and weighed the traditional confinement factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s likelihood of rehabilitation, and deterrence. Defense counsel acknowledged the sentence fell within the statutory range but said that, because the offense was a presumed-probatable Class C felony under the applicable sentencing scheme, the judge’s apparent prioritization of depreciation effectively made presumed probation unavailable. The state said the record included victim testimony and family statements supporting the judge’s conclusion that confinement was necessary.

Counsel also debated factual matters in the presentence report: defense counsel disputed that an alleged post-arrest contact/violation in the report was a material factor and said the report’s references to it were minimal; the state noted the report and the victim’s testimony indicating alleged harassment while the defendant was on bond. Neither side reported a final ruling at the conclusion of oral argument; the panel closed arguments with the statement, “That concludes our arguments today.”

The appellate court did not issue a decision on the record during the hearing excerpted in the transcript.

Votes at a glance: no formal appellate decision or vote is recorded in the provided transcript excerpt; the defense requested remand for resentencing and the state requested affirmation of the sentence.

What happened next: the court took the arguments and concluded the oral argument session; no ruling is recorded in the transcript provided.