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U.S. Helsinki Commission briefing: Ukrainian officials and experts urge expanded air-defense supplies as Russia escalates missile and drone strikes

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Summary

Ukrainian defense officials and international experts told a U.S. Helsinki Commission briefing that Russia’s rapidly scaling use of missiles and one‑way attack drones has outpaced Ukraine’s air‑defense stocks and urged faster delivery of systems, more munitions, and help building local production and integrated command-and-control.

WASHINGTON — Ukrainian and Western experts told a public briefing hosted by the U.S. Helsinki Commission on July 23 that Russia’s recent escalation in long‑range missiles and massed one‑way attack drones has created an urgent shortfall in Ukraine’s air‑defense capacity.

Major General Boris Kremenitsky, defense attaché at Ukraine’s embassy in Washington, described a surge in combined missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure and said “air defense is really crucial.” He and other panelists warned that the scale and tempo of attacks are increasing and that existing Western supplies, while valuable, are insufficient to protect all population centers and critical nodes.

The briefing assembled three panelists with air‑defense expertise: Major General Boris Kremenitsky (defense attaché, Embassy of Ukraine), Dara Massicot (senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and John Hardy (deputy director, Russia program, Foundation for Defense of Democracies). The moderator was Connor Lewis, policy fellow at the Helsinki Commission; Kyle Parker, chief of staff to the commission’s chairman, opened the session.

Why it matters: Panelists said the combination of higher Russian production, foreign assistance to Moscow, and tactical adaptations designed to saturate or evade defenders are straining Ukraine’s layered defenses. Faster transfers of interceptors and munitions, help fielding integrated command‑and‑control, and support for Ukrainian production of drones and counter‑drone systems were the chief policy recommendations.

Key facts and testimony

- Scale and tactics: Kremenitsky summarized recent trends he said Ukrainian forces are seeing: “They create a strike group of swarm of drones and almost simultaneously attack a specific target,” and Russia has shifted to larger, concentrated salvos rather than dispersed strikes. He gave figures the Ukrainian side has reported for recent months (described as approximate in the briefing): July figures in the thousands of drones (the transcript cites roughly 5,635 in July and 5,230 in June, with individual nights of 723 and 506 drones reported). Kremenitsky warned manufacturers are increasing warhead weight on some strike drones to about 90 kilograms from earlier, smaller warheads.

- Weapons and systems named: Panelists cited a range of ground‑ and air‑based defenses already in use or requested for Ukraine, including Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS‑T (SAMP/T/Scalp family referenced), HAWK, Mistral and various counter‑drone systems. Experts also discussed strike weapons Ukraine seeks to acquire for deeper counter‑force strikes, naming systems such as Storm Shadow/SCALP, ATACMS, and Tomahawk as examples that could reach production sites and launch infrastructure farther inside Russia.

- Production and supply constraints: Dara Massicot said Russia’s supplies of missiles and one‑way attack drones have risen above prewar levels and noted that Iran and North Korea have supplied technologies or systems that Moscow has adapted. ‘‘The dramatic increase in Russian one‑way attack drones . . . have supplemented Russia’s missile stockpiles,’’ Massicot said. John Hardy and others urged Western partners to accelerate transfers and munitions resupply and recommended using U.S. production capacity and allied buy‑and‑back arrangements to get systems to Ukraine faster.

- Command, control and integration: Kremenitsky emphasized that situational awareness and integrated command‑and‑control are force multipliers. He described an open‑architecture Ukrainian situational awareness system called Delta and said integrating sensors and different partner platforms (including Link 16‑capable equipment) is a priority to coordinate multilayered defenses.

- Tactical innovations and training: Panelists highlighted Ukrainian innovation on the battlefield, from improvised mobile firing teams and electronic warfare to repurposing Soviet launchers with Western missiles (a concept they referenced informally). John Hardy and others described examples of technical collaboration between Ukrainian teams and U.S. partners that improved intercept performance.

Panel recommendations and policy options discussed

- Faster supply and more munitions: Panelists urged accelerating deliveries and not limiting assistance to single system pledges. ‘‘It shouldn’t just be one Patriot and done,’’ Hardy said, arguing for bundled assistance that includes interceptors and munitions.

- Enable offensive options to hit launch infrastructure: Multiple panelists said defense alone will be insufficient and urged giving Ukraine capabilities to strike critical production and launch sites deeper in Russia, citing Tomahawk‑class strike options as an example discussed at the briefing.

- Scale Ukrainian production and industry partnerships: Kremenitsky and others urged investment in joint production and localized manufacturing in Ukraine for drones, interceptors and related systems, and noted legal and bureaucratic issues that require government‑to‑government coordination.

- Improve C2 and sensor integration: The panel recommended continued assistance to integrate varied partner systems into unified situational awareness and command networks so defenders can allocate interceptors efficiently.

What was not decided

No formal actions or votes occurred at the briefing. The session was a public, on‑the‑record expert discussion and question‑and‑answer session; panelists and attendees debated options and urged policy steps but did not adopt or commit to specific U.S. government actions beyond public recommendations.

Ending

Speakers concluded by reiterating that Ukraine’s defenders are adapting rapidly but require expanded Western assistance and industrial cooperation to sustain a layered, integrated air defense over time. The panel encouraged further technical collaboration and faster transfer of munitions and systems to Ukraine while cultivating local production and improved command‑and‑control integration.