The North Dakota Supreme Court heard oral argument June 5, 2025, in State of North Dakota v. Solomon (file no. 20250021) over whether the district court erred by setting a criminal trial outside the state’s statutory 90‑day speedy‑trial period and by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

The case matters because it asks whether an appellate court may, on de novo review, add up a district court’s factual findings to determine “good cause” under the balancing test used in speedy‑trial matters, or whether the case should be remanded for the district court to apply the statutory factors explicitly.

Defense counsel Kiera Krausper argued the district court “didn’t actually do any analysis” under the four‑factor balancing test and therefore the Supreme Court should remand or find a statutory speedy‑trial violation. Krausper told the justices the record shows an asserted 90‑day demand, an initial trial date in mid‑May and later scheduling that left the case roughly 40 days beyond the statutory window (about 130 days total), the withdrawal of the original defense attorney shortly before the May date, and last‑minute production of large discovery materials that she said did not justify overrunning the statutory deadline.

Assistant attorney Nicholas Samuelson, representing the state, said the district court’s factual findings supported a determination of good cause and that counsel for Solomon consented to the July trial date through their lawyer. Samuelson asked the court to take judicial notice of filings in a related matter involving Spencer Mullen and argued, “First that good cause did exist to set the trial more than 90 days ... And second, that Solomon’s consent to the July trial date, albeit through counsel, constituted a waiver of that right.”

Justices pressed both sides on procedure. Several justices asked whether the Supreme Court — under a de novo standard of review — may combine the district court’s factual findings to reach a legal conclusion here or whether remand is the better course to allow the trial court to apply the statutory four‑factor test explicitly. The state argued the record contains “abundant factual findings” that can be weighed on appeal; defense counsel urged that the district court failed to probe the asserted scheduling conflict, including the prosecutor’s precise role in the other case and whether that other case in fact created a true conflict.

Counsel and the justices discussed specific facts in the record: an arraignment that included an assertion of the statutory speedy‑trial right, an initial May 14 trial date, an eventual July trial date, an attorney withdrawal on May 3 that left little time before the May date, and prosecution statements that a member of the prosecutor’s office believed she “was scheduled to be” in another murder trial on the same dates. The defense emphasized that statutory speedy‑trial rights are intended to prevent cases from “drag[ging] on” and argued that mere assertions of scheduling conflicts without detailed inquiry are insufficient to establish good cause.

The court did not rule at the hearing. After arguments, the justices took the case under advisement; no written decision was announced from the bench. The court noted that, as with other oral arguments, a written opinion or order will be posted later.

The court’s collegial panel at the argument included Chief Justice Crothers and Justices Lisa Fair McEvers, Jared Tufte, Douglas Barr and John Jensen; Kiera Krausper spoke for Solomon and Nicholas Samuelson argued for the state.