House Homeland Security subcommittee hears industry calls to expand counter‑drone authorities

The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security held a hearing on drone warfare tactics used abroad and how those tactics are reshaping threats to the U.S. homeland, with industry witnesses urging Congress to expand authorities, funding, and training for detection and mitigation systems.

The hearing focused on the rapid proliferation of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in conflicts such as Ukraine and the Middle East and the risk that techniques, tactics and commercially available components can be adapted by terrorists, lone actors or state proxies inside the United States. Chairman Jimenez opened the session by warning that "We cannot afford to be reactive. The time to act is now." He and several members cited recent incidents — including unauthorized drone activity near airports, the July flood response in Texas where a privately operated drone struck a rescue helicopter, and repeated sightings over New Jersey — as evidence of growing domestic risk.

Industry witnesses presented both capability assessments and policy recommendations. Church Hutton, chief growth officer at AeroVironment, said the defense industrial base has tools and experience from overseas deployments and warned: "Collectively, we'll either address these issues now before we suffer a major drone attack in the homeland, or we'll address them afterward." Tom Walker, chief executive officer of DroneUp, urged creation of an integrated, real‑time airspace management system that fuses Remote ID, flight authorizations and authenticated operator credentials, saying, "The technology to keep Americans safe exists today." Brett Feddersen, vice president for strategy and government affairs at Defend Solutions, told the panel that "the industry agrees an attack is only a matter of time. It is not a matter of if it will happen," and called for expanded authorities with training and oversight. Michael Robbins, president and CEO of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), emphasized economic and public‑safety benefits of UAS while urging Congress to modernize policy: "This is not a technology problem. AUVSI member companies ... have built and deployed proven effective solutions for detection, identification, and mitigation of rogue drones."

Witnesses and members repeatedly called out gaps in existing authorities. Multiple speakers described the 2018 federal authorization as limited and repeatedly renewed in short increments; witnesses said that current law gives only a handful of federal agencies (DHS, DOJ, DOD, DOE in tightly circumscribed circumstances) the authority to disrupt or disable rogue drones and that state and local law enforcement generally lack mitigation authority. Members and witnesses discussed the need for statutory changes that would (a) expand detection authority broadly, (b) expand mitigation authority more narrowly with mandatory training and oversight, and (c) provide dedicated grant funding so state, local and infrastructure operators can acquire, test and operate counter‑UAS systems.

Panelists and members offered additional prescriptions: deploy a national real‑time flight information exchange and low‑altitude airspace coordination system, bind pilot, platform and mission data using cryptographic credentials to reduce spoofing, publish FAA mission priority tables, and create federally accredited counter‑UAS training curricula so delegated authorities have consistent certification standards. Several witnesses stressed the need for layered sensor fusion (radar, RF, acoustic) to create an integrated air domain awareness picture, and for federal test and evaluation results or an approved equipment list so critical infrastructure operators can buy systems known to be safe in the National Airspace System.

Members pressed witnesses on practical concerns. Representative Pfluger (TX) and others asked whether major events such as the 2026 World Cup and 2028 Olympics should be staged in domed venues to reduce drone risk; Hutton said he would follow up and "be happy to" help amplify that recommendation. Lawmakers also raised incidents that highlight operational risk: a deputy testified that FAA and military data show hundreds of unauthorized airport incursions and dozens of overflights of military installations in recent years; one witness said the FAA recorded more than 400 illegal incursions over U.S. airports in 2025 and the military had reported roughly 350 unauthorized flights over more than 100 bases (figures given during testimony).

Members and witnesses also discussed cybersecurity and supply‑chain concerns. Several witnesses warned about data and control risks associated with foreign‑manufactured platforms, naming DJI as a dominant commercial supplier. Panelists said platforms that connect via Wi‑Fi, Bluetooth or cellular links can present cyber vulnerabilities and proposed cryptographic credentialing and tighter digital authorization services to reduce such risks.

There were no formal votes or policy actions taken at the hearing. Witnesses agreed to provide follow‑up material and several offered to meet with the subcommittee staff in classified sessions to discuss operational details. Chairman Jimenez closed by asking witnesses to assist subcommittee staff in mapping interagency and committee jurisdictions so Congress can pursue coordinated legislation. The hearing record will remain open for 10 days for additional written responses.

Ending: The subcommittee signaled intent to pursue legislative options to expand authorities, funding and training for counter‑UAS capabilities; staff will collect additional written testimony and classified follow‑ups as lawmakers consider possible statutory changes.