The Supreme Court of Alabama heard oral arguments on an appeal by 790 Montclair LLC challenging the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction that would have barred The Station at Crestline Heights LLC from making a curb cut and ADA crosswalk on Dan Hudson Drive, a lawyer for 790 Montclair said.

The dispute centers on the meaning of a 2018 reciprocal easement created when a hospital campus was split and whether the easement language for "access facilities" and Exhibit C allows the Station to alter sidewalks and curbs without 790 Montclair's written consent. The question matters for the parties' property rights and for a development the appellees say cost roughly $60 million and is substantially complete.

At argument, Carl Smiley, attorney for 790 Montclair LLC, told the court the principal issue is interpretation of an unambiguous easement. "This case is about the meaning and effect of an unambiguous easement," Smiley said, arguing that the trial court misconstrued the easement and therefore abused its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction. Smiley asked the court to rule that the phrase "access facilities" in the 2018 easement includes sidewalks and the curb segment that the Station removed and replaced when creating the new entrance. "We need a ruling that access facilities as used in the 2018 easement includes that sidewalk and curb that the station demolished and replaced," Smiley said.

Patrick Miller, attorney for the Station at Crestline Heights LLC and the other appellees, urged the court to defer to the trial court's balancing of equities. "The 2018 easement gives the station a express easement for ingress, egress, and access using Dan Hudson Drive," Miller said, pointing to section 2(a) of the agreement and to a "notwithstanding" provision that he said preserves the Station's right to use the identified access facilities so long as it does not materially interfere with others' easement rights. Miller argued the trial court found no evidence the curb cut and crosswalk would "materially interfere" with 790 Montclair's use and that injunctive relief was therefore improper.

Justices repeatedly pressed both sides on practical and factual details. Justice Sellers asked Smiley for a quantification of damages and whether the plaintiff had identified specific harms; Smiley replied the harm is the infringement on 790 Montclair's property rights and the need for a correct construction of the easement, and he noted other lots on Dan Hudson Drive could be affected if the easement is misread. Justice Cook questioned whether Exhibit C was intended to be limiting, noting the drawing on Exhibit C was prepared by counsel for 790 Montclair; Smiley acknowledged counsel's involvement but argued the contract language "including but not limited to" expands the exhibit's scope.

The parties disputed timing and remedy. Miller told the court the Station had expended tens of millions on construction before the TRO was lifted; he said the curb cut and crosswalk are reasonable and necessary for the Station's use of its express easement and cited precedent the trial court relied on in denying injunctive relief. The argument record shows the trial court earlier entered a temporary restraining order, required a bond, increased the bond, and the TRO was later lifted after the bond was not posted; the Station continued construction using alternative access. Miller said the trial court correctly weighed the equities and noted authorities such as Alabama Power v. Drummond and Toomey v. Riverside RV Resort in urging that minor infringements do not always justify removal or injunctive relief.

Smiley told the court that even if the Supreme Court were to leave substantive relief to the trial court, 790 Montclair is entitled to a correct legal interpretation and that equitable remedies short of removal may still be appropriate if the easement is found infringed. He cited Alabama Power v. Drummond as an example of a trial court fashioning remedial relief other than outright removal.

The justices explored public-safety arguments and local permitting. Justice Sellers asked whether any provision in the easement created a public-safety exception; counsel for 790 Montclair said he did not find such an exception in the easement and emphasized that the Station's design choice, not an inherent access necessity, drove the need for a second means of vehicular access. Miller responded that Birmingham required two means of access for the size and design of the development and that the curb cut served that municipal requirement.

The appeal before the court is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction and whether the trial court correctly construed the easement as a matter of law. The argument concluded with both sides asking the court to reverse or to affirm based on those standards; the record includes testimony and exhibits introduced at the trial level, including testimony from a 30(b)(6) corporate representative and from a Louisiana lawyer called by 790 Montclair who testified about intent.

The oral argument concluded with the justices taking a short recess; no decision was announced from the bench. The trial-court denial of preliminary injunctive relief remains the operative interlocutory outcome, and the record shows related claims, including a tortious-interference claim and a potential request for permanent injunctive relief, remain pending in the trial court.