Panel at U.S. Helsinki Commission briefing urges U.S. engagement as Armenia and Azerbaijan finalize peace text

WASHINGTON — At a briefing hosted by the U.S. Helsinki Commission on May 15, 2025, parliamentarians from Armenia and scholars urged U.S. officials to press for rapid signing and implementation of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan while offering a mix of diplomatic incentives and pressure to reduce the risk of renewed hostilities.

Ms. Karapetian, a parliamentarian with the Armenia–U.S. parliamentary friendship group in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, said the two countries completed the full text of a peace agreement in March 2025 and that Armenia is ready to sign. "We believe that the signing of the peace agreement needs to accompany this joint application to the OSCE to ensure that a signed peace agreement will immediately and permanently take the place of the already obsolete conflict mechanisms," she said.

The panelists described two outstanding conditions cited by Azerbaijan: a joint request to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to dissolve the conflict-era mechanisms and constitutional amendments in Armenia to remove language Azerbaijan regards as territorial claims. Ms. Karapetian said Armenia prefers the two steps proceed together — signing the treaty and applying jointly to the OSCE — to avoid replacing one set of conflict mechanisms with another.

Why it matters: Experts at the briefing framed a signed interstate treaty as the essential first step to stabilize the South Caucasus, reopen transport and trade links known as the Middle Corridor, and create space for reconciliation and return of displaced persons. Without a signed agreement, panelists warned of continuing instability that external actors could exploit.

Dr. Jennifer Wustran, an anthropologist and former deputy director at the Kennan Institute, cautioned against framing the conflict as a religious one. "I do not think that this has ever or is now about Christians versus Muslims," she said, noting long-standing mixed populations and historical socioeconomic drivers of tension. Dr. Wustran urged patient, multi-year work to build trust on the ground once interstate arrangements are in place.

Garo, identified by the panel as a visiting scholar and former member of the Turkish parliament, told commissioners the United States should press Turkey to open its border with Armenia and encourage Ankara to use its influence with Baku. "Turkey should open the border and establish formal diplomatic relations with Armenia as soon as possible," he said, adding that an open border would benefit all parties by creating new trade and transit routes.

Several panelists recommended concrete steps for U.S. policy. Dr. Kapayem, who spoke on U.S.–Armenia strategic ties, presented three legislative and executive measures she said Congress and the administration should consider: increased bilateral security cooperation and foreign military financing for Armenia; programs to strengthen Armenian economic links and attract U.S. investment in sectors such as IT and energy; and a system of "trigger sanctions" aimed at Azerbaijan's political and military elite in case of renewed hostile actions. "Trigger sanctions are not designed to serve a punitive purpose, but rather to outline the risks that should Baku continue to engage in hostile actions," she said.

Panelists also debated Russia’s role. Several witnesses said Moscow prefers a frozen-conflict model because a lasting peace would reduce its leverage in the region. "Russia absolutely is not interested in a peace deal," one expert said, arguing that Moscow benefits strategically from persistent instability.

Audience participants raised questions about justice, accountability and the rights of displaced populations. A member of the audience asked how Armenia could sign a treaty while Azerbaijan continued to detain people, carry out ceasefire violations and occupy territory. Panelists responded that a signed interstate treaty would create the legal and political framework to address those concerns and that, in their view, rejecting the treaty until every grievance is resolved risks falling into tactics that could indefinitely delay peace.

There were no formal votes or decisions at the briefing. Speakers and commissioners framed the event as an exchange of analysis and recommendations to inform U.S. engagement options.

Next steps noted by witnesses included sustained U.S. diplomatic engagement with Turkey and Azerbaijan, incremental U.S. security and economic assistance to Armenia, and use of calibrated sanctions as a deterrent against renewed military action. Panelists emphasized that implementation on the ground — demining, demarcation of borders, transportation links and cultural-protection provisions — would take time after any signing and would require international monitoring and stepwise confidence-building measures.

Ending: The panel concluded by calling the moment "historic" and urging the United States to combine diplomatic pressure and incentives to translate the draft text into a signed, enforceable treaty that can open the South Caucasus to trade and transit while addressing security and humanitarian concerns.