Texas Supreme Court hears dispute over interlocutory appeals of venue in multi‑plaintiff suits

The Supreme Court of Texas heard argument in Rush Truck Centers v. Sayre on whether courts of appeals may entertain interlocutory appeals of venue rulings in multi‑plaintiff cases under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §15.003, and how that statute should be read alongside §15.064.

The question could affect where multi‑party suits proceed and when parties may seek immediate review. Petitioners’ counsel, Mr. Grafton, argued that the statute’s text grants an interlocutory right when a trial court makes a determination that a plaintiff did or did not "independently establish proper venue," and that the legislature enacted §15.003 in 2003 as a specific exception to the general bar on interlocutory venue appeals in §15.064. "The language is plain and it's clear," Mr. Grafton told the court, urging the justices to apply the statute according to its text.

Respondents’ counsel, Mr. Levinger, told the court that jurisdiction should not lie where the trial court was never asked to—and did not—make plaintiff‑specific determinations. "Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction does not lie when the trial court is not asked to make a determination whether each plaintiff did or did not independently establish venue," he said, arguing that the court of appeals had been treating nearly every multi‑plaintiff case as immediately appealable and that was incorrect.

The justices tested both sides on how to read "independently" and "determination," and on whether a broad construction would generate excessive interlocutory appeals. Justice Young and others pressed the practical consequences: would the petitioner’s reading allow any multi‑plaintiff case to be appealed immediately and thus substantially increase interlocutory appellate traffic? Petitioners responded that the statute is explicit and that courts must not add limitations not present in the text; respondents responded that jurisdiction only follows when the trial court actually makes the plaintiff‑specific finding specified in the statute.

Counsel on both sides cited the statute’s 2003 amendment and the history of appellate treatment: petitioners pointed to decisions from multiple courts of appeals that their reading supports; respondents warned that courts of appeals have been inconsistent and that a plaintiff‑specific determination is necessary for jurisdiction. The bench questioned whether legislative acquiescence to appellate practice since 2003 (appeals began arising in the mid‑2000s) should bear on statutory construction, and whether harmonizing §15.003 and §15.064 is possible without judicial revision.

The issue drew repeated references to prior cases flagged by counsel and the bench (including Jackson v. Jackson and Double Diamond v. Alfonso) and to the legislative history showing the 02/2003 amendment. The argument concluded with the court taking the case under submission.

Because the question turns on statutory construction of interlocutory appeal provisions and on what constitutes a "determination" with respect to each plaintiff, the court’s decision could change the timing of review in multi‑plaintiff venue disputes across Texas.