Virginia presenters say law broadly shields first responders who give naloxone in good faith

Tim Spencer, Roanoke city attorney and a member of the Opioid Abatement Authority Board of Directors, told attendees that Virginia law provides several layers of civil-immunity protections for police officers and other first responders who administer naloxone in emergencies.

Spencer said the first and strongest protection is the state Good Samaritan statute. He described Virginia Code §8.01-225 as providing broad immunity for "police officers, first responders, who in good faith" administer naloxone to someone believed to be experiencing a life‑threatening opioid overdose, and he emphasized that the immunity applies unless the act results from "gross negligence or willful misconduct." "As long as you're trying to help or aid the individual, you're gonna be found to have acted in good faith," Spencer said.

Spencer reviewed federal and state case law the panel cited as illustrative. He said a federal trial court in Harrison v. Prince William County Police Department applied Virginia's Good Samaritan protection to shield individuals providing emergency care without compensation. He also discussed a state appellate matter referred to in the presentation (identified in the session as the "Stutes" case), which the speakers said defined "good faith" broadly and found that plaintiffs must show bad faith—not merely negligence—to overcome the statutory immunity.

In addition to the statutory Good Samaritan protection, Spencer described two other doctrines that can protect responding employees: derivative sovereign immunity under Virginia common law and qualified immunity in federal civil rights litigation. He said derivative sovereign immunity can shield an employee performing a governmental function from liability for ordinary negligence, but not for gross negligence. He characterized qualified immunity as a separate federal-law protection that applies unless a response violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Speakers repeatedly urged that the protections hinge on acting in an emergency and with appropriate training, and they recommended that agencies maintain approved naloxone training programs. Spencer cited Virginia Code section 9.1-101 in connection with approved training for first responders as a condition for certain statutory protections mentioned earlier in the talk.

The presenters did not identify any recent Virginia decision that removes these protections for typical naloxone administration; however, they cautioned that extreme intentional misconduct would not be protected. Spencer offered an extreme hypothetical—an officer administering naloxone knowing the recipient had told the officer it would be deadly—as an example of conduct likely to be treated as bad faith and not covered by the immunity.

Ending

Panelists directed attendees to take approved training and noted that the legal protections discussed are civil‑law defenses; they did not claim absolute immunity in all circumstances and said factual questions in any particular case could affect outcomes.