Tennessee appeals panel hears pro se challenge to Rule 36.1 dismissal in Fletcher case

A three-judge panel of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ Western Section heard oral argument in the appeal of Lamar Fletcher’s Rule 36.1 post-conviction motion, where Fletcher challenged the use of several 1970s convictions to support a habitual-offender life sentence.

Fletcher, appearing pro se, told the panel, “My name is Lamar Fletcher. I'm a pro se. ... I'm here today on the issue of a of a rule 36.1 motion, and that's to correct an illegal sentence.” He said seven prior convictions from the 1972–1975 period were used at a later proceeding to find him a habitual offender and impose mandatory life sentences.

The core issue presented to the panel was whether Fletcher can obtain relief under Rule 36.1 for an allegedly illegal sentence when the underlying prior convictions and the sentences imposed on them long ago have expired. Judge Robert Holloway questioned the appellant about the years and the guilty pleas connected to those prior convictions. Fletcher said he pleaded guilty to the earlier offenses in the 1970s and contended that counsel did not develop evidence that, he said, would have undercut the government's use of the priors at the habitual-offender proceeding.

On behalf of the state, Garrett Ward argued the court should affirm the trial court's summary dismissal. “This court must affirm ... the trial court summary dismissal of Mister Fletcher's Rule 36.1 motion for 3 independent reasons,” Ward told the panel. He told the judges that, according to the record and Fletcher's filings, the sentences Fletcher seeks to attack were imposed in the mid-1970s and had long since expired, and that Wooten and later amendments to Rule 36.1 limit the availability of relief for the kind of claim Fletcher advances.

Ward told the court that Rule 36.1 was amended in February 2015 to foreclose relief when the illegality alleged is a benefit derived from a plea bargain (for example, concurrent rather than consecutive service of sentences) and that the advisory commission specifically addressed the situation Fletcher raises. He also cited Wooten, an opinion that addressed whether Rule 36.1 relief is available for expired sentences, and argued the amendment and caselaw together support dismissal.

Fletcher responded that he lacked counsel and did not have access to trial records that might support his claim, and that Wooten and other precedents addressing collateral attacks on habitual-offender sentences left unresolved questions for his case. He told the court he had tried to explain at the trial-court level why he should have further proceedings and that the lower court’s two-line order summarily found he had not stated a claim.

The judges discussed the legal distinctions between attacks on guilt versus attacks on sentence legality, the effect of an expired sentence on Rule 36.1 relief, and whether the particular illegality Fletcher alleges — the use of earlier convictions at the habitual-offender proceeding — is the sort of claim barred by the 2015 amendment. The panel did not announce a decision from the bench during the hearing.

The court adjourned the session; no ruling on the appeal was recorded on the transcript.