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Appeals court considers broker’s claim for commission after buyer contacted seller via listing
Summary
Pro se appellant Chris Derico argued entitlement to a 4% sales commission under a listing agreement; appellees said the contract granted only an exclusive right to lease and that the broker’s conduct and license status preclude the claim.
The Appeals Court heard argument in Derico v. 50 Pleasant Realty, LLC (No. 24‑249), in which pro se appellant Chris Derico seeks a broker’s commission after a property sale that he says followed a listing his firm placed.
Derico told the panel that if the listing agreement created an exclusive right to sell, his verified complaint already established entitlement to the contract commission once the deed recorded the sale; he argued that the document’s language (paragraphs 10 and 12, cited at argument) required the owner to pay a 4% commission if a purchaser introduced during the contract term took title. Derico described evidence that a prospective buyer or his wife saw the LoopNet listing, called the number on a sign at the property, met with Derico and his son at the site, and then directly contacted the seller; he argued those facts support payment under either an exclusive‑sale or an implied bilateral contract theory.
Counsel for the appellees responded that the parties contracted for an exclusive right to lease, not an exclusive right to sell; they said the broker’s unilateral extension clause is revocable and, in any event, the owner did not authorize a sales listing. Appellees also noted procedural and factual points: some claims (including a Chapter 93A count) were not preserved in the lower court briefing, and there is a dispute about whether the broker’s license remained active at the time of the transaction. Defense counsel cited Massachusetts authority holding that an owner may contract for exclusive leasing services and that extension language does not automatically convert an exclusive lease marketing agreement into an exclusive right to sell the property, absent clear, unambiguous language or separate consideration for a sale commission.
The justices questioned whether the listing language is ambiguous, whether the word “introduced” in paragraph 10 qualifies the broader language, and whether Derico’s interactions with the buyer constituted the “introduction” the contract requires. The argument concluded and the case was submitted.
