Control center audit finds staffing, training and procedural gaps; 9 findings, 3 recommendations issued

A Washington Metrorail Safety Commission audit released Aug. 27, 2025, of MetroRail’s control center and rail operations identified nine findings and three recommendations, WMSC staff told commissioners at the Sept. 16 public meeting.

The audit documented operational improvements — for example, new control center equipment and recorded ambient audio at consoles — but found persistent shortfalls in staffing, training, procedural compliance and documentation. John O'Donnell, who presented the audit, emphasized that while MetroRail has made improvements tied to earlier WMSC corrective action plans, more work is required to sustain staffing and training gains.

Key findings

- Staffing shortfall and turnover: The audit found that MetroRail has not maintained the rail traffic controller staffing level its own assessments identified as the minimum (61). Staffing has varied; the audit reported peaks of 51 controllers in March 2024 and a count of 46 at report time. WMSC concluded additional actions are needed to resolve sustained staffing and retention issues.

- Training and assessment inconsistencies: The audit identified cases where students failed written tests during courses but later passed practical exams and were certified. The review found instances from June–Nov. 2024 where written assessments conflicted with final practical exam results, and noted that paired-console certification practices make it harder to assess individual trainee aptitude.

- Refresher training gaps for vehicle operators: MetroRail provided incident and emergency training during initial qualification but did not provide refresher training to all vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies.

- Undefined “train the trainer” procedures: The audit reported insufficient evidence of a defined train‑the‑trainer program that documents instructor onboarding, evaluation and coaching.

- Procedure communication lapses: The audit found instances in which Automatic Train Control local procedures were revised without reaching rail traffic controllers, creating risk that field personnel would follow outdated procedures.

- Console manipulation and alarm/display practices: WMSC documented console manipulations — instances where other personnel remotely altered a rail traffic controller’s console without documented coordination — and reviewed data showing four instances from Nov. 1, 2023–Nov. 1, 2024. The audit also recommended standardizing alarm displays across consoles and training personnel on console alarm setup.

- Use of Microsoft Teams chat during events: The audit found MetroRail uses Microsoft Teams chats during unfolding events but has not demonstrated systematic review of those chats when investigating incidents; the WMSC reminded MetroRail that instant messages are a required source of evidence under the program standard.

Recommendations and next steps

The audit included three recommendations: separate incident management and communications leadership during major service disruptions, standardize RTC alarm displays and training, and evaluate the effectiveness of line platform instructors. MetroRail has until Sept. 26 to propose draft corrective action plans addressing the audit’s findings and recommendations.

O'Donnell told commissioners the WMSC will review MetroRail’s CAP proposals and continue audits and inspections to verify improvements. Commissioners asked staff to provide follow-up briefings on training matrices and whether an overarching, systemwide training program exists across departments.